1 files changed, 1 insertions, 27 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c
index 4fd92eb04e..3b29364586 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/evp/e_chacha20poly1305.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.21 2019/03/27 15:34:01 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: e_chacha20poly1305.c,v 1.22 2022/08/20 18:51:09 jsing Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2015 Reyk Floter <reyk@openbsd.org>
@@ -124,21 +124,8 @@ aead_chacha20_poly1305_seal(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
         poly1305_state poly1305;
         const unsigned char *iv;
-        const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
         uint64_t ctr;
 
-        /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
-         * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
-         * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
-         * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
-         * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
-         * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
-         * the warning. */
-        if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
-                EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
-                return 0;
-        }
-
         if (max_out_len < in_len + c20_ctx->tag_len) {
                 EVPerror(EVP_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
                 return 0;
@@ -188,7 +175,6 @@ aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         unsigned char poly1305_key[32];
         const unsigned char *iv = nonce;
         poly1305_state poly1305;
-        const uint64_t in_len_64 = in_len;
         size_t plaintext_len;
         uint64_t ctr = 0;
 
@@ -197,18 +183,6 @@ aead_chacha20_poly1305_open(const EVP_AEAD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                 return 0;
         }
 
-        /* The underlying ChaCha implementation may not overflow the block
-         * counter into the second counter word. Therefore we disallow
-         * individual operations that work on more than 2TB at a time.
-         * in_len_64 is needed because, on 32-bit platforms, size_t is only
-         * 32-bits and this produces a warning because it's always false.
-         * Casting to uint64_t inside the conditional is not sufficient to stop
-         * the warning. */
-        if (in_len_64 >= (1ULL << 32) * 64 - 64) {
-                EVPerror(EVP_R_TOO_LARGE);
-                return 0;
-        }
-
         if (nonce_len != ctx->aead->nonce_len) {
                 EVPerror(EVP_R_IV_TOO_LARGE);
                 return 0;