1 files changed, 1 insertions, 22 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
index 8160014b3b..52f5044997 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/ecdsa/ecdsa.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ecdsa.c,v 1.17 2023/08/03 18:53:56 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ecdsa.c,v 1.18 2023/08/08 13:09:28 tb Exp $ */
 /* ====================================================================
  * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -341,27 +341,6 @@ ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *in_ctx, BIGNUM **out_kinv, BIGNUM **out_r)
                 if (!bn_rand_interval(k, 1, order))
                         goto err;
 
-                /*
-                 * We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
-                 * so we compute G * k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
-                 * bit-length.
-                 *
-                 * We unconditionally perform both of these additions to prevent
-                 * a small timing information leakage.  We then choose the sum
-                 * that is one bit longer than the order.  This guarantees the
-                 * code path used in the constant time implementations
-                 * elsewhere.
-                 *
-                 * TODO: revisit the bn_copy aiming for a memory access agnostic
-                 * conditional copy.
-                 */
-                if (!BN_add(r, k, order) ||
-                    !BN_add(x, r, order) ||
-                    !bn_copy(k, BN_num_bits(r) > order_bits ? r : x))
-                        goto err;
-
-                BN_set_flags(k, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
                 /* Step 5: P = k * G. */
                 if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
                         ECerror(ERR_R_EC_LIB);