77 files changed, 8629 insertions, 43 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/des/FILES0 b/src/lib/libcrypto/des/FILES0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c7ea2de7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/des/FILES0
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/* General stuff */
+COPYRIGHT       - Copyright info.
+MODES.DES       - A description of the features of the different modes of DES.
+FILES           - This file.
+INSTALL         - How to make things compile.
+Imakefile       - For use with kerberos.
+README          - What this package is.
+VERSION         - Which version this is and what was changed.
+KERBEROS        - Kerberos version 4 notes.
+Makefile.PL     - An old makefile to build with perl5, not current.
+Makefile.ssl    - The SSLeay makefile
+Makefile.uni    - The normal unix makefile.
+GNUmakefile     - The makefile for use with glibc.
+makefile.bc     - A Borland C makefile
+times           - Some outputs from 'speed' on some machines.
+vms.com         - For use when compiling under VMS
+
+/* My SunOS des(1) replacement */
+des.c           - des(1) source code.
+des.man         - des(1) manual.
+
+/* Testing and timing programs. */
+destest.c       - Source for libdes.a test program.
+speed.c         - Source for libdes.a timing program.
+rpw.c           - Source for libdes.a testing password reading routines.
+
+/* libdes.a source code */
+des_crypt.man   - libdes.a manual page.
+des.h           - Public libdes.a header file.
+ecb_enc.c       - des_ecb_encrypt() source, this contains the basic DES code.
+ecb3_enc.c      - des_ecb3_encrypt() source.
+cbc_ckm.c       - des_cbc_cksum() source.
+cbc_enc.c       - des_cbc_encrypt() source.
+ncbc_enc.c      - des_cbc_encrypt() that is 'normal' in that it copies
+                  the new iv values back in the passed iv vector.
+ede_enc.c       - des_ede3_cbc_encrypt() cbc mode des using triple DES.
+cbc3_enc.c      - des_3cbc_encrypt() source, don't use this function.
+cfb_enc.c       - des_cfb_encrypt() source.
+cfb64enc.c      - des_cfb64_encrypt() cfb in 64 bit mode but setup to be
+                  used as a stream cipher.
+cfb64ede.c      - des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt() cfb in 64 bit mode but setup to be
+                  used as a stream cipher and using triple DES.
+ofb_enc.c       - des_cfb_encrypt() source.
+ofb64_enc.c     - des_ofb_encrypt() ofb in 64 bit mode but setup to be
+                  used as a stream cipher.
+ofb64ede.c      - des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt() ofb in 64 bit mode but setup to be
+                  used as a stream cipher and using triple DES.
+enc_read.c      - des_enc_read() source.
+enc_writ.c      - des_enc_write() source.
+pcbc_enc.c      - des_pcbc_encrypt() source.
+qud_cksm.c      - quad_cksum() source.
+rand_key.c      - des_random_key() source.
+read_pwd.c      - Source for des_read_password() plus related functions.
+set_key.c       - Source for des_set_key().
+str2key.c       - Covert a string of any length into a key.
+fcrypt.c        - A small, fast version of crypt(3).
+des_locl.h      - Internal libdes.a header file.
+podd.h          - Odd parity tables - used in des_set_key().
+sk.h            - Lookup tables used in des_set_key().
+spr.h           - What is left of the S tables - used in ecb_encrypt().
+des_ver.h       - header file for the external definition of the
+                  version string.
+des.doc         - SSLeay documentation for the library.
+
+/* The perl scripts - you can ignore these files they are only
+ * included for the curious */
+des.pl          - des in perl anyone? des_set_key and des_ecb_encrypt
+                  both done in a perl library.
+testdes.pl      - Testing program for des.pl
+doIP            - Perl script used to develop IP xor/shift code.
+doPC1           - Perl script used to develop PC1 xor/shift code.
+doPC2           - Generates sk.h.
+PC1             - Output of doPC1 should be the same as output from PC1.
+PC2             - used in development of doPC2.
+shifts.pl       - Perl library used by my perl scripts.
+
+/* I started making a perl5 dynamic library for libdes
+ * but did not fully finish, these files are part of that effort. */
+DES.pm
+DES.pod
+DES.xs
+t
+typemap
+
+/* The following are for use with sun RPC implementaions. */
+rpc_des.h
+rpc_enc.c
+
+/* The following are contibuted by Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za>.  They
+ * are not normally built into libdes due to machine specific routines
+ * contained in them.  They are for use in the most recent incarnation of
+ * export kerberos v 4 (eBones). */
+supp.c
+new_rkey.c
+
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/hw_sureware.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/hw_sureware.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fca467e690
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/hw_sureware.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1039 @@
+/* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com)
+* 
+*
+* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+* are met:
+*
+* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+*
+* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+*    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+*    distribution.
+*
+* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+*    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+*    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+*    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+*
+* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+*    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+*    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+*    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+*
+* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+*    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+*    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+*
+* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+*    acknowledgment:
+*    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+*    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+*
+* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com)
+*
+* Copyright@2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
+* All right Reserved.
+*                                                                                                                                                                                               *       
+*               THIS FILE IS PROVIDED BY BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES ``AS IS'' AND                                                                                                                                                   *
+*               ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE                                   * 
+*               IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE                              *
+*               ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES BE LIABLE                                             *
+*               FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL                              *
+*               DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS                                 *
+*               OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)                                   *
+*               HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT                              *
+*               LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY                               *
+*               OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF                                  *
+*               SUCH DAMAGE.                                                                                                                                                    *
+====================================================================*/
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include "eng_int.h"
+#include "engine.h"
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
+
+#ifdef FLAT_INC
+#include "sureware.h"
+#else
+#include "vendor_defns/sureware.h"
+#endif
+
+#define SUREWARE_LIB_NAME "sureware engine"
+#include "hw_sureware_err.c"
+
+static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
+static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+        const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to,
+                        RSA *rsa,int padding);
+static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to,
+                            RSA *rsa,int padding);
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
+
+/* KM stuff */
+static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+        UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+        UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+        int idx,long argl, void *argp);
+#if 0
+static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+        int idx,long argl, void *argp);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
+static int surewarehk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+        return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD surewarehk_rsa =
+        {
+        "SureWare RSA method",
+        NULL, /* pub_enc*/
+        NULL, /* pub_dec*/
+        surewarehk_rsa_sign, /* our rsa_sign is OpenSSL priv_enc*/
+        surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec, /* priv_dec*/
+        NULL, /*mod_exp*/
+        surewarehk_mod_exp_mont, /*mod_exp_mongomery*/
+        NULL, /* init*/
+        NULL, /* finish*/
+        0,      /* RSA flag*/
+        NULL, 
+        NULL, /* OpenSSL sign*/
+        NULL  /* OpenSSL verify*/
+        };
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the dh and mont dropped). */
+static int surewarehk_modexp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+        const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+        return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+
+static DH_METHOD surewarehk_dh =
+        {
+        "SureWare DH method",
+        NULL,/*gen_key*/
+        NULL,/*agree,*/
+        surewarehk_modexp_dh, /*dh mod exp*/
+        NULL, /* init*/
+        NULL, /* finish*/
+        0,    /* flags*/
+        NULL 
+        };
+#endif
+
+static RAND_METHOD surewarehk_rand =
+        {
+        /* "SureWare RAND method", */
+        surewarehk_rand_seed,
+        surewarehk_rand_bytes,
+        NULL,/*cleanup*/
+        surewarehk_rand_add,
+        surewarehk_rand_bytes,
+        NULL,/*rand_status*/
+        };
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* DSA stuff */
+static  DSA_SIG * surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+static int surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1,
+                BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m,
+                BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+        BIGNUM t;
+        int to_return = 0;
+        BN_init(&t);
+        /* let rr = a1 ^ p1 mod m */
+        if (!surewarehk_modexp(rr,a1,p1,m,ctx)) goto end;
+        /* let t = a2 ^ p2 mod m */
+        if (!surewarehk_modexp(&t,a2,p2,m,ctx)) goto end;
+        /* let rr = rr * t mod m */
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(rr,rr,&t,m,ctx)) goto end;
+        to_return = 1;
+end:
+        BN_free(&t);
+        return to_return;
+}
+
+static DSA_METHOD surewarehk_dsa =
+        {
+         "SureWare DSA method", 
+        surewarehk_dsa_do_sign,
+        NULL,/*sign setup*/
+        NULL,/*verify,*/
+        surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp,/*mod exp*/
+        NULL,/*bn mod exp*/
+        NULL, /*init*/
+        NULL,/*finish*/
+        0,
+        NULL,
+        };
+#endif
+
+static const char *engine_sureware_id = "sureware";
+static const char *engine_sureware_name = "SureWare hardware engine support";
+
+/* Now, to our own code */
+
+/* As this is only ever called once, there's no need for locking
+ * (indeed - the lock will already be held by our caller!!!) */
+static int bind_sureware(ENGINE *e)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        const DSA_METHOD *meth2;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        const DH_METHOD *meth3;
+#endif
+
+        if(!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_sureware_id) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_sureware_name) ||
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+           !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &surewarehk_rsa) ||
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+           !ENGINE_set_DSA(e, &surewarehk_dsa) ||
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+           !ENGINE_set_DH(e, &surewarehk_dh) ||
+#endif
+           !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &surewarehk_rand) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, surewarehk_destroy) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, surewarehk_init) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, surewarehk_finish) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, surewarehk_ctrl) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_privkey) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_pubkey))
+          return 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        /* We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly
+         * to the cswift-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use
+         * those functions. NB: We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or
+         * anything "more generic" because something like the RSAref
+         * code may not hook properly, and if you own one of these
+         * cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it
+         * anyway! */ 
+        meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+        if (meth1)
+        {
+                surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
+                surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        /* Use the DSA_OpenSSL() method and just hook the mod_exp-ish
+         * bits. */
+        meth2 = DSA_OpenSSL();
+        if (meth2)
+        {
+                surewarehk_dsa.dsa_do_verify = meth2->dsa_do_verify;
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        /* Much the same for Diffie-Hellman */
+        meth3 = DH_OpenSSL();
+        if (meth3)
+        {
+                surewarehk_dh.generate_key = meth3->generate_key;
+                surewarehk_dh.compute_key = meth3->compute_key;
+        }
+#endif
+
+        /* Ensure the sureware error handling is set up */
+        ERR_load_SUREWARE_strings();
+        return 1;
+}
+
+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+        {
+        if(id && (strcmp(id, engine_sureware_id) != 0))
+                return 0;
+        if(!bind_sureware(e))
+                return 0;
+        return 1;
+        }       
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+#else
+static ENGINE *engine_sureware(void)
+        {
+        ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+        if(!ret)
+                return NULL;
+        if(!bind_sureware(ret))
+                {
+                ENGINE_free(ret);
+                return NULL;
+                }
+        return ret;
+        }
+
+void ENGINE_load_sureware(void)
+        {
+        /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
+        ENGINE *toadd = engine_sureware();
+        if(!toadd) return;
+        ENGINE_add(toadd);
+        ENGINE_free(toadd);
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+#endif
+
+/* This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading
+ * the SureWareHook library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an
+ * init() or finish() call (reference counts permitting) and they're
+ * operating with global locks, so this should be thread-safe
+ * implicitly. */
+static DSO *surewarehk_dso = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static int rsaHndidx = -1;      /* Index for KM handle.  Not really used yet. */
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int dsaHndidx = -1;      /* Index for KM handle.  Not really used yet. */
+#endif
+
+/* These are the function pointers that are (un)set when the library has
+ * successfully (un)loaded. */
+static SureWareHook_Init_t *p_surewarehk_Init = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Finish_t *p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Free_t *p_surewarehk_Free=NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec=NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign=NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign=NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp=NULL;
+
+/* Used in the DSO operations. */
+static const char *surewarehk_LIBNAME = "SureWareHook";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Init = "SureWareHook_Init";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Finish = "SureWareHook_Finish";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes="SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed="SureWareHook_Rand_Seed";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey="SureWareHook_Load_Privkey";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey="SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey="SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey="SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Free="SureWareHook_Free";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec="SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign="SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign="SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp="SureWareHook_Mod_Exp";
+static BIO *logstream = NULL;
+
+/* SureWareHook library functions and mechanics - these are used by the
+ * higher-level functions further down. NB: As and where there's no
+ * error checking, take a look lower down where these functions are
+ * called, the checking and error handling is probably down there. 
+*/
+static int threadsafe=1;
+static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
+{
+        int to_return = 1;
+
+        switch(cmd)
+        {
+                case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM:
+                {
+                        BIO *bio = (BIO *)p;
+                        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+                        if (logstream)
+                        {
+                                BIO_free(logstream);
+                                logstream = NULL;
+                        }
+                        if (CRYPTO_add(&bio->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO) > 1)
+                                logstream = bio;
+                        else
+                                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL,SUREWARE_R_BIO_WAS_FREED);
+                }
+                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+                break;
+        /* This will prevent the initialisation function from "installing"
+         * the mutex-handling callbacks, even if they are available from
+         * within the library (or were provided to the library from the
+         * calling application). This is to remove any baggage for
+         * applications not using multithreading. */
+        case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING:
+                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+                threadsafe = 0;
+                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+                break;
+
+        /* The command isn't understood by this engine */
+        default:
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL,
+                        ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+                to_return = 0;
+                break;
+                }
+
+        return to_return;
+}
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_surewarehk()" constructor) */
+static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+        ERR_unload_SUREWARE_strings();
+        return 1;
+}
+
+/* (de)initialisation functions. */
+static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_init";
+        SureWareHook_Init_t *p1=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Finish_t *p2=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p3=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p4=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p5=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p6=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Free_t *p7=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p8=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p9=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p12=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p13=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p14=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p15=NULL;
+
+        if(surewarehk_dso != NULL)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* Attempt to load libsurewarehk.so/surewarehk.dll/whatever. */
+        surewarehk_dso = DSO_load(NULL, surewarehk_LIBNAME, NULL, 0);
+        if(surewarehk_dso == NULL)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if(!(p1=(SureWareHook_Init_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Init)) ||
+           !(p2=(SureWareHook_Finish_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Finish)) ||
+           !(p3=(SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes)) ||
+           !(p4=(SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed)) ||
+           !(p5=(SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey)) ||
+           !(p6=(SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey)) ||
+           !(p7=(SureWareHook_Free_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Free)) ||
+           !(p8=(SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec)) ||
+           !(p9=(SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign)) ||
+           !(p12=(SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign)) ||
+           !(p13=(SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey)) ||
+           !(p14=(SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey)) ||
+           !(p15=(SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp)))
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* Copy the pointers */
+        p_surewarehk_Init = p1;
+        p_surewarehk_Finish = p2;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = p3;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = p4;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = p5;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = p6;
+        p_surewarehk_Free = p7;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = p8;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = p9;
+        p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = p12;
+        p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = p13;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = p14;
+        p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = p15;
+        /* Contact the hardware and initialises it. */
+        if(p_surewarehk_Init(msg,threadsafe)==SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if(p_surewarehk_Init(msg,threadsafe)==SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* try to load the default private key, if failed does not return a failure but
+           wait for an explicit ENGINE_load_privakey */
+        surewarehk_load_privkey(e,NULL,NULL,NULL);
+
+        /* Everything's fine. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (rsaHndidx == -1)
+                rsaHndidx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                                "SureWareHook RSA key handle",
+                                                NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (dsaHndidx == -1)
+                dsaHndidx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                                "SureWareHook DSA key handle",
+                                                NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free);
+#endif
+
+        return 1;
+err:
+        if(surewarehk_dso)
+                DSO_free(surewarehk_dso);
+        surewarehk_dso = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Init = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Free = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+        int to_return = 1;
+        if(surewarehk_dso == NULL)
+                {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH,ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED);
+                to_return = 0;
+                goto err;
+                }
+        p_surewarehk_Finish();
+        if(!DSO_free(surewarehk_dso))
+                {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+                to_return = 0;
+                goto err;
+                }
+ err:
+        if (logstream)
+                BIO_free(logstream);
+        surewarehk_dso = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Init = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Free = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL;
+        return to_return;
+}
+
+static void surewarehk_error_handling(char *const msg,int func,int ret)
+{
+        switch (ret)
+        {
+                case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
+                        break;
+                case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+                        break;
+                case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_SIZE_TOO_LARGE_OR_TOO_SMALL);
+                        break;
+                case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_INVALID_PAD:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+                        break;
+                default:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+                        break;
+                case 1:/*nothing*/
+                        msg[0]='\0';
+        }
+        if (*msg)
+        {
+                ERR_add_error_data(1,msg);
+                if (logstream)
+                {
+                        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+                        BIO_write(logstream, msg, strlen(msg));
+                        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+                }
+        }
+}
+
+static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+        int ret=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_rand_bytes";
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes(msg,buf, num);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES,ret);
+        }
+        return ret==1 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+{
+        int ret=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_rand_seed";
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed(msg,buf, num);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED,ret);
+        }
+}
+
+static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
+{
+        surewarehk_rand_seed(buf,num);
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY* sureware_load_public(ENGINE *e,const char *key_id,char *hptr,unsigned long el,char keytype)
+{
+        EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        RSA *rsatmp = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        DSA *dsatmp=NULL;
+#endif
+        char msg[64]="sureware_load_public";
+        int ret=0;
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey || !p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        switch (keytype)
+        {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        case 1: /*RSA*/
+                /* set private external reference */
+                rsatmp = RSA_new_method(e);
+                RSA_set_ex_data(rsatmp,rsaHndidx,hptr);
+                rsatmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
+
+                /* set public big nums*/
+                rsatmp->e = BN_new();
+                rsatmp->n = BN_new();
+                bn_expand2(rsatmp->e, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(rsatmp->n, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                if (!rsatmp->e || rsatmp->e->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG))|| 
+                        !rsatmp->n || rsatmp->n->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
+                        goto err;
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey(msg,key_id,el,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)rsatmp->n->d,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)rsatmp->e->d);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ret);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                /* normalise pub e and pub n */
+                rsatmp->e->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(rsatmp->e);
+                rsatmp->n->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(rsatmp->n);
+                /* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */
+                res = EVP_PKEY_new();
+                EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rsatmp);
+                break;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        case 2:/*DSA*/
+                /* set private/public external reference */
+                dsatmp = DSA_new_method(e);
+                DSA_set_ex_data(dsatmp,dsaHndidx,hptr);
+                /*dsatmp->flags |= DSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;*/
+
+                /* set public key*/
+                dsatmp->pub_key = BN_new();
+                dsatmp->p = BN_new();
+                dsatmp->q = BN_new();
+                dsatmp->g = BN_new();
+                bn_expand2(dsatmp->pub_key, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(dsatmp->p, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(dsatmp->q, 20/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(dsatmp->g, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                if (!dsatmp->pub_key || dsatmp->pub_key->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG))|| 
+                        !dsatmp->p || dsatmp->p->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)) ||
+                        !dsatmp->q || dsatmp->q->dmax!=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG) ||
+                        !dsatmp->g || dsatmp->g->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
+                        goto err;
+
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey(msg,key_id,el,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)dsatmp->pub_key->d, 
+                                                 (unsigned long *)dsatmp->p->d,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)dsatmp->q->d,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)dsatmp->g->d);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ret);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                /* set parameters */
+                /* normalise pubkey and parameters in case of */
+                dsatmp->pub_key->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(dsatmp->pub_key);
+                dsatmp->p->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(dsatmp->p);
+                dsatmp->q->top=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(dsatmp->q);
+                dsatmp->g->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(dsatmp->g);
+
+                /* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */
+                res = EVP_PKEY_new();
+                EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(res, dsatmp);
+                break;
+#endif
+
+        default:
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        return res;
+ err:
+        if (res)
+                EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (rsatmp)
+                RSA_free(rsatmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (dsatmp)
+                DSA_free(dsatmp);
+#endif
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+                                         UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+        EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+        int ret=0;
+        unsigned long el=0;
+        char *hptr=NULL;
+        char keytype=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_load_privkey";
+
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey(msg,key_id,&hptr,&el,&keytype);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+                        ERR_add_error_data(1,msg);              
+                }
+                else
+                        res=sureware_load_public(e,key_id,hptr,el,keytype);
+        }
+        return res;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+                                         UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+        EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+        int ret=0;
+        unsigned long el=0;
+        char *hptr=NULL;
+        char keytype=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_load_pubkey";
+
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                /* call once to identify if DSA or RSA */
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey(msg,key_id,&el,&keytype);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
+                        ERR_add_error_data(1,msg);
+                }
+                else
+                        res=sureware_load_public(e,key_id,hptr,el,keytype);
+        }
+        return res;
+}
+
+/* This cleans up an RSA/DSA KM key(do not destroy the key into the hardware)
+, called when ex_data is freed */
+static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+        int idx,long argl, void *argp)
+{
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Free)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_EX_FREE,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+                p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item,0);
+}
+
+#if 0
+/* This cleans up an DH KM key (destroys the key into hardware), 
+called when ex_data is freed */
+static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+        int idx,long argl, void *argp)
+{
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Free)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_EX_FREE,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+                p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item,1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+* return number of decrypted bytes
+*/
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to,
+                        RSA *rsa,int padding)
+{
+        int ret=0,tlen;
+        char *buf=NULL,*hptr=NULL;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_rsa_priv_dec";
+        if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        /* extract ref to private key */
+        else if (!(hptr=RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx)))
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* analyse what padding we can do into the hardware */
+        if (padding==RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+        {
+                /* do it one shot */
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg,flen,(unsigned char *)from,&tlen,to,hptr,SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ret);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                        goto err;
+                ret=tlen;
+        }
+        else /* do with no padding into hardware */
+        {
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg,flen,(unsigned char *)from,&tlen,to,hptr,SUREWARE_NO_PAD);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ret);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                        goto err;
+                /* intermediate buffer for padding */
+                if ((buf=OPENSSL_malloc(tlen)) == NULL)
+                {
+                        RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                memcpy(buf,to,tlen);/* transfert to into buf */
+                switch (padding) /* check padding in software */
+                {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+                case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+                        ret=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,tlen,(unsigned char *)buf,tlen,tlen,NULL,0);
+                        break;
+#endif
+                case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+                        ret=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,tlen,(unsigned char *)buf,flen,tlen);
+                        break;
+                case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                        ret=RSA_padding_check_none(to,tlen,(unsigned char *)buf,flen,tlen);
+                        break;
+                default:
+                        RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                if (ret < 0)
+                        RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+        }
+err:
+        if (buf)
+        {
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,tlen);
+                OPENSSL_free(buf);
+        }
+        return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+* Does what OpenSSL rsa_priv_enc does.
+*/
+static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to,
+                            RSA *rsa,int padding)
+{
+        int ret=0,tlen;
+        char *hptr=NULL;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_rsa_sign";
+        if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        /* extract ref to private key */
+        else if (!(hptr=RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx)))
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                switch (padding)
+                {
+                case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: /* do it in one shot */
+                        ret=p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign(msg,flen,(unsigned char *)from,&tlen,to,hptr,SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD);
+                        surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,ret);
+                        break;
+                case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                default:
+                        RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                }
+        }
+        return ret==1 ? tlen : ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* DSA sign and verify */
+static  DSA_SIG * surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *from, int flen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+        int ret=0;
+        char *hptr=NULL;
+        DSA_SIG *psign=NULL;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_dsa_do_sign";
+        if (!p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        /* extract ref to private key */
+        else if (!(hptr=DSA_get_ex_data(dsa, dsaHndidx)))
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                if((psign = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                psign->r=BN_new();
+                psign->s=BN_new();
+                bn_expand2(psign->r, 20/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(psign->s, 20/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                if (!psign->r || psign->r->dmax!=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG) ||
+                        !psign->s || psign->s->dmax!=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG))
+                        goto err;
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign(msg,flen,from,
+                                          (unsigned long *)psign->r->d,
+                                          (unsigned long *)psign->s->d,
+                                          hptr);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,ret);
+        }
+        psign->r->top=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+        bn_fix_top(psign->r);
+        psign->s->top=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+        bn_fix_top(psign->s);
+
+err:    
+        if (psign)
+        {
+                DSA_SIG_free(psign);
+                psign=NULL;
+        }
+        return psign;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                             const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+        int ret=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_modexp";
+        if (!p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                bn_expand2(r,m->top);
+                if (r && r->dmax==m->top)
+                {
+                        /* do it*/
+                        ret=p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp(msg,
+                                                 m->top*sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+                                                 (unsigned long *)m->d,
+                                                 p->top*sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+                                                 (unsigned long *)p->d,
+                                                 a->top*sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+                                                 (unsigned long *)a->d,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)r->d);
+                        surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MOD_EXP,ret);
+                        if (ret==1)
+                        {
+                                /* normalise result */
+                                r->top=m->top;
+                                bn_fix_top(r);
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+        return ret;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/vendor_defns/hw_ubsec.h b/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/vendor_defns/hw_ubsec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b6619d40f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/vendor_defns/hw_ubsec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  Copyright 2000
+ *  Broadcom Corporation
+ *  16215 Alton Parkway
+ *  PO Box 57013
+ *  Irvine CA 92619-7013
+ *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+/* 
+ * Broadcom Corporation uBSec SDK 
+ */
+/*
+ * Character device header file.
+ */
+/*
+ * Revision History:
+ *
+ * October 2000 JTT Created.
+ */
+
+#define MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_BITS (1024)
+#define MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES (1024/8)
+#define SHA_BIT_SIZE  (160)
+#define MAX_CRYPTO_KEY_LENGTH 24
+#define MAX_MAC_KEY_LENGTH 64
+#define UBSEC_CRYPTO_DEVICE_NAME ((unsigned char *)"/dev/ubscrypt")
+#define UBSEC_KEY_DEVICE_NAME ((unsigned char *)"/dev/ubskey")
+
+/* Math command types. */
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODADD 0x0001
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODSUB 0x0002
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODMUL 0x0004
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODEXP 0x0008
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODREM 0x0010
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODINV 0x0020
+
+typedef long ubsec_MathCommand_t;
+typedef long ubsec_RNGCommand_t;
+
+typedef struct ubsec_crypto_context_s {
+        unsigned int    flags;
+        unsigned char   crypto[MAX_CRYPTO_KEY_LENGTH];
+        unsigned char   auth[MAX_MAC_KEY_LENGTH];
+} ubsec_crypto_context_t, *ubsec_crypto_context_p;
+
+/* 
+ * Predeclare the function pointer types that we dynamically load from the DSO.
+ */
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_ubsec_bytes_to_bits(unsigned char *n, int bytes);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_ubsec_bits_to_bytes(int bits);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_ubsec_open(unsigned char *device);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_ubsec_close(int fd);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_diffie_hellman_generate_ioctl (int fd,
+        unsigned char *x, int *x_len, unsigned char *y, int *y_len, 
+        unsigned char *g, int g_len, unsigned char *m, int m_len,
+        unsigned char *userX, int userX_len, int random_bits);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_diffie_hellman_agree_ioctl (int fd,
+        unsigned char *x, int x_len, unsigned char *y, int y_len, 
+        unsigned char *m, int m_len, unsigned char *k, int *k_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_rsa_mod_exp_ioctl (int fd,
+        unsigned char *x, int x_len, unsigned char *m, int m_len,
+        unsigned char *e, int e_len, unsigned char *y, int *y_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_rsa_mod_exp_crt_ioctl (int fd,
+        unsigned char *x, int x_len, unsigned char *qinv, int qinv_len,
+        unsigned char *edq, int edq_len, unsigned char *q, int q_len,
+        unsigned char *edp, int edp_len, unsigned char *p, int p_len,
+        unsigned char *y, int *y_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_dsa_sign_ioctl (int fd,
+        int hash, unsigned char *data, int data_len, 
+        unsigned char *rndom, int random_len, 
+        unsigned char *p, int p_len, unsigned char *q, int q_len,
+        unsigned char *g, int g_len, unsigned char *key, int key_len,
+        unsigned char *r, int *r_len, unsigned char *s, int *s_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_dsa_verify_ioctl (int fd,
+        int hash, unsigned char *data, int data_len,
+        unsigned char *p, int p_len, unsigned char *q, int q_len,
+        unsigned char *g, int g_len, unsigned char *key, int key_len,
+        unsigned char *r, int r_len, unsigned char *s, int s_len,
+        unsigned char *v, int *v_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_math_accelerate_ioctl(int fd, ubsec_MathCommand_t command,
+        unsigned char *ModN, int *ModN_len, unsigned char *ExpE, int *ExpE_len, 
+        unsigned char *ParamA, int *ParamA_len, unsigned char *ParamB, int *ParamB_len,
+        unsigned char *Result, int *Result_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_rng_ioctl(int fd, ubsec_RNGCommand_t command,
+        unsigned char *Result, int *Result_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_max_key_len_ioctl(int fd, int *max_key_len);
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h b/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aaa4d4575e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+/*
+ * ModExp / RSA (with/without KM) plugin API
+ *
+ * The application will load a dynamic library which
+ * exports entrypoint(s) defined in this file.
+ *
+ * This set of entrypoints provides only a multithreaded,
+ * synchronous-within-each-thread, facility.
+ *
+ *
+ * This file is Copyright 1998-2000 nCipher Corporation Limited.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with opr without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions, and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+ *    copyright notice, this list of conditions, and the following
+ *    disclaimer, in the documentation and/or other materials provided
+ *    with the distribution
+ *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL NCIPHER CORPORATION LIMITED (`NCIPHER') AND/OR
+ * ANY OTHER AUTHORS OR DISTRIBUTORS OF THIS FILE BE LIABLE for any
+ * damages arising directly or indirectly from this file, its use or
+ * this licence.  Without prejudice to the generality of the
+ * foregoing: all liability shall be excluded for direct, indirect,
+ * special, incidental, consequential or other damages or any loss of
+ * profits, business, revenue goodwill or anticipated savings;
+ * liability shall be excluded even if nCipher or anyone else has been
+ * advised of the possibility of damage.  In any event, if the
+ * exclusion of liability is not effective, the liability of nCipher
+ * or any author or distributor shall be limited to the lesser of the
+ * price paid and 1,000 pounds sterling. This licence only fails to
+ * exclude or limit liability for death or personal injury arising out
+ * of negligence, and only to the extent that such an exclusion or
+ * limitation is not effective.
+ *
+ * NCIPHER AND THE AUTHORS AND DISTRIBUTORS SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIM ALL
+ * AND ANY WARRANTIES (WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED), including, but not
+ * limited to, any implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for
+ * a particular purpose, satisfactory quality, and/or non-infringement
+ * of any third party rights.
+ *
+ * US Government use: This software and documentation is Commercial
+ * Computer Software and Computer Software Documentation, as defined in
+ * sub-paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(5) of DFAR 252.227-7014, "Rights in
+ * Noncommercial Computer Software and Noncommercial Computer Software
+ * Documentation."  Use, duplication or disclosure by the Government is
+ * subject to the terms and conditions specified here.
+ *
+ * By using or distributing this file you will be accepting these
+ * terms and conditions, including the limitation of liability and
+ * lack of warranty.  If you do not wish to accept these terms and
+ * conditions, DO NOT USE THE FILE.
+ *
+ *
+ * The actual dynamically loadable plugin, and the library files for
+ * static linking, which are also provided in some distributions, are
+ * not covered by the licence described above.  You should have
+ * received a separate licence with terms and conditions for these
+ * library files; if you received the library files without a licence,
+ * please contact nCipher.
+ *
+ *
+ * $Id: hwcryptohook.h,v 1.1.1.1 2003/05/11 21:35:16 markus Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef HWCRYPTOHOOK_H
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifndef HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES 1
+#endif
+
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FAILED   -1
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK -2
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE  -3
+
+#if HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES
+
+/* These structs are defined by the application and opaque to the
+ * crypto plugin.  The application may define these as it sees fit.
+ * Default declarations are provided here, but the application may
+ *  #define HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES 0
+ * to prevent these declarations, and instead provide its own
+ * declarations of these types.  (Pointers to them must still be
+ * ordinary pointers to structs or unions, or the resulting combined
+ * program will have a type inconsistency.)
+ */
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue HWCryptoHook_Mutex;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_CondVarValue HWCryptoHook_CondVar;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue HWCryptoHook_CallerContext;
+
+#endif /* HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES */
+
+/* These next two structs are opaque to the application.  The crypto
+ * plugin will return pointers to them; the caller simply manipulates
+ * the pointers.
+ */
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_Context *HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_RSAKey *HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle;
+
+typedef struct {
+  char *buf;
+  size_t size;
+} HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf;
+/* Used for error reporting.  When a HWCryptoHook function fails it
+ * will return a sentinel value (0 for pointer-valued functions, or a
+ * negative number, usually HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FAILED, for
+ * integer-valued ones).  It will, if an ErrMsgBuf is passed, also put
+ * an error message there.
+ * 
+ * size is the size of the buffer, and will not be modified.  If you
+ * pass 0 for size you must pass 0 for buf, and nothing will be
+ * recorded (just as if you passed 0 for the struct pointer).
+ * Messages written to the buffer will always be null-terminated, even
+ * when truncated to fit within size bytes.
+ *
+ * The contents of the buffer are not defined if there is no error.
+ */
+
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_MPIStruct {
+  unsigned char *buf;
+  size_t size;
+} HWCryptoHook_MPI;
+/* When one of these is returned, a pointer is passed to the function.
+ * At call, size is the space available.  Afterwards it is updated to
+ * be set to the actual length (which may be more than the space available,
+ * if there was not enough room and the result was truncated).
+ * buf (the pointer) is not updated.
+ *
+ * size is in bytes and may be zero at call or return, but must be a
+ * multiple of the limb size.  Zero limbs at the MS end are not
+ * permitted.
+ */
+
+#define HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_FallbackModExp    0x0002UL
+#define HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_FallbackRSAImmed  0x0004UL
+/* Enable requesting fallback to software in case of problems with the
+ * hardware support.  This indicates to the crypto provider that the
+ * application is prepared to fall back to software operation if the
+ * ModExp* or RSAImmed* functions return HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK.
+ * Without this flag those calls will never return
+ * HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK.  The flag will also cause the crypto
+ * provider to avoid repeatedly attempting to contact dead hardware
+ * within a short interval, if appropriate.
+ */
+
+#define HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck   0x0010UL
+/* Without _SimpleForkCheck the library is allowed to assume that the
+ * application will not fork and call the library in the child(ren).
+ *
+ * When it is specified, this is allowed.  However, after a fork
+ * neither parent nor child may unload any loaded keys or call
+ * _Finish.  Instead, they should call exit (or die with a signal)
+ * without calling _Finish.  After all the children have died the
+ * parent may unload keys or call _Finish.
+ *
+ * This flag only has any effect on UN*X platforms.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+  unsigned long flags;
+  void *logstream; /* usually a FILE*.  See below. */
+
+  size_t limbsize; /* bignum format - size of radix type, must be power of 2 */
+  int mslimbfirst; /* 0 or 1 */
+  int msbytefirst; /* 0 or 1; -1 = native */
+
+  /* All the callback functions should return 0 on success, or a
+   * nonzero integer (whose value will be visible in the error message
+   * put in the buffer passed to the call).
+   *
+   * If a callback is not available pass a null function pointer.
+   *
+   * The callbacks may not call down again into the crypto plugin.
+   */
+  
+  /* For thread-safety.  Set everything to 0 if you promise only to be
+   * singlethreaded.  maxsimultaneous is the number of calls to
+   * ModExp[Crt]/RSAImmed{Priv,Pub}/RSA.  If you don't know what to
+   * put there then say 0 and the hook library will use a default.
+   *
+   * maxmutexes is a small limit on the number of simultaneous mutexes
+   * which will be requested by the library.  If there is no small
+   * limit, set it to 0.  If the crypto plugin cannot create the
+   * advertised number of mutexes the calls to its functions may fail.
+   * If a low number of mutexes is advertised the plugin will try to
+   * do the best it can.  Making larger numbers of mutexes available
+   * may improve performance and parallelism by reducing contention
+   * over critical sections.  Unavailability of any mutexes, implying
+   * single-threaded operation, should be indicated by the setting
+   * mutex_init et al to 0.
+   */
+  int maxmutexes;
+  int maxsimultaneous;
+  size_t mutexsize;
+  int (*mutex_init)(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*, HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+  int (*mutex_acquire)(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
+  void (*mutex_release)(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
+  void (*mutex_destroy)(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
+
+  /* For greater efficiency, can use condition vars internally for
+   * synchronisation.  In this case maxsimultaneous is ignored, but
+   * the other mutex stuff must be available.  In singlethreaded
+   * programs, set everything to 0.
+   */
+  size_t condvarsize;
+  int (*condvar_init)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*, HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+  int (*condvar_wait)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*, HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
+  void (*condvar_signal)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*);
+  void (*condvar_broadcast)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*);
+  void (*condvar_destroy)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*);
+  
+  /* The semantics of acquiring and releasing mutexes and broadcasting
+   * and waiting on condition variables are expected to be those from
+   * POSIX threads (pthreads).  The mutexes may be (in pthread-speak)
+   * fast mutexes, recursive mutexes, or nonrecursive ones.
+   * 
+   * The _release/_signal/_broadcast and _destroy functions must
+   * always succeed when given a valid argument; if they are given an
+   * invalid argument then the program (crypto plugin + application)
+   * has an internal error, and they should abort the program.
+   */
+
+  int (*getpassphrase)(const char *prompt_info,
+                       int *len_io, char *buf,
+                       HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx,
+                       HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+  /* Passphrases and the prompt_info, if they contain high-bit-set
+   * characters, are UTF-8.  The prompt_info may be a null pointer if
+   * no prompt information is available (it should not be an empty
+   * string).  It will not contain text like `enter passphrase';
+   * instead it might say something like `Operator Card for John
+   * Smith' or `SmartCard in nFast Module #1, Slot #1'.
+   *
+   * buf points to a buffer in which to return the passphrase; on
+   * entry *len_io is the length of the buffer.  It should be updated
+   * by the callback.  The returned passphrase should not be
+   * null-terminated by the callback.
+   */
+  
+  int (*getphystoken)(const char *prompt_info,
+                      const char *wrong_info,
+                      HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx,
+                      HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+  /* Requests that the human user physically insert a different
+   * smartcard, DataKey, etc.  The plugin should check whether the
+   * currently inserted token(s) are appropriate, and if they are it
+   * should not make this call.
+   *
+   * prompt_info is as before.  wrong_info is a description of the
+   * currently inserted token(s) so that the user is told what
+   * something is.  wrong_info, like prompt_info, may be null, but
+   * should not be an empty string.  Its contents should be
+   * syntactically similar to that of prompt_info. 
+   */
+  
+  /* Note that a single LoadKey operation might cause several calls to
+   * getpassphrase and/or requestphystoken.  If requestphystoken is
+   * not provided (ie, a null pointer is passed) then the plugin may
+   * not support loading keys for which authorisation by several cards
+   * is required.  If getpassphrase is not provided then cards with
+   * passphrases may not be supported.
+   *
+   * getpassphrase and getphystoken do not need to check that the
+   * passphrase has been entered correctly or the correct token
+   * inserted; the crypto plugin will do that.  If this is not the
+   * case then the crypto plugin is responsible for calling these
+   * routines again as appropriate until the correct token(s) and
+   * passphrase(s) are supplied as required, or until any retry limits
+   * implemented by the crypto plugin are reached.
+   *
+   * In either case, the application must allow the user to say `no'
+   * or `cancel' to indicate that they do not know the passphrase or
+   * have the appropriate token; this should cause the callback to
+   * return nonzero indicating error.
+   */
+
+  void (*logmessage)(void *logstream, const char *message);
+  /* A log message will be generated at least every time something goes
+   * wrong and an ErrMsgBuf is filled in (or would be if one was
+   * provided).  Other diagnostic information may be written there too,
+   * including more detailed reasons for errors which are reported in an
+   * ErrMsgBuf.
+   *
+   * When a log message is generated, this callback is called.  It
+   * should write a message to the relevant logging arrangements.
+   *
+   * The message string passed will be null-terminated and may be of arbitrary
+   * length.  It will not be prefixed by the time and date, nor by the
+   * name of the library that is generating it - if this is required,
+   * the logmessage callback must do it.  The message will not have a
+   * trailing newline (though it may contain internal newlines).
+   *
+   * If a null pointer is passed for logmessage a default function is
+   * used.  The default function treats logstream as a FILE* which has
+   * been converted to a void*.  If logstream is 0 it does nothing.
+   * Otherwise it prepends the date and time and library name and
+   * writes the message to logstream.  Each line will be prefixed by a
+   * descriptive string containing the date, time and identity of the
+   * crypto plugin.  Errors on the logstream are not reported
+   * anywhere, and the default function doesn't flush the stream, so
+   * the application must set the buffering how it wants it.
+   *
+   * The crypto plugin may also provide a facility to have copies of
+   * log messages sent elsewhere, and or for adjusting the verbosity
+   * of the log messages; any such facilities will be configured by
+   * external means.
+   */
+
+} HWCryptoHook_InitInfo;
+
+typedef
+HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle HWCryptoHook_Init_t(const HWCryptoHook_InitInfo *initinfo,
+                                               size_t initinfosize,
+                                               const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors,
+                                               HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+extern HWCryptoHook_Init_t HWCryptoHook_Init;
+
+/* Caller should set initinfosize to the size of the HWCryptoHook struct,
+ * so it can be extended later.
+ *
+ * On success, a message for display or logging by the server,
+ * including the name and version number of the plugin, will be filled
+ * in into *errors; on failure *errors is used for error handling, as
+ * usual.
+ */
+
+/* All these functions return 0 on success, HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FAILED
+ * on most failures.  HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE means at least one of
+ * the output MPI buffer(s) was too small; the sizes of all have been
+ * set to the desired size (and for those where the buffer was large
+ * enough, the value may have been copied in), and no error message
+ * has been recorded.
+ *
+ * You may pass 0 for the errors struct.  In any case, unless you set
+ * _NoStderr at init time then messages may be reported to stderr.
+ */
+
+/* The RSAImmed* functions (and key managed RSA) only work with
+ * modules which have an RSA patent licence - currently that means KM
+ * units; the ModExp* ones work with all modules, so you need a patent
+ * licence in the software in the US.  They are otherwise identical.
+ */
+
+typedef
+void HWCryptoHook_Finish_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx);
+extern HWCryptoHook_Finish_t HWCryptoHook_Finish;
+/* You must not have any calls going or keys loaded when you call this. */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                               unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+                               const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI a,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI p,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI n,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                          const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t HWCryptoHook_ModExp;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPub_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI m,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI e,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI n,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                               const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPub_t HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPub;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI a,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI p,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI q,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI dmp1,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI dmq1,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI iqmp,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                             const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPriv_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI m,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI p,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI q,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI dmp1,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI dmq1,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI iqmp,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                                const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPriv_t HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPriv;
+
+/* The RSAImmed* and ModExp* functions may return E_FAILED or
+ * E_FALLBACK for failure.
+ *
+ * E_FAILED means the failure is permanent and definite and there
+ *    should be no attempt to fall back to software.  (Eg, for some
+ *    applications, which support only the acceleration-only
+ *    functions, the `key material' may actually be an encoded key
+ *    identifier, and doing the operation in software would give wrong
+ *    answers.)
+ *
+ * E_FALLBACK means that doing the computation in software would seem
+ *    reasonable.  If an application pays attention to this and is
+ *    able to fall back, it should also set the Fallback init flags.
+ */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                              const char *key_ident,
+                              HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *keyhandle_r,
+                              const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors,
+                              HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey;
+/* The key_ident is a null-terminated string configured by the
+ * user via the application's usual configuration mechanisms.
+ * It is provided to the user by the crypto provider's key management
+ * system.  The user must be able to enter at least any string of between
+ * 1 and 1023 characters inclusive, consisting of printable 7-bit
+ * ASCII characters.  The provider should avoid using
+ * any characters except alphanumerics and the punctuation
+ * characters  _ - + . / @ ~  (the user is expected to be able
+ * to enter these without quoting).  The string may be case-sensitive.
+ * The application may allow the user to enter other NULL-terminated strings,
+ * and the provider must cope (returning an error if the string is not
+ * valid).
+ *
+ * If the key does not exist, no error is recorded and 0 is returned;
+ * keyhandle_r will be set to 0 instead of to a key handle.
+ */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle k,
+                                   HWCryptoHook_MPI *n,
+                                   HWCryptoHook_MPI *e,
+                                   const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey;
+/* The crypto plugin will not store certificates.
+ *
+ * Although this function for acquiring the public key value is
+ * provided, it is not the purpose of this API to deal fully with the
+ * handling of the public key.
+ *
+ * It is expected that the crypto supplier's key generation program
+ * will provide general facilities for producing X.509
+ * self-certificates and certificate requests in PEM format.  These
+ * will be given to the user so that they can configure them in the
+ * application, send them to CAs, or whatever.
+ *
+ * In case this kind of certificate handling is not appropriate, the
+ * crypto supplier's key generation program should be able to be
+ * configured not to generate such a self-certificate or certificate
+ * request.  Then the application will need to do all of this, and
+ * will need to store and handle the public key and certificates
+ * itself.
+ */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle k,
+                                const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey;
+/* Might fail due to locking problems, or other serious internal problems. */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSA_t(HWCryptoHook_MPI m,
+                       HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle k,
+                       HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                       const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSA_t HWCryptoHook_RSA;
+/* RSA private key operation (sign or decrypt) - raw, unpadded. */
+
+#endif /*HWCRYPTOHOOK_H*/
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/vendor_defns/sureware.h b/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/vendor_defns/sureware.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d3789219d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/engine/vendor_defns/sureware.h
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+/*
+* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com)
+*
+* Copyright@2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
+*                                                                                                                                                                                               *       
+*               THIS FILE IS PROVIDED BY BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES ``AS IS'' AND                                                                                                                                                   *
+*               ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE                                   * 
+*               IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE                              *
+*               ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES BE LIABLE                                             *
+*               FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL                              *
+*               DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS                                 *
+*               OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)                                   *
+*               HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT                              *
+*               LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY                               *
+*               OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF                                  *
+*               SUCH DAMAGE.                                                                                                                                                    *
+*
+* 
+*/
+#ifdef WIN32
+#define SW_EXPORT       __declspec ( dllexport )
+#else
+#define SW_EXPORT
+#endif
+
+/*
+*       List of exposed SureWare errors
+*/
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_FAILED               -1
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK             -2
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE -3
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE -4
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_INVALID_PAD -5
+/*
+* -----------------WARNING-----------------------------------
+* In all the following functions:
+* msg is a string with at least 24 bytes free.
+* A 24 bytes string will be concatenated to the existing content of msg. 
+*/
+/*
+*       SureWare Initialisation function
+*       in param threadsafe, if !=0, thread safe enabled
+*       return SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if failure, 1 if success
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Init_t(char*const msg,int threadsafe);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Init_t SureWareHook_Init;
+/*
+*       SureWare Finish function
+*/
+typedef void SureWareHook_Finish_t();
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Finish_t SureWareHook_Finish;
+/*
+*        PRE_CONDITION:
+*               DO NOT CALL ANY OF THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS IN CASE OF INIT FAILURE
+*/
+/*
+*       SureWare RAND Bytes function
+*       In case of failure, the content of buf is unpredictable.
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK if function not available in hardware
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in/out param buf : a num bytes long buffer where random bytes will be put
+*       in param num : the number of bytes into buf
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t(char*const msg,unsigned char *buf, int num);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare RAND Seed function
+*       Adds some seed to the Hardware Random Number Generator
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK if function not available in hardware
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in param buf : the seed to add into the HRNG
+*       in param num : the number of bytes into buf
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t(char*const msg,const void *buf, int num);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t SureWareHook_Rand_Seed;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Load Private Key function
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*       No hardware is contact for this function.
+*
+*       in param key_id :the name of the private protected key file without the extension
+                                                ".sws"
+*       out param hptr : a pointer to a buffer allocated by SureWare_Hook
+*       out param num: the effective key length in bytes
+*       out param keytype: 1 if RSA 2 if DSA
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t(char*const msg,const char *key_id,char **hptr,unsigned long *num,char *keytype);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t SureWareHook_Load_Privkey;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Info Public Key function
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*       No hardware is contact for this function.
+*
+*       in param key_id :the name of the private protected key file without the extension
+                                                ".swp"
+*       out param hptr : a pointer to a buffer allocated by SureWare_Hook
+*       out param num: the effective key length in bytes
+*       out param keytype: 1 if RSA 2 if DSA
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t(char*const msg,const char *key_id,unsigned long *num,
+                                                                                char *keytype);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Load Public Key function
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*       No hardware is contact for this function.
+*
+*       in param key_id :the name of the public protected key file without the extension
+                                                ".swp"
+*       in param num : the bytes size of n and e
+*       out param n: where to write modulus in bn format
+*       out param e: where to write exponent in bn format
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t(char*const msg,const char *key_id,unsigned long num,
+                                                                                unsigned long *n, unsigned long *e);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Load DSA Public Key function
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*       No hardware is contact for this function.
+*
+*       in param key_id :the name of the public protected key file without the extension
+                                                ".swp"
+*       in param num : the bytes size of n and e
+*       out param pub: where to write pub key in bn format
+*       out param p: where to write prime in bn format
+*       out param q: where to write sunprime (length 20 bytes) in bn format
+*       out param g: where to write base in bn format
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t(char*const msg,const char *key_id,unsigned long num,
+                                                                                unsigned long *pub, unsigned long *p,unsigned long*q,
+                                                                                unsigned long *g);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Free function
+*       Destroy the key into the hardware if destroy==1
+*/
+typedef void SureWareHook_Free_t(char *p,int destroy);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Free_t SureWareHook_Free;
+
+#define SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD 1
+#define SUREWARE_ISO9796_PAD 2
+#define SUREWARE_NO_PAD 0
+/*
+* SureWare RSA Private Decryption
+* return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in param flen : byte size of from and to
+*       in param from : encrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*       out param tlen: byte size of decrypted data, if error, unexpected value
+*       out param to : decrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*   in param prsa: a protected key pointer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*   int padding: padding id as follow
+*                                       SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD
+*                                       SUREWARE_NO_PAD
+*
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t(char*const msg,int flen,unsigned char *from,
+                                                                                int *tlen,unsigned char *to,
+                                                                                char *prsa,int padding);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec;
+/*
+* SureWare RSA Signature
+* return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in param flen : byte size of from and to
+*       in param from : encrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*       out param tlen: byte size of decrypted data, if error, unexpected value
+*       out param to : decrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*   in param prsa: a protected key pointer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*   int padding: padding id as follow
+*                                       SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD
+*                                       SUREWARE_ISO9796_PAD
+*
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t(char*const msg,int flen,unsigned char *from,
+                                                                                int *tlen,unsigned char *to,
+                                                                                char *prsa,int padding);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign;
+/*
+* SureWare DSA Signature
+* return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in param flen : byte size of from and to
+*       in param from : encrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*       out param to : decrypted data buffer, should be a 40bytes valid pointer
+*   in param pdsa: a protected key pointer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t(char*const msg,int flen,const unsigned char *from,
+                                                                                unsigned long *r,unsigned long *s,char *pdsa);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign;
+
+
+/*
+* SureWare Mod Exp
+* return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       mod and res are mlen bytes long.
+*       exp is elen bytes long
+*       data is dlen bytes long
+*       mlen,elen and dlen are all multiple of sizeof(unsigned long)
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t(char*const msg,int mlen,const unsigned long *mod,
+                                                                        int elen,const unsigned long *exp,
+                                                                        int dlen,unsigned long *data,
+                                                                        unsigned long *res);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t SureWareHook_Mod_Exp;
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/idea/version b/src/lib/libcrypto/idea/version
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f22293795
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/idea/version
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+1.1 07/12/95 - eay
+        Many thanks to Rhys Weatherley <rweather@us.oracle.com>
+        for pointing out that I was assuming little endian byte
+        order for all quantities what idea actually used
+        bigendian.  No where in the spec does it mention
+        this, it is all in terms of 16 bit numbers and even the example
+        does not use byte streams for the input example :-(.
+        If you byte swap each pair of input, keys and iv, the functions
+        would produce the output as the old version :-(.
+
+1.0 ??/??/95 - eay
+        First version.
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c b/src/lib/libcrypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9abe99d92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/* crypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2)
+#define OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No MDC2 support\n");
+    return(0);
+}
+#else
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+#endif
+
+static unsigned char pad1[16]={
+        0x42,0xE5,0x0C,0xD2,0x24,0xBA,0xCE,0xBA,
+        0x76,0x0B,0xDD,0x2B,0xD4,0x09,0x28,0x1A
+        };
+
+static unsigned char pad2[16]={
+        0x2E,0x46,0x79,0xB5,0xAD,0xD9,0xCA,0x75,
+        0x35,0xD8,0x7A,0xFE,0xAB,0x33,0xBE,0xE2
+        };
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+        {
+        int ret=0;
+        unsigned char md[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+        int i;
+        EVP_MD_CTX c;
+        static char *text="Now is the time for all ";
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        ebcdic2ascii(text,text,strlen(text));
+#endif
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
+        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,EVP_mdc2(), NULL);
+        EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,(unsigned char *)text,strlen(text));
+        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c,&(md[0]),NULL);
+
+        if (memcmp(md,pad1,MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
+                {
+                for (i=0; i<MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                        printf("%02X",md[i]);
+                printf(" <- generated\n");
+                for (i=0; i<MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                        printf("%02X",pad1[i]);
+                printf(" <- correct\n");
+                ret=1;
+                }
+        else
+                printf("pad1 - ok\n");
+
+        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,EVP_mdc2(), NULL);
+        /* FIXME: use a ctl function? */
+        ((MDC2_CTX *)c.md_data)->pad_type=2;
+        EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,(unsigned char *)text,strlen(text));
+        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c,&(md[0]),NULL);
+
+        if (memcmp(md,pad2,MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
+                {
+                for (i=0; i<MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                        printf("%02X",md[i]);
+                printf(" <- generated\n");
+                for (i=0; i<MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                        printf("%02X",pad2[i]);
+                printf(" <- correct\n");
+                ret=1;
+                }
+        else
+                printf("pad2 - ok\n");
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+        EXIT(ret);
+        return(ret);
+        }
+#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/rc5/rc5s.cpp b/src/lib/libcrypto/rc5/rc5s.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1c5518bc80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/rc5/rc5s.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+//
+// gettsc.inl
+//
+// gives access to the Pentium's (secret) cycle counter
+//
+// This software was written by Leonard Janke (janke@unixg.ubc.ca)
+// in 1996-7 and is entered, by him, into the public domain.
+
+#if defined(__WATCOMC__)
+void GetTSC(unsigned long&);
+#pragma aux GetTSC = 0x0f 0x31 "mov [edi], eax" parm [edi] modify [edx eax];
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+inline
+void GetTSC(unsigned long& tsc)
+{
+  asm volatile(".byte 15, 49\n\t"
+               : "=eax" (tsc)
+               :
+               : "%edx", "%eax");
+}
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+inline
+void GetTSC(unsigned long& tsc)
+{
+  unsigned long a;
+  __asm _emit 0fh
+  __asm _emit 31h
+  __asm mov a, eax;
+  tsc=a;
+}
+#endif      
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/rc5.h>
+
+void main(int argc,char *argv[])
+        {
+        RC5_32_KEY key;
+        unsigned long s1,s2,e1,e2;
+        unsigned long data[2];
+        int i,j;
+        static unsigned char d[16]={0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF};
+
+        RC5_32_set_key(&key, 16,d,12);
+
+        for (j=0; j<6; j++)
+                {
+                for (i=0; i<1000; i++) /**/
+                        {
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        GetTSC(s1);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        GetTSC(e1);
+                        GetTSC(s2);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        GetTSC(e2);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        }
+
+                printf("cast %d %d (%d)\n",
+                        e1-s1,e2-s2,((e2-s2)-(e1-s1)));
+                }
+        }
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/util/bat.sh b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/bat.sh
index c6f48e8a7b..4d9a8287d0 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/util/bat.sh
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/bat.sh
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ sub var_add
         local($dir,$val)=@_;
         local(@a,$_,$ret);
 
+        return("") if $no_engine && $dir =~ /\/engine/;
         return("") if $no_idea && $dir =~ /\/idea/;
         return("") if $no_rc2  && $dir =~ /\/rc2/;
         return("") if $no_rc4  && $dir =~ /\/rc4/;
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ sub var_add
         @a=grep(!/(^sha1)|(_sha1$)|(m_dss1$)/,@a) if $no_sha1;
         @a=grep(!/_mdc2$/,@a) if $no_mdc2;
 
+        @a=grep(!/^engine$/,@a) if $no_engine;
         @a=grep(!/(^rsa$)|(^genrsa$)|(^req$)|(^ca$)/,@a) if $no_rsa;
         @a=grep(!/(^dsa$)|(^gendsa$)|(^dsaparam$)/,@a) if $no_dsa;
         @a=grep(!/^gendsa$/,@a) if $no_sha1;
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/util/extract-names.pl b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/extract-names.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d413a045cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/extract-names.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+
+$/ = "";                        # Eat a paragraph at once.
+while(<STDIN>) {
+    chop;
+    s/\n/ /gm;
+    if (/^=head1 /) {
+        $name = 0;
+    } elsif ($name) {
+        if (/ - /) {
+            s/ - .*//;
+            s/[ \t,]+/ /g;
+            push @words, split ' ';
+        }
+    }
+    if (/^=head1 *NAME *$/) {
+        $name = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+print join("\n", @words),"\n";
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/util/mkcerts.sh b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/mkcerts.sh
index 5f8a1dae73..0184fcb70e 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/util/mkcerts.sh
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/mkcerts.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!bin/sh
+#!/bin/sh
 
 # This script will re-make all the required certs.
 # cd apps
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
 #
  
 CAbits=1024
-SSLEAY="../apps/ssleay"
-CONF="-config ../apps/ssleay.cnf"
+SSLEAY="../apps/openssl"
+CONF="-config ../apps/openssl.cnf"
 
 # create pca request.
 echo creating $CAbits bit PCA cert request
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/util/pl/VC-CE.pl b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/pl/VC-CE.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1805ef9d97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/util/pl/VC-CE.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl
+# VC-CE.pl - the file for eMbedded Visual C++ 3.0 for windows CE, static libraries
+#
+
+$ssl=   "ssleay32";
+$crypto="libeay32";
+$RSAref="RSAref32";
+
+$o='\\';
+$cp='copy nul+';        # Timestamps get stuffed otherwise
+$rm='del';
+
+# C compiler stuff
+$cc='$(CC)';
+$cflags=' /W3 /WX /Ox /O2 /Ob2 /Gs0 /GF /Gy /nologo $(WCETARGETDEFS) -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -DWIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -DNO_CHMOD -I$(WCECOMPAT)/include';
+$lflags='/nologo /subsystem:windowsce,$(WCELDVERSION) /machine:$(WCELDMACHINE) /opt:ref';
+$mlflags='';
+
+$out_def='out32_$(TARGETCPU)';
+$tmp_def='tmp32_$(TARGETCPU)';
+$inc_def="inc32";
+
+if ($debug)
+        {
+        $cflags=" /MDd /W3 /WX /Zi /Yd /Od /nologo -DWIN32 -D_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DDEBUG -DDSO_WIN32";
+        $lflags.=" /debug";
+        $mlflags.=' /debug';
+        }
+
+$obj='.obj';
+$ofile="/Fo";
+
+# EXE linking stuff
+$link="link";
+$efile="/out:";
+$exep='.exe';
+if ($no_sock)
+        { $ex_libs=""; }
+else    { $ex_libs='winsock.lib $(WCECOMPAT)/lib/wcecompatex.lib $(WCELDFLAGS)'; }
+
+# static library stuff
+$mklib='lib';
+$ranlib='';
+$plib="";
+$libp=".lib";
+$shlibp=($shlib)?".dll":".lib";
+$lfile='/out:';
+
+$shlib_ex_obj="";
+#$app_ex_obj="setargv.obj";
+$app_ex_obj="";
+
+$bn_asm_obj='';
+$bn_asm_src='';
+$des_enc_obj='';
+$des_enc_src='';
+$bf_enc_obj='';
+$bf_enc_src='';
+
+if ($shlib)
+        {
+        $mlflags.=" $lflags /dll";
+#       $cflags =~ s| /MD| /MT|;
+        $lib_cflag=" -D_WINDLL -D_DLL";
+        $out_def='out32dll_$(TARGETCPU)';
+        $tmp_def='tmp32dll_$(TARGETCPU)';
+        }
+
+$cflags.=" /Fd$out_def";
+
+sub do_lib_rule
+        {
+        local($objs,$target,$name,$shlib)=@_;
+        local($ret,$Name);
+
+        $taget =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
+        ($Name=$name) =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/;
+
+#       $target="\$(LIB_D)$o$target";
+        $ret.="$target: $objs\n";
+        if (!$shlib)
+                {
+#               $ret.="\t\$(RM) \$(O_$Name)\n";
+                $ex =' ';
+                $ret.="\t\$(MKLIB) $lfile$target @<<\n  $objs $ex\n<<\n";
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                local($ex)=($target =~ /O_SSL/)?' $(L_CRYPTO)':'';
+#               $ex.=' winsock.lib coredll.lib $(WCECOMPAT)/lib/wcecompatex.lib';
+                $ex.=' winsock.lib $(WCECOMPAT)/lib/wcecompatex.lib';
+                $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target /def:ms/${Name}.def @<<\n  \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex\n<<\n";
+                }
+        $ret.="\n";
+        return($ret);
+        }
+
+sub do_link_rule
+        {
+        local($target,$files,$dep_libs,$libs)=@_;
+        local($ret,$_);
+        
+        $file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
+        $n=&bname($targer);
+        $ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
+        $ret.="  \$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
+        $ret.="  \$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files $libs\n<<\n\n";
+        return($ret);
+        }
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/INSTALL.DJGPP b/src/lib/libssl/src/INSTALL.DJGPP
index 0120b946b5..cdeac222b2 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/INSTALL.DJGPP
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/INSTALL.DJGPP
@@ -12,12 +12,14 @@
  latest versions of DJGPP, GCC, BINUTILS, BASH, etc. This package
  requires that PERL and BC also be installed.
 
- All of these can be obtained from the usual DJGPP mirror sites, such as
- "ftp://ftp.simtel.net/pub/simtelnet/gnu/djgpp". You also need to have
- the WATT-32 networking package installed before you try to compile
- openssl. This can be obtained from "http://www.bgnett.no/~giva/". The
- Makefile assumes that the WATT-32 code is in directory "watt32" under
- /dev/env/DJDIR.
+ All of these can be obtained from the usual DJGPP mirror sites, such
+ as "ftp://ftp.simtel.net/pub/simtelnet/gnu/djgpp". You also need to
+ have the WATT-32 networking package installed before you try to compile
+ openssl. This can be obtained from "http://www.bgnett.no/~giva/".
+ The Makefile assumes that the WATT-32 code is in the directory
+ specified by the environment variable WATT_ROOT. If you have watt-32
+ in directory "watt32" under your main DJGPP directory, specify
+ WATT_ROOT="/dev/env/DJDIR/watt32".
 
  To compile openssl, start your BASH shell. Then configure for DOS by
  running "./Configure" with appropriate arguments. The basic syntax for
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/INSTALL.WCE b/src/lib/libssl/src/INSTALL.WCE
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ac587d6bd2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/INSTALL.WCE
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+ 
+ INSTALLATION FOR THE WINDOWS CE PLATFORM
+ ----------------------------------------
+
+ Building OpenSSL for Windows CE requires the following external tools:
+
+  * Microsoft eMbedded Visual C++ 3.0
+  * wcecompat compatibility library (www.essemer.com.au)
+  * Optionally ceutils for running automated tests (www.essemer.com.au)
+
+ You also need Perl for Win32.  You will need ActiveState Perl, available
+ from http://www.activestate.com/ActivePerl.
+
+ Windows CE support in OpenSSL relies on wcecompat.  All Windows CE specific
+ issues should be directed to www.essemer.com.au.
+
+ The C Runtime Library implementation for Windows CE that is included with
+ Microsoft eMbedded Visual C++ 3.0 is incomplete and in some places
+ incorrect.  wcecompat plugs the holes and tries to bring the Windows CE
+ CRT to a level that is more compatible with ANSI C.  wcecompat goes further
+ and provides low-level IO and stream IO support for stdin/stdout/stderr
+ (which Windows CE does not provide).  This IO functionality is not needed
+ by the OpenSSL library itself but is used for the tests and openssl.exe.
+ More information is available at www.essemer.com.au.
+
+ Building
+ --------
+
+ Setup the eMbedded Visual C++ environment.  There are batch files for doing
+ this installed with eVC++.  For an ARM processor, for example, execute:
+
+ > "C:\Program Files\Microsoft eMbedded Tools\EVC\WCE300\BIN\WCEARM.BAT"
+
+ Next indicate where wcecompat is located:
+
+ > set WCECOMPAT=C:\wcecompat
+
+ Next you should run Configure:
+
+ > perl Configure VC-CE
+
+ Next you need to build the Makefiles:
+
+ > ms\do_ms
+
+ If you get errors about things not having numbers assigned then check the
+ troubleshooting section in INSTALL.W32: you probably won't be able to compile
+ it as it stands.
+
+ Then from the VC++ environment at a prompt do:
+
+ - to build static libraries:
+
+   > nmake -f ms\ce.mak
+
+ - or to build DLLs:
+
+   > nmake -f ms\cedll.mak
+
+ If all is well it should compile and you will have some static libraries and
+ executables in out32, or some DLLs and executables in out32dll.  If you want
+ to try the tests then make sure the ceutils are in the path and do:
+ 
+ > cd out32
+ > ..\ms\testce
+
+ This will copy each of the test programs to the Windows CE device and execute
+ them, displaying the output of the tests on this computer.  The output should
+ look similar to the output produced by running the tests for a regular Windows
+ build.
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b97b394661
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,575 @@
+/*
+ * x86_64 BIGNUM accelerator version 0.1, December 2002.
+ *
+ * Implemented by Andy Polyakov <appro@fy.chalmers.se> for the OpenSSL
+ * project.
+ *
+ * Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are
+ * granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is
+ * disclaimed.
+ *
+ * Q. Version 0.1? It doesn't sound like Andy, he used to assign real
+ *    versions, like 1.0...
+ * A. Well, that's because this code is basically a quick-n-dirty
+ *    proof-of-concept hack. As you can see it's implemented with
+ *    inline assembler, which means that you're bound to GCC and that
+ *    there must be a room for fine-tuning.
+ *
+ * Q. Why inline assembler?
+ * A. x86_64 features own ABI I'm not familiar with. Which is why
+ *    I decided to let the compiler take care of subroutine
+ *    prologue/epilogue as well as register allocation.
+ *
+ * Q. How much faster does it get?
+ * A. Unfortunately people sitting on x86_64 hardware are prohibited
+ *    to disclose the performance numbers, so they (SuSE labs to be
+ *    specific) wouldn't tell me. However! Very similar coding technique
+ *    (reaching out for 128-bit result from 64x64-bit multiplication)
+ *    results in >3 times performance improvement on MIPS and I see no
+ *    reason why gain on x86_64 would be so much different:-)
+ */
+
+#define BN_ULONG unsigned long
+
+/*
+ * "m"(a), "+m"(r)      is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code;
+ * "g"(0)               let the compiler to decide where does it
+ *                      want to keep the value of zero;
+ */
+#define mul_add(r,a,word,carry) do {    \
+        register BN_ULONG high,low;     \
+        asm ("mulq %3"                  \
+                : "=a"(low),"=d"(high)  \
+                : "a"(word),"m"(a)      \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\
+                : "a"(low),"g"(0)       \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+m"(r),"+d"(high)    \
+                : "r"(carry),"g"(0)     \
+                : "cc");                \
+        carry=high;                     \
+        } while (0)
+
+#define mul(r,a,word,carry) do {        \
+        register BN_ULONG high,low;     \
+        asm ("mulq %3"                  \
+                : "=a"(low),"=d"(high)  \
+                : "a"(word),"g"(a)      \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\
+                : "a"(low),"g"(0)       \
+                : "cc");                \
+        (r)=carry, carry=high;          \
+        } while (0)
+
+#define sqr(r0,r1,a)                    \
+        asm ("mulq %2"                  \
+                : "=a"(r0),"=d"(r1)     \
+                : "a"(a)                \
+                : "cc");
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+        {
+        BN_ULONG c1=0;
+
+        if (num <= 0) return(c1);
+
+        while (num&~3)
+                {
+                mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1);
+                mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1);
+                mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1);
+                mul_add(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1);
+                ap+=4; rp+=4; num-=4;
+                }
+        if (num)
+                {
+                mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); if (--num==0) return c1;
+                mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); if (--num==0) return c1;
+                mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); return c1;
+                }
+        
+        return(c1);
+        } 
+
+BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w)
+        {
+        BN_ULONG c1=0;
+
+        if (num <= 0) return(c1);
+
+        while (num&~3)
+                {
+                mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1);
+                mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1);
+                mul(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1);
+                mul(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1);
+                ap+=4; rp+=4; num-=4;
+                }
+        if (num)
+                {
+                mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); if (--num == 0) return c1;
+                mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); if (--num == 0) return c1;
+                mul(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1);
+                }
+        return(c1);
+        } 
+
+void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, int n)
+        {
+        if (n <= 0) return;
+
+        while (n&~3)
+                {
+                sqr(r[0],r[1],a[0]);
+                sqr(r[2],r[3],a[1]);
+                sqr(r[4],r[5],a[2]);
+                sqr(r[6],r[7],a[3]);
+                a+=4; r+=8; n-=4;
+                }
+        if (n)
+                {
+                sqr(r[0],r[1],a[0]); if (--n == 0) return;
+                sqr(r[2],r[3],a[1]); if (--n == 0) return;
+                sqr(r[4],r[5],a[2]);
+                }
+        }
+
+BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d)
+{       BN_ULONG ret,waste;
+
+        asm ("divq      %3"
+                : "=a"(ret),"=d"(waste)
+                : "a"(l),"d"(h),"g"(d)
+                : "cc");
+
+        return ret;
+}
+
+BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int n)
+{ BN_ULONG ret,i;
+
+        if (n <= 0) return 0;
+
+        asm (
+        "       subq    %2,%2           \n"
+        ".align 16                      \n"
+        "1:     movq    (%4,%2,8),%0    \n"
+        "       adcq    (%5,%2,8),%0    \n"
+        "       movq    %0,(%3,%2,8)    \n"
+        "       leaq    1(%2),%2        \n"
+        "       loop    1b              \n"
+        "       sbbq    %0,%0           \n"
+                : "+a"(ret),"+c"(n),"+r"(i)
+                : "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
+                : "cc"
+        );
+
+  return ret&1;
+}
+
+#ifndef SIMICS
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, BN_ULONG *ap, BN_ULONG *bp,int n)
+{ BN_ULONG ret,i;
+
+        if (n <= 0) return 0;
+
+        asm (
+        "       subq    %2,%2           \n"
+        ".align 16                      \n"
+        "1:     movq    (%4,%2,8),%0    \n"
+        "       sbbq    (%5,%2,8),%0    \n"
+        "       movq    %0,(%3,%2,8)    \n"
+        "       leaq    1(%2),%2        \n"
+        "       loop    1b              \n"
+        "       sbbq    %0,%0           \n"
+                : "+a"(ret),"+c"(n),"+r"(i)
+                : "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp)
+                : "cc"
+        );
+
+  return ret&1;
+}
+#else
+/* Simics 1.4<7 has buggy sbbq:-( */
+#define BN_MASK2 0xffffffffffffffffL
+BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n)
+        {
+        BN_ULONG t1,t2;
+        int c=0;
+
+        if (n <= 0) return((BN_ULONG)0);
+
+        for (;;)
+                {
+                t1=a[0]; t2=b[0];
+                r[0]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2;
+                if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2);
+                if (--n <= 0) break;
+
+                t1=a[1]; t2=b[1];
+                r[1]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2;
+                if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2);
+                if (--n <= 0) break;
+
+                t1=a[2]; t2=b[2];
+                r[2]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2;
+                if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2);
+                if (--n <= 0) break;
+
+                t1=a[3]; t2=b[3];
+                r[3]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2;
+                if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2);
+                if (--n <= 0) break;
+
+                a+=4;
+                b+=4;
+                r+=4;
+                }
+        return(c);
+        }
+#endif
+
+/* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2)  -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+/* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */
+
+#if 0
+/* original macros are kept for reference purposes */
+#define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) {       \
+        BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b);         \
+        t1 = ta * tb;                   \
+        t2 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);      \
+        c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;    \
+        c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;    \
+        }
+
+#define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) {      \
+        BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b),t0;      \
+        t1 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb);      \
+        t0 = ta * tb;                   \
+        t2 = t1+t1; c2 += (t2<t1)?1:0;  \
+        t1 = t0+t0; t2 += (t1<t0)?1:0;  \
+        c0 += t1; t2 += (c0<t1)?1:0;    \
+        c1 += t2; c2 += (c1<t2)?1:0;    \
+        }
+#else
+#define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do {    \
+        asm ("mulq %3"                  \
+                : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2)     \
+                : "a"(a),"m"(b)         \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2)     \
+                : "a"(t1),"g"(0)        \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)     \
+                : "d"(t2),"g"(0)        \
+                : "cc");                \
+        } while (0)
+
+#define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) do {    \
+        asm ("mulq %2"                  \
+                : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2)     \
+                : "a"(a[i])             \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2)     \
+                : "a"(t1),"g"(0)        \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)     \
+                : "d"(t2),"g"(0)        \
+                : "cc");                \
+        } while (0)
+
+#define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) do {   \
+        asm ("mulq %3"                  \
+                : "=a"(t1),"=d"(t2)     \
+                : "a"(a),"m"(b)         \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1"   \
+                : "+d"(t2),"+r"(c2)     \
+                : "g"(0)                \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %0,%0; adcq %2,%1"   \
+                : "+a"(t1),"+d"(t2)     \
+                : "g"(0)                \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(c0),"+d"(t2)     \
+                : "a"(t1),"g"(0)        \
+                : "cc");                \
+        asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1"   \
+                : "+r"(c1),"+r"(c2)     \
+                : "d"(t2),"g"(0)        \
+                : "cc");                \
+        } while (0)
+#endif
+
+#define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2)      \
+        mul_add_c2((a)[i],(a)[j],c0,c1,c2)
+
+void bn_mul_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+        {
+        BN_ULONG bl,bh;
+        BN_ULONG t1,t2;
+        BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
+
+        c1=0;
+        c2=0;
+        c3=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+        r[0]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+        r[1]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+        r[2]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+        r[3]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+        r[4]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+        r[5]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+        r[6]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+        r[7]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+        r[8]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+        r[9]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+        r[10]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2);
+        r[11]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3);
+        r[12]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1);
+        r[13]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2);
+        r[14]=c3;
+        r[15]=c1;
+        }
+
+void bn_mul_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b)
+        {
+        BN_ULONG bl,bh;
+        BN_ULONG t1,t2;
+        BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
+
+        c1=0;
+        c2=0;
+        c3=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+        r[0]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1);
+        r[1]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+        r[2]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3);
+        r[3]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1);
+        mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1);
+        r[4]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2);
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2);
+        r[5]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3);
+        r[6]=c1;
+        r[7]=c2;
+        }
+
+void bn_sqr_comba8(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+        {
+        BN_ULONG bl,bh;
+        BN_ULONG t1,t2;
+        BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
+
+        c1=0;
+        c2=0;
+        c3=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
+        r[0]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+        r[1]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+        r[2]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+        r[3]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,4,0,c2,c3,c1);
+        r[4]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,5,0,c3,c1,c2);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,4,1,c3,c1,c2);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+        r[5]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,4,2,c1,c2,c3);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,5,1,c1,c2,c3);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,6,0,c1,c2,c3);
+        r[6]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,7,0,c2,c3,c1);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,6,1,c2,c3,c1);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,5,2,c2,c3,c1);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,4,3,c2,c3,c1);
+        r[7]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,4,c3,c1,c2);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,5,3,c3,c1,c2);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,6,2,c3,c1,c2);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,7,1,c3,c1,c2);
+        r[8]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,7,2,c1,c2,c3);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,6,3,c1,c2,c3);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,5,4,c1,c2,c3);
+        r[9]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,5,c2,c3,c1);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,6,4,c2,c3,c1);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,7,3,c2,c3,c1);
+        r[10]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,7,4,c3,c1,c2);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,6,5,c3,c1,c2);
+        r[11]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,6,c1,c2,c3);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,7,5,c1,c2,c3);
+        r[12]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,7,6,c2,c3,c1);
+        r[13]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,7,c3,c1,c2);
+        r[14]=c3;
+        r[15]=c1;
+        }
+
+void bn_sqr_comba4(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a)
+        {
+        BN_ULONG bl,bh;
+        BN_ULONG t1,t2;
+        BN_ULONG c1,c2,c3;
+
+        c1=0;
+        c2=0;
+        c3=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,0,c1,c2,c3);
+        r[0]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,1,0,c2,c3,c1);
+        r[1]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,1,c3,c1,c2);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,2,0,c3,c1,c2);
+        r[2]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,3,0,c1,c2,c3);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,2,1,c1,c2,c3);
+        r[3]=c1;
+        c1=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,2,c2,c3,c1);
+        sqr_add_c2(a,3,1,c2,c3,c1);
+        r[4]=c2;
+        c2=0;
+        sqr_add_c2(a,3,2,c3,c1,c2);
+        r[5]=c3;
+        c3=0;
+        sqr_add_c(a,3,c1,c2,c3);
+        r[6]=c1;
+        r[7]=c2;
+        }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/des/FILES0 b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/des/FILES0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4c7ea2de7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/des/FILES0
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/* General stuff */
+COPYRIGHT       - Copyright info.
+MODES.DES       - A description of the features of the different modes of DES.
+FILES           - This file.
+INSTALL         - How to make things compile.
+Imakefile       - For use with kerberos.
+README          - What this package is.
+VERSION         - Which version this is and what was changed.
+KERBEROS        - Kerberos version 4 notes.
+Makefile.PL     - An old makefile to build with perl5, not current.
+Makefile.ssl    - The SSLeay makefile
+Makefile.uni    - The normal unix makefile.
+GNUmakefile     - The makefile for use with glibc.
+makefile.bc     - A Borland C makefile
+times           - Some outputs from 'speed' on some machines.
+vms.com         - For use when compiling under VMS
+
+/* My SunOS des(1) replacement */
+des.c           - des(1) source code.
+des.man         - des(1) manual.
+
+/* Testing and timing programs. */
+destest.c       - Source for libdes.a test program.
+speed.c         - Source for libdes.a timing program.
+rpw.c           - Source for libdes.a testing password reading routines.
+
+/* libdes.a source code */
+des_crypt.man   - libdes.a manual page.
+des.h           - Public libdes.a header file.
+ecb_enc.c       - des_ecb_encrypt() source, this contains the basic DES code.
+ecb3_enc.c      - des_ecb3_encrypt() source.
+cbc_ckm.c       - des_cbc_cksum() source.
+cbc_enc.c       - des_cbc_encrypt() source.
+ncbc_enc.c      - des_cbc_encrypt() that is 'normal' in that it copies
+                  the new iv values back in the passed iv vector.
+ede_enc.c       - des_ede3_cbc_encrypt() cbc mode des using triple DES.
+cbc3_enc.c      - des_3cbc_encrypt() source, don't use this function.
+cfb_enc.c       - des_cfb_encrypt() source.
+cfb64enc.c      - des_cfb64_encrypt() cfb in 64 bit mode but setup to be
+                  used as a stream cipher.
+cfb64ede.c      - des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt() cfb in 64 bit mode but setup to be
+                  used as a stream cipher and using triple DES.
+ofb_enc.c       - des_cfb_encrypt() source.
+ofb64_enc.c     - des_ofb_encrypt() ofb in 64 bit mode but setup to be
+                  used as a stream cipher.
+ofb64ede.c      - des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt() ofb in 64 bit mode but setup to be
+                  used as a stream cipher and using triple DES.
+enc_read.c      - des_enc_read() source.
+enc_writ.c      - des_enc_write() source.
+pcbc_enc.c      - des_pcbc_encrypt() source.
+qud_cksm.c      - quad_cksum() source.
+rand_key.c      - des_random_key() source.
+read_pwd.c      - Source for des_read_password() plus related functions.
+set_key.c       - Source for des_set_key().
+str2key.c       - Covert a string of any length into a key.
+fcrypt.c        - A small, fast version of crypt(3).
+des_locl.h      - Internal libdes.a header file.
+podd.h          - Odd parity tables - used in des_set_key().
+sk.h            - Lookup tables used in des_set_key().
+spr.h           - What is left of the S tables - used in ecb_encrypt().
+des_ver.h       - header file for the external definition of the
+                  version string.
+des.doc         - SSLeay documentation for the library.
+
+/* The perl scripts - you can ignore these files they are only
+ * included for the curious */
+des.pl          - des in perl anyone? des_set_key and des_ecb_encrypt
+                  both done in a perl library.
+testdes.pl      - Testing program for des.pl
+doIP            - Perl script used to develop IP xor/shift code.
+doPC1           - Perl script used to develop PC1 xor/shift code.
+doPC2           - Generates sk.h.
+PC1             - Output of doPC1 should be the same as output from PC1.
+PC2             - used in development of doPC2.
+shifts.pl       - Perl library used by my perl scripts.
+
+/* I started making a perl5 dynamic library for libdes
+ * but did not fully finish, these files are part of that effort. */
+DES.pm
+DES.pod
+DES.xs
+t
+typemap
+
+/* The following are for use with sun RPC implementaions. */
+rpc_des.h
+rpc_enc.c
+
+/* The following are contibuted by Mark Murray <mark@grondar.za>.  They
+ * are not normally built into libdes due to machine specific routines
+ * contained in them.  They are for use in the most recent incarnation of
+ * export kerberos v 4 (eBones). */
+supp.c
+new_rkey.c
+
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/hw_sureware.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/hw_sureware.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fca467e690
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/hw_sureware.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1039 @@
+/* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com)
+* 
+*
+* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+* are met:
+*
+* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+*
+* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+*    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+*    distribution.
+*
+* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+*    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+*    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+*    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+*
+* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+*    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+*    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+*    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+*
+* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+*    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+*    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+*
+* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+*    acknowledgment:
+*    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+*    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+*
+* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com)
+*
+* Copyright@2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
+* All right Reserved.
+*                                                                                                                                                                                               *       
+*               THIS FILE IS PROVIDED BY BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES ``AS IS'' AND                                                                                                                                                   *
+*               ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE                                   * 
+*               IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE                              *
+*               ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES BE LIABLE                                             *
+*               FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL                              *
+*               DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS                                 *
+*               OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)                                   *
+*               HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT                              *
+*               LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY                               *
+*               OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF                                  *
+*               SUCH DAMAGE.                                                                                                                                                    *
+====================================================================*/
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "cryptlib.h"
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/dso.h>
+#include "eng_int.h"
+#include "engine.h"
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
+
+#ifdef FLAT_INC
+#include "sureware.h"
+#else
+#include "vendor_defns/sureware.h"
+#endif
+
+#define SUREWARE_LIB_NAME "sureware engine"
+#include "hw_sureware_err.c"
+
+static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)());
+static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e);
+static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e);
+static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e);
+static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+        const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx);
+
+/* RSA stuff */
+static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to,
+                        RSA *rsa,int padding);
+static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to,
+                            RSA *rsa,int padding);
+
+/* RAND stuff */
+static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
+
+/* KM stuff */
+static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+        UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+        UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
+static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+        int idx,long argl, void *argp);
+#if 0
+static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+        int idx,long argl, void *argp);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the mont stuff dropped). */
+static int surewarehk_mod_exp_mont(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+        return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+
+/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+static RSA_METHOD surewarehk_rsa =
+        {
+        "SureWare RSA method",
+        NULL, /* pub_enc*/
+        NULL, /* pub_dec*/
+        surewarehk_rsa_sign, /* our rsa_sign is OpenSSL priv_enc*/
+        surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec, /* priv_dec*/
+        NULL, /*mod_exp*/
+        surewarehk_mod_exp_mont, /*mod_exp_mongomery*/
+        NULL, /* init*/
+        NULL, /* finish*/
+        0,      /* RSA flag*/
+        NULL, 
+        NULL, /* OpenSSL sign*/
+        NULL  /* OpenSSL verify*/
+        };
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
+/* This function is aliased to mod_exp (with the dh and mont dropped). */
+static int surewarehk_modexp_dh(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
+        const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
+{
+        return surewarehk_modexp(r, a, p, m, ctx);
+}
+
+static DH_METHOD surewarehk_dh =
+        {
+        "SureWare DH method",
+        NULL,/*gen_key*/
+        NULL,/*agree,*/
+        surewarehk_modexp_dh, /*dh mod exp*/
+        NULL, /* init*/
+        NULL, /* finish*/
+        0,    /* flags*/
+        NULL 
+        };
+#endif
+
+static RAND_METHOD surewarehk_rand =
+        {
+        /* "SureWare RAND method", */
+        surewarehk_rand_seed,
+        surewarehk_rand_bytes,
+        NULL,/*cleanup*/
+        surewarehk_rand_add,
+        surewarehk_rand_bytes,
+        NULL,/*rand_status*/
+        };
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* DSA stuff */
+static  DSA_SIG * surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+static int surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1,
+                BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *a2, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *m,
+                BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont)
+{
+        BIGNUM t;
+        int to_return = 0;
+        BN_init(&t);
+        /* let rr = a1 ^ p1 mod m */
+        if (!surewarehk_modexp(rr,a1,p1,m,ctx)) goto end;
+        /* let t = a2 ^ p2 mod m */
+        if (!surewarehk_modexp(&t,a2,p2,m,ctx)) goto end;
+        /* let rr = rr * t mod m */
+        if (!BN_mod_mul(rr,rr,&t,m,ctx)) goto end;
+        to_return = 1;
+end:
+        BN_free(&t);
+        return to_return;
+}
+
+static DSA_METHOD surewarehk_dsa =
+        {
+         "SureWare DSA method", 
+        surewarehk_dsa_do_sign,
+        NULL,/*sign setup*/
+        NULL,/*verify,*/
+        surewarehk_dsa_mod_exp,/*mod exp*/
+        NULL,/*bn mod exp*/
+        NULL, /*init*/
+        NULL,/*finish*/
+        0,
+        NULL,
+        };
+#endif
+
+static const char *engine_sureware_id = "sureware";
+static const char *engine_sureware_name = "SureWare hardware engine support";
+
+/* Now, to our own code */
+
+/* As this is only ever called once, there's no need for locking
+ * (indeed - the lock will already be held by our caller!!!) */
+static int bind_sureware(ENGINE *e)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        const RSA_METHOD *meth1;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        const DSA_METHOD *meth2;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        const DH_METHOD *meth3;
+#endif
+
+        if(!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_sureware_id) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_sureware_name) ||
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+           !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, &surewarehk_rsa) ||
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+           !ENGINE_set_DSA(e, &surewarehk_dsa) ||
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+           !ENGINE_set_DH(e, &surewarehk_dh) ||
+#endif
+           !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &surewarehk_rand) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, surewarehk_destroy) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, surewarehk_init) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, surewarehk_finish) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, surewarehk_ctrl) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_privkey) ||
+           !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, surewarehk_load_pubkey))
+          return 0;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        /* We know that the "PKCS1_SSLeay()" functions hook properly
+         * to the cswift-specific mod_exp and mod_exp_crt so we use
+         * those functions. NB: We don't use ENGINE_openssl() or
+         * anything "more generic" because something like the RSAref
+         * code may not hook properly, and if you own one of these
+         * cards then you have the right to do RSA operations on it
+         * anyway! */ 
+        meth1 = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
+        if (meth1)
+        {
+                surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_enc = meth1->rsa_pub_enc;
+                surewarehk_rsa.rsa_pub_dec = meth1->rsa_pub_dec;
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        /* Use the DSA_OpenSSL() method and just hook the mod_exp-ish
+         * bits. */
+        meth2 = DSA_OpenSSL();
+        if (meth2)
+        {
+                surewarehk_dsa.dsa_do_verify = meth2->dsa_do_verify;
+        }
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
+        /* Much the same for Diffie-Hellman */
+        meth3 = DH_OpenSSL();
+        if (meth3)
+        {
+                surewarehk_dh.generate_key = meth3->generate_key;
+                surewarehk_dh.compute_key = meth3->compute_key;
+        }
+#endif
+
+        /* Ensure the sureware error handling is set up */
+        ERR_load_SUREWARE_strings();
+        return 1;
+}
+
+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
+        {
+        if(id && (strcmp(id, engine_sureware_id) != 0))
+                return 0;
+        if(!bind_sureware(e))
+                return 0;
+        return 1;
+        }       
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
+IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
+#else
+static ENGINE *engine_sureware(void)
+        {
+        ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
+        if(!ret)
+                return NULL;
+        if(!bind_sureware(ret))
+                {
+                ENGINE_free(ret);
+                return NULL;
+                }
+        return ret;
+        }
+
+void ENGINE_load_sureware(void)
+        {
+        /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
+        ENGINE *toadd = engine_sureware();
+        if(!toadd) return;
+        ENGINE_add(toadd);
+        ENGINE_free(toadd);
+        ERR_clear_error();
+        }
+#endif
+
+/* This is a process-global DSO handle used for loading and unloading
+ * the SureWareHook library. NB: This is only set (or unset) during an
+ * init() or finish() call (reference counts permitting) and they're
+ * operating with global locks, so this should be thread-safe
+ * implicitly. */
+static DSO *surewarehk_dso = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static int rsaHndidx = -1;      /* Index for KM handle.  Not really used yet. */
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+static int dsaHndidx = -1;      /* Index for KM handle.  Not really used yet. */
+#endif
+
+/* These are the function pointers that are (un)set when the library has
+ * successfully (un)loaded. */
+static SureWareHook_Init_t *p_surewarehk_Init = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Finish_t *p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Free_t *p_surewarehk_Free=NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec=NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign=NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign=NULL;
+static SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp=NULL;
+
+/* Used in the DSO operations. */
+static const char *surewarehk_LIBNAME = "SureWareHook";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Init = "SureWareHook_Init";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Finish = "SureWareHook_Finish";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes="SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed="SureWareHook_Rand_Seed";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey="SureWareHook_Load_Privkey";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey="SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey="SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey="SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Free="SureWareHook_Free";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec="SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign="SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign="SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign";
+static const char *n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp="SureWareHook_Mod_Exp";
+static BIO *logstream = NULL;
+
+/* SureWareHook library functions and mechanics - these are used by the
+ * higher-level functions further down. NB: As and where there's no
+ * error checking, take a look lower down where these functions are
+ * called, the checking and error handling is probably down there. 
+*/
+static int threadsafe=1;
+static int surewarehk_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)())
+{
+        int to_return = 1;
+
+        switch(cmd)
+        {
+                case ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM:
+                {
+                        BIO *bio = (BIO *)p;
+                        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+                        if (logstream)
+                        {
+                                BIO_free(logstream);
+                                logstream = NULL;
+                        }
+                        if (CRYPTO_add(&bio->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO) > 1)
+                                logstream = bio;
+                        else
+                                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL,SUREWARE_R_BIO_WAS_FREED);
+                }
+                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+                break;
+        /* This will prevent the initialisation function from "installing"
+         * the mutex-handling callbacks, even if they are available from
+         * within the library (or were provided to the library from the
+         * calling application). This is to remove any baggage for
+         * applications not using multithreading. */
+        case ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING:
+                CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+                threadsafe = 0;
+                CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_ENGINE);
+                break;
+
+        /* The command isn't understood by this engine */
+        default:
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_CTRL,
+                        ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
+                to_return = 0;
+                break;
+                }
+
+        return to_return;
+}
+
+/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_surewarehk()" constructor) */
+static int surewarehk_destroy(ENGINE *e)
+{
+        ERR_unload_SUREWARE_strings();
+        return 1;
+}
+
+/* (de)initialisation functions. */
+static int surewarehk_init(ENGINE *e)
+{
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_init";
+        SureWareHook_Init_t *p1=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Finish_t *p2=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t *p3=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t *p4=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t *p5=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t *p6=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Free_t *p7=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t *p8=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t *p9=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t *p12=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t *p13=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t *p14=NULL;
+        SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t *p15=NULL;
+
+        if(surewarehk_dso != NULL)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* Attempt to load libsurewarehk.so/surewarehk.dll/whatever. */
+        surewarehk_dso = DSO_load(NULL, surewarehk_LIBNAME, NULL, 0);
+        if(surewarehk_dso == NULL)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if(!(p1=(SureWareHook_Init_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Init)) ||
+           !(p2=(SureWareHook_Finish_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Finish)) ||
+           !(p3=(SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes)) ||
+           !(p4=(SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rand_Seed)) ||
+           !(p5=(SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Load_Privkey)) ||
+           !(p6=(SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey)) ||
+           !(p7=(SureWareHook_Free_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Free)) ||
+           !(p8=(SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec)) ||
+           !(p9=(SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign)) ||
+           !(p12=(SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign)) ||
+           !(p13=(SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey)) ||
+           !(p14=(SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey)) ||
+           !(p15=(SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t*)DSO_bind_func(surewarehk_dso, n_surewarehk_Mod_Exp)))
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* Copy the pointers */
+        p_surewarehk_Init = p1;
+        p_surewarehk_Finish = p2;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = p3;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = p4;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = p5;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = p6;
+        p_surewarehk_Free = p7;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = p8;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = p9;
+        p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = p12;
+        p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = p13;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = p14;
+        p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = p15;
+        /* Contact the hardware and initialises it. */
+        if(p_surewarehk_Init(msg,threadsafe)==SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        if(p_surewarehk_Init(msg,threadsafe)==SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_INIT,SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* try to load the default private key, if failed does not return a failure but
+           wait for an explicit ENGINE_load_privakey */
+        surewarehk_load_privkey(e,NULL,NULL,NULL);
+
+        /* Everything's fine. */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (rsaHndidx == -1)
+                rsaHndidx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                                "SureWareHook RSA key handle",
+                                                NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (dsaHndidx == -1)
+                dsaHndidx = DSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
+                                                "SureWareHook DSA key handle",
+                                                NULL, NULL, surewarehk_ex_free);
+#endif
+
+        return 1;
+err:
+        if(surewarehk_dso)
+                DSO_free(surewarehk_dso);
+        surewarehk_dso = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Init = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Free = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL;
+        return 0;
+}
+
+static int surewarehk_finish(ENGINE *e)
+{
+        int to_return = 1;
+        if(surewarehk_dso == NULL)
+                {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH,ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED);
+                to_return = 0;
+                goto err;
+                }
+        p_surewarehk_Finish();
+        if(!DSO_free(surewarehk_dso))
+                {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_FINISH,ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE);
+                to_return = 0;
+                goto err;
+                }
+ err:
+        if (logstream)
+                BIO_free(logstream);
+        surewarehk_dso = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Init = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Finish = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Free = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey = NULL;
+        p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp = NULL;
+        return to_return;
+}
+
+static void surewarehk_error_handling(char *const msg,int func,int ret)
+{
+        switch (ret)
+        {
+                case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_UNIT_FAILURE);
+                        break;
+                case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FALLBACK);
+                        break;
+                case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_SIZE_TOO_LARGE_OR_TOO_SMALL);
+                        break;
+                case SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_INVALID_PAD:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+                        break;
+                default:
+                        ENGINEerr(func,SUREWARE_R_REQUEST_FAILED);
+                        break;
+                case 1:/*nothing*/
+                        msg[0]='\0';
+        }
+        if (*msg)
+        {
+                ERR_add_error_data(1,msg);
+                if (logstream)
+                {
+                        CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+                        BIO_write(logstream, msg, strlen(msg));
+                        CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_BIO);
+                }
+        }
+}
+
+static int surewarehk_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+        int ret=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_rand_bytes";
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Bytes(msg,buf, num);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_BYTES,ret);
+        }
+        return ret==1 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static void surewarehk_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
+{
+        int ret=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_rand_seed";
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                ret = p_surewarehk_Rand_Seed(msg,buf, num);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RAND_SEED,ret);
+        }
+}
+
+static void surewarehk_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
+{
+        surewarehk_rand_seed(buf,num);
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY* sureware_load_public(ENGINE *e,const char *key_id,char *hptr,unsigned long el,char keytype)
+{
+        EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        RSA *rsatmp = NULL;
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        DSA *dsatmp=NULL;
+#endif
+        char msg[64]="sureware_load_public";
+        int ret=0;
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey || !p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        switch (keytype)
+        {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        case 1: /*RSA*/
+                /* set private external reference */
+                rsatmp = RSA_new_method(e);
+                RSA_set_ex_data(rsatmp,rsaHndidx,hptr);
+                rsatmp->flags |= RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
+
+                /* set public big nums*/
+                rsatmp->e = BN_new();
+                rsatmp->n = BN_new();
+                bn_expand2(rsatmp->e, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(rsatmp->n, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                if (!rsatmp->e || rsatmp->e->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG))|| 
+                        !rsatmp->n || rsatmp->n->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
+                        goto err;
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Load_Rsa_Pubkey(msg,key_id,el,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)rsatmp->n->d,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)rsatmp->e->d);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ret);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                /* normalise pub e and pub n */
+                rsatmp->e->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(rsatmp->e);
+                rsatmp->n->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(rsatmp->n);
+                /* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */
+                res = EVP_PKEY_new();
+                EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(res, rsatmp);
+                break;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        case 2:/*DSA*/
+                /* set private/public external reference */
+                dsatmp = DSA_new_method(e);
+                DSA_set_ex_data(dsatmp,dsaHndidx,hptr);
+                /*dsatmp->flags |= DSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;*/
+
+                /* set public key*/
+                dsatmp->pub_key = BN_new();
+                dsatmp->p = BN_new();
+                dsatmp->q = BN_new();
+                dsatmp->g = BN_new();
+                bn_expand2(dsatmp->pub_key, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(dsatmp->p, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(dsatmp->q, 20/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(dsatmp->g, el/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                if (!dsatmp->pub_key || dsatmp->pub_key->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG))|| 
+                        !dsatmp->p || dsatmp->p->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)) ||
+                        !dsatmp->q || dsatmp->q->dmax!=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG) ||
+                        !dsatmp->g || dsatmp->g->dmax!=(int)(el/sizeof(BN_ULONG)))
+                        goto err;
+
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Load_Dsa_Pubkey(msg,key_id,el,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)dsatmp->pub_key->d, 
+                                                 (unsigned long *)dsatmp->p->d,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)dsatmp->q->d,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)dsatmp->g->d);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ret);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                /* set parameters */
+                /* normalise pubkey and parameters in case of */
+                dsatmp->pub_key->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(dsatmp->pub_key);
+                dsatmp->p->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(dsatmp->p);
+                dsatmp->q->top=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(dsatmp->q);
+                dsatmp->g->top=el/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+                bn_fix_top(dsatmp->g);
+
+                /* create an EVP object: engine + rsa key */
+                res = EVP_PKEY_new();
+                EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(res, dsatmp);
+                break;
+#endif
+
+        default:
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        return res;
+ err:
+        if (res)
+                EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+        if (rsatmp)
+                RSA_free(rsatmp);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+        if (dsatmp)
+                DSA_free(dsatmp);
+#endif
+        return NULL;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+                                         UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+        EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+        int ret=0;
+        unsigned long el=0;
+        char *hptr=NULL;
+        char keytype=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_load_privkey";
+
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Load_Privkey(msg,key_id,&hptr,&el,&keytype);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PRIVATE_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+                        ERR_add_error_data(1,msg);              
+                }
+                else
+                        res=sureware_load_public(e,key_id,hptr,el,keytype);
+        }
+        return res;
+}
+
+static EVP_PKEY *surewarehk_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id,
+                                         UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
+{
+        EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+        int ret=0;
+        unsigned long el=0;
+        char *hptr=NULL;
+        char keytype=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_load_pubkey";
+
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                /* call once to identify if DSA or RSA */
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Info_Pubkey(msg,key_id,&el,&keytype);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_LOAD_PUBLIC_KEY,ENGINE_R_FAILED_LOADING_PUBLIC_KEY);
+                        ERR_add_error_data(1,msg);
+                }
+                else
+                        res=sureware_load_public(e,key_id,hptr,el,keytype);
+        }
+        return res;
+}
+
+/* This cleans up an RSA/DSA KM key(do not destroy the key into the hardware)
+, called when ex_data is freed */
+static void surewarehk_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+        int idx,long argl, void *argp)
+{
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Free)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_EX_FREE,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+                p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item,0);
+}
+
+#if 0
+/* This cleans up an DH KM key (destroys the key into hardware), 
+called when ex_data is freed */
+static void surewarehk_dh_ex_free(void *obj, void *item, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+        int idx,long argl, void *argp)
+{
+        if(!p_surewarehk_Free)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_EX_FREE,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+                p_surewarehk_Free((char *)item,1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+* return number of decrypted bytes
+*/
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
+static int surewarehk_rsa_priv_dec(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to,
+                        RSA *rsa,int padding)
+{
+        int ret=0,tlen;
+        char *buf=NULL,*hptr=NULL;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_rsa_priv_dec";
+        if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        /* extract ref to private key */
+        else if (!(hptr=RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx)))
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+                goto err;
+        }
+        /* analyse what padding we can do into the hardware */
+        if (padding==RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+        {
+                /* do it one shot */
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg,flen,(unsigned char *)from,&tlen,to,hptr,SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ret);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                        goto err;
+                ret=tlen;
+        }
+        else /* do with no padding into hardware */
+        {
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Rsa_Priv_Dec(msg,flen,(unsigned char *)from,&tlen,to,hptr,SUREWARE_NO_PAD);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ret);
+                if (ret!=1)
+                        goto err;
+                /* intermediate buffer for padding */
+                if ((buf=OPENSSL_malloc(tlen)) == NULL)
+                {
+                        RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                memcpy(buf,to,tlen);/* transfert to into buf */
+                switch (padding) /* check padding in software */
+                {
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+                case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
+                        ret=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to,tlen,(unsigned char *)buf,tlen,tlen,NULL,0);
+                        break;
+#endif
+                case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
+                        ret=RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to,tlen,(unsigned char *)buf,flen,tlen);
+                        break;
+                case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                        ret=RSA_padding_check_none(to,tlen,(unsigned char *)buf,flen,tlen);
+                        break;
+                default:
+                        RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                if (ret < 0)
+                        RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_DEC,RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
+        }
+err:
+        if (buf)
+        {
+                OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,tlen);
+                OPENSSL_free(buf);
+        }
+        return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+* Does what OpenSSL rsa_priv_enc does.
+*/
+static int surewarehk_rsa_sign(int flen,const unsigned char *from,unsigned char *to,
+                            RSA *rsa,int padding)
+{
+        int ret=0,tlen;
+        char *hptr=NULL;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_rsa_sign";
+        if (!p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        /* extract ref to private key */
+        else if (!(hptr=RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsaHndidx)))
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                switch (padding)
+                {
+                case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: /* do it in one shot */
+                        ret=p_surewarehk_Rsa_Sign(msg,flen,(unsigned char *)from,&tlen,to,hptr,SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD);
+                        surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,ret);
+                        break;
+                case RSA_NO_PADDING:
+                default:
+                        RSAerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_RSA_PRIV_ENC,RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
+                }
+        }
+        return ret==1 ? tlen : ret;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
+/* DSA sign and verify */
+static  DSA_SIG * surewarehk_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *from, int flen, DSA *dsa)
+{
+        int ret=0;
+        char *hptr=NULL;
+        DSA_SIG *psign=NULL;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_dsa_do_sign";
+        if (!p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        /* extract ref to private key */
+        else if (!(hptr=DSA_get_ex_data(dsa, dsaHndidx)))
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,SUREWARE_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENTS);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                if((psign = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
+                {
+                        SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+                        goto err;
+                }
+                psign->r=BN_new();
+                psign->s=BN_new();
+                bn_expand2(psign->r, 20/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                bn_expand2(psign->s, 20/sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+                if (!psign->r || psign->r->dmax!=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG) ||
+                        !psign->s || psign->s->dmax!=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG))
+                        goto err;
+                ret=p_surewarehk_Dsa_Sign(msg,flen,from,
+                                          (unsigned long *)psign->r->d,
+                                          (unsigned long *)psign->s->d,
+                                          hptr);
+                surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_DSA_DO_SIGN,ret);
+        }
+        psign->r->top=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+        bn_fix_top(psign->r);
+        psign->s->top=20/sizeof(BN_ULONG);
+        bn_fix_top(psign->s);
+
+err:    
+        if (psign)
+        {
+                DSA_SIG_free(psign);
+                psign=NULL;
+        }
+        return psign;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int surewarehk_modexp(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
+                             const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx)
+{
+        int ret=0;
+        char msg[64]="ENGINE_modexp";
+        if (!p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp)
+        {
+                SUREWAREerr(SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MOD_EXP,ENGINE_R_NOT_INITIALISED);
+        }
+        else
+        {
+                bn_expand2(r,m->top);
+                if (r && r->dmax==m->top)
+                {
+                        /* do it*/
+                        ret=p_surewarehk_Mod_Exp(msg,
+                                                 m->top*sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+                                                 (unsigned long *)m->d,
+                                                 p->top*sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+                                                 (unsigned long *)p->d,
+                                                 a->top*sizeof(BN_ULONG),
+                                                 (unsigned long *)a->d,
+                                                 (unsigned long *)r->d);
+                        surewarehk_error_handling(msg,SUREWARE_F_SUREWAREHK_MOD_EXP,ret);
+                        if (ret==1)
+                        {
+                                /* normalise result */
+                                r->top=m->top;
+                                bn_fix_top(r);
+                        }
+                }
+        }
+        return ret;
+}
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare */
+#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/vendor_defns/hw_ubsec.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/vendor_defns/hw_ubsec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b6619d40f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/vendor_defns/hw_ubsec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/******************************************************************************
+ *
+ *  Copyright 2000
+ *  Broadcom Corporation
+ *  16215 Alton Parkway
+ *  PO Box 57013
+ *  Irvine CA 92619-7013
+ *
+ *****************************************************************************/
+/* 
+ * Broadcom Corporation uBSec SDK 
+ */
+/*
+ * Character device header file.
+ */
+/*
+ * Revision History:
+ *
+ * October 2000 JTT Created.
+ */
+
+#define MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_BITS (1024)
+#define MAX_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES (1024/8)
+#define SHA_BIT_SIZE  (160)
+#define MAX_CRYPTO_KEY_LENGTH 24
+#define MAX_MAC_KEY_LENGTH 64
+#define UBSEC_CRYPTO_DEVICE_NAME ((unsigned char *)"/dev/ubscrypt")
+#define UBSEC_KEY_DEVICE_NAME ((unsigned char *)"/dev/ubskey")
+
+/* Math command types. */
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODADD 0x0001
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODSUB 0x0002
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODMUL 0x0004
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODEXP 0x0008
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODREM 0x0010
+#define UBSEC_MATH_MODINV 0x0020
+
+typedef long ubsec_MathCommand_t;
+typedef long ubsec_RNGCommand_t;
+
+typedef struct ubsec_crypto_context_s {
+        unsigned int    flags;
+        unsigned char   crypto[MAX_CRYPTO_KEY_LENGTH];
+        unsigned char   auth[MAX_MAC_KEY_LENGTH];
+} ubsec_crypto_context_t, *ubsec_crypto_context_p;
+
+/* 
+ * Predeclare the function pointer types that we dynamically load from the DSO.
+ */
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_ubsec_bytes_to_bits(unsigned char *n, int bytes);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_ubsec_bits_to_bytes(int bits);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_ubsec_open(unsigned char *device);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_ubsec_close(int fd);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_diffie_hellman_generate_ioctl (int fd,
+        unsigned char *x, int *x_len, unsigned char *y, int *y_len, 
+        unsigned char *g, int g_len, unsigned char *m, int m_len,
+        unsigned char *userX, int userX_len, int random_bits);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_diffie_hellman_agree_ioctl (int fd,
+        unsigned char *x, int x_len, unsigned char *y, int y_len, 
+        unsigned char *m, int m_len, unsigned char *k, int *k_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_rsa_mod_exp_ioctl (int fd,
+        unsigned char *x, int x_len, unsigned char *m, int m_len,
+        unsigned char *e, int e_len, unsigned char *y, int *y_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_rsa_mod_exp_crt_ioctl (int fd,
+        unsigned char *x, int x_len, unsigned char *qinv, int qinv_len,
+        unsigned char *edq, int edq_len, unsigned char *q, int q_len,
+        unsigned char *edp, int edp_len, unsigned char *p, int p_len,
+        unsigned char *y, int *y_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_dsa_sign_ioctl (int fd,
+        int hash, unsigned char *data, int data_len, 
+        unsigned char *rndom, int random_len, 
+        unsigned char *p, int p_len, unsigned char *q, int q_len,
+        unsigned char *g, int g_len, unsigned char *key, int key_len,
+        unsigned char *r, int *r_len, unsigned char *s, int *s_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_dsa_verify_ioctl (int fd,
+        int hash, unsigned char *data, int data_len,
+        unsigned char *p, int p_len, unsigned char *q, int q_len,
+        unsigned char *g, int g_len, unsigned char *key, int key_len,
+        unsigned char *r, int r_len, unsigned char *s, int s_len,
+        unsigned char *v, int *v_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_math_accelerate_ioctl(int fd, ubsec_MathCommand_t command,
+        unsigned char *ModN, int *ModN_len, unsigned char *ExpE, int *ExpE_len, 
+        unsigned char *ParamA, int *ParamA_len, unsigned char *ParamB, int *ParamB_len,
+        unsigned char *Result, int *Result_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_rng_ioctl(int fd, ubsec_RNGCommand_t command,
+        unsigned char *Result, int *Result_len);
+
+typedef int t_UBSEC_max_key_len_ioctl(int fd, int *max_key_len);
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aaa4d4575e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/vendor_defns/hwcryptohook.h
@@ -0,0 +1,486 @@
+/*
+ * ModExp / RSA (with/without KM) plugin API
+ *
+ * The application will load a dynamic library which
+ * exports entrypoint(s) defined in this file.
+ *
+ * This set of entrypoints provides only a multithreaded,
+ * synchronous-within-each-thread, facility.
+ *
+ *
+ * This file is Copyright 1998-2000 nCipher Corporation Limited.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with opr without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright notice,
+ *    this list of conditions, and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above
+ *    copyright notice, this list of conditions, and the following
+ *    disclaimer, in the documentation and/or other materials provided
+ *    with the distribution
+ *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL NCIPHER CORPORATION LIMITED (`NCIPHER') AND/OR
+ * ANY OTHER AUTHORS OR DISTRIBUTORS OF THIS FILE BE LIABLE for any
+ * damages arising directly or indirectly from this file, its use or
+ * this licence.  Without prejudice to the generality of the
+ * foregoing: all liability shall be excluded for direct, indirect,
+ * special, incidental, consequential or other damages or any loss of
+ * profits, business, revenue goodwill or anticipated savings;
+ * liability shall be excluded even if nCipher or anyone else has been
+ * advised of the possibility of damage.  In any event, if the
+ * exclusion of liability is not effective, the liability of nCipher
+ * or any author or distributor shall be limited to the lesser of the
+ * price paid and 1,000 pounds sterling. This licence only fails to
+ * exclude or limit liability for death or personal injury arising out
+ * of negligence, and only to the extent that such an exclusion or
+ * limitation is not effective.
+ *
+ * NCIPHER AND THE AUTHORS AND DISTRIBUTORS SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIM ALL
+ * AND ANY WARRANTIES (WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED), including, but not
+ * limited to, any implied warranties of merchantability, fitness for
+ * a particular purpose, satisfactory quality, and/or non-infringement
+ * of any third party rights.
+ *
+ * US Government use: This software and documentation is Commercial
+ * Computer Software and Computer Software Documentation, as defined in
+ * sub-paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(5) of DFAR 252.227-7014, "Rights in
+ * Noncommercial Computer Software and Noncommercial Computer Software
+ * Documentation."  Use, duplication or disclosure by the Government is
+ * subject to the terms and conditions specified here.
+ *
+ * By using or distributing this file you will be accepting these
+ * terms and conditions, including the limitation of liability and
+ * lack of warranty.  If you do not wish to accept these terms and
+ * conditions, DO NOT USE THE FILE.
+ *
+ *
+ * The actual dynamically loadable plugin, and the library files for
+ * static linking, which are also provided in some distributions, are
+ * not covered by the licence described above.  You should have
+ * received a separate licence with terms and conditions for these
+ * library files; if you received the library files without a licence,
+ * please contact nCipher.
+ *
+ *
+ * $Id: hwcryptohook.h,v 1.1.1.1 2003/05/11 21:35:16 markus Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef HWCRYPTOHOOK_H
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifndef HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES 1
+#endif
+
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FAILED   -1
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK -2
+#define HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE  -3
+
+#if HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES
+
+/* These structs are defined by the application and opaque to the
+ * crypto plugin.  The application may define these as it sees fit.
+ * Default declarations are provided here, but the application may
+ *  #define HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES 0
+ * to prevent these declarations, and instead provide its own
+ * declarations of these types.  (Pointers to them must still be
+ * ordinary pointers to structs or unions, or the resulting combined
+ * program will have a type inconsistency.)
+ */
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_MutexValue HWCryptoHook_Mutex;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_CondVarValue HWCryptoHook_CondVar;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContextValue HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_CallerContextValue HWCryptoHook_CallerContext;
+
+#endif /* HWCRYPTOHOOK_DECLARE_APPTYPES */
+
+/* These next two structs are opaque to the application.  The crypto
+ * plugin will return pointers to them; the caller simply manipulates
+ * the pointers.
+ */
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_Context *HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle;
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_RSAKey *HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle;
+
+typedef struct {
+  char *buf;
+  size_t size;
+} HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf;
+/* Used for error reporting.  When a HWCryptoHook function fails it
+ * will return a sentinel value (0 for pointer-valued functions, or a
+ * negative number, usually HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FAILED, for
+ * integer-valued ones).  It will, if an ErrMsgBuf is passed, also put
+ * an error message there.
+ * 
+ * size is the size of the buffer, and will not be modified.  If you
+ * pass 0 for size you must pass 0 for buf, and nothing will be
+ * recorded (just as if you passed 0 for the struct pointer).
+ * Messages written to the buffer will always be null-terminated, even
+ * when truncated to fit within size bytes.
+ *
+ * The contents of the buffer are not defined if there is no error.
+ */
+
+typedef struct HWCryptoHook_MPIStruct {
+  unsigned char *buf;
+  size_t size;
+} HWCryptoHook_MPI;
+/* When one of these is returned, a pointer is passed to the function.
+ * At call, size is the space available.  Afterwards it is updated to
+ * be set to the actual length (which may be more than the space available,
+ * if there was not enough room and the result was truncated).
+ * buf (the pointer) is not updated.
+ *
+ * size is in bytes and may be zero at call or return, but must be a
+ * multiple of the limb size.  Zero limbs at the MS end are not
+ * permitted.
+ */
+
+#define HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_FallbackModExp    0x0002UL
+#define HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_FallbackRSAImmed  0x0004UL
+/* Enable requesting fallback to software in case of problems with the
+ * hardware support.  This indicates to the crypto provider that the
+ * application is prepared to fall back to software operation if the
+ * ModExp* or RSAImmed* functions return HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK.
+ * Without this flag those calls will never return
+ * HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK.  The flag will also cause the crypto
+ * provider to avoid repeatedly attempting to contact dead hardware
+ * within a short interval, if appropriate.
+ */
+
+#define HWCryptoHook_InitFlags_SimpleForkCheck   0x0010UL
+/* Without _SimpleForkCheck the library is allowed to assume that the
+ * application will not fork and call the library in the child(ren).
+ *
+ * When it is specified, this is allowed.  However, after a fork
+ * neither parent nor child may unload any loaded keys or call
+ * _Finish.  Instead, they should call exit (or die with a signal)
+ * without calling _Finish.  After all the children have died the
+ * parent may unload keys or call _Finish.
+ *
+ * This flag only has any effect on UN*X platforms.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+  unsigned long flags;
+  void *logstream; /* usually a FILE*.  See below. */
+
+  size_t limbsize; /* bignum format - size of radix type, must be power of 2 */
+  int mslimbfirst; /* 0 or 1 */
+  int msbytefirst; /* 0 or 1; -1 = native */
+
+  /* All the callback functions should return 0 on success, or a
+   * nonzero integer (whose value will be visible in the error message
+   * put in the buffer passed to the call).
+   *
+   * If a callback is not available pass a null function pointer.
+   *
+   * The callbacks may not call down again into the crypto plugin.
+   */
+  
+  /* For thread-safety.  Set everything to 0 if you promise only to be
+   * singlethreaded.  maxsimultaneous is the number of calls to
+   * ModExp[Crt]/RSAImmed{Priv,Pub}/RSA.  If you don't know what to
+   * put there then say 0 and the hook library will use a default.
+   *
+   * maxmutexes is a small limit on the number of simultaneous mutexes
+   * which will be requested by the library.  If there is no small
+   * limit, set it to 0.  If the crypto plugin cannot create the
+   * advertised number of mutexes the calls to its functions may fail.
+   * If a low number of mutexes is advertised the plugin will try to
+   * do the best it can.  Making larger numbers of mutexes available
+   * may improve performance and parallelism by reducing contention
+   * over critical sections.  Unavailability of any mutexes, implying
+   * single-threaded operation, should be indicated by the setting
+   * mutex_init et al to 0.
+   */
+  int maxmutexes;
+  int maxsimultaneous;
+  size_t mutexsize;
+  int (*mutex_init)(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*, HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+  int (*mutex_acquire)(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
+  void (*mutex_release)(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
+  void (*mutex_destroy)(HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
+
+  /* For greater efficiency, can use condition vars internally for
+   * synchronisation.  In this case maxsimultaneous is ignored, but
+   * the other mutex stuff must be available.  In singlethreaded
+   * programs, set everything to 0.
+   */
+  size_t condvarsize;
+  int (*condvar_init)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*, HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+  int (*condvar_wait)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*, HWCryptoHook_Mutex*);
+  void (*condvar_signal)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*);
+  void (*condvar_broadcast)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*);
+  void (*condvar_destroy)(HWCryptoHook_CondVar*);
+  
+  /* The semantics of acquiring and releasing mutexes and broadcasting
+   * and waiting on condition variables are expected to be those from
+   * POSIX threads (pthreads).  The mutexes may be (in pthread-speak)
+   * fast mutexes, recursive mutexes, or nonrecursive ones.
+   * 
+   * The _release/_signal/_broadcast and _destroy functions must
+   * always succeed when given a valid argument; if they are given an
+   * invalid argument then the program (crypto plugin + application)
+   * has an internal error, and they should abort the program.
+   */
+
+  int (*getpassphrase)(const char *prompt_info,
+                       int *len_io, char *buf,
+                       HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx,
+                       HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+  /* Passphrases and the prompt_info, if they contain high-bit-set
+   * characters, are UTF-8.  The prompt_info may be a null pointer if
+   * no prompt information is available (it should not be an empty
+   * string).  It will not contain text like `enter passphrase';
+   * instead it might say something like `Operator Card for John
+   * Smith' or `SmartCard in nFast Module #1, Slot #1'.
+   *
+   * buf points to a buffer in which to return the passphrase; on
+   * entry *len_io is the length of the buffer.  It should be updated
+   * by the callback.  The returned passphrase should not be
+   * null-terminated by the callback.
+   */
+  
+  int (*getphystoken)(const char *prompt_info,
+                      const char *wrong_info,
+                      HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx,
+                      HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+  /* Requests that the human user physically insert a different
+   * smartcard, DataKey, etc.  The plugin should check whether the
+   * currently inserted token(s) are appropriate, and if they are it
+   * should not make this call.
+   *
+   * prompt_info is as before.  wrong_info is a description of the
+   * currently inserted token(s) so that the user is told what
+   * something is.  wrong_info, like prompt_info, may be null, but
+   * should not be an empty string.  Its contents should be
+   * syntactically similar to that of prompt_info. 
+   */
+  
+  /* Note that a single LoadKey operation might cause several calls to
+   * getpassphrase and/or requestphystoken.  If requestphystoken is
+   * not provided (ie, a null pointer is passed) then the plugin may
+   * not support loading keys for which authorisation by several cards
+   * is required.  If getpassphrase is not provided then cards with
+   * passphrases may not be supported.
+   *
+   * getpassphrase and getphystoken do not need to check that the
+   * passphrase has been entered correctly or the correct token
+   * inserted; the crypto plugin will do that.  If this is not the
+   * case then the crypto plugin is responsible for calling these
+   * routines again as appropriate until the correct token(s) and
+   * passphrase(s) are supplied as required, or until any retry limits
+   * implemented by the crypto plugin are reached.
+   *
+   * In either case, the application must allow the user to say `no'
+   * or `cancel' to indicate that they do not know the passphrase or
+   * have the appropriate token; this should cause the callback to
+   * return nonzero indicating error.
+   */
+
+  void (*logmessage)(void *logstream, const char *message);
+  /* A log message will be generated at least every time something goes
+   * wrong and an ErrMsgBuf is filled in (or would be if one was
+   * provided).  Other diagnostic information may be written there too,
+   * including more detailed reasons for errors which are reported in an
+   * ErrMsgBuf.
+   *
+   * When a log message is generated, this callback is called.  It
+   * should write a message to the relevant logging arrangements.
+   *
+   * The message string passed will be null-terminated and may be of arbitrary
+   * length.  It will not be prefixed by the time and date, nor by the
+   * name of the library that is generating it - if this is required,
+   * the logmessage callback must do it.  The message will not have a
+   * trailing newline (though it may contain internal newlines).
+   *
+   * If a null pointer is passed for logmessage a default function is
+   * used.  The default function treats logstream as a FILE* which has
+   * been converted to a void*.  If logstream is 0 it does nothing.
+   * Otherwise it prepends the date and time and library name and
+   * writes the message to logstream.  Each line will be prefixed by a
+   * descriptive string containing the date, time and identity of the
+   * crypto plugin.  Errors on the logstream are not reported
+   * anywhere, and the default function doesn't flush the stream, so
+   * the application must set the buffering how it wants it.
+   *
+   * The crypto plugin may also provide a facility to have copies of
+   * log messages sent elsewhere, and or for adjusting the verbosity
+   * of the log messages; any such facilities will be configured by
+   * external means.
+   */
+
+} HWCryptoHook_InitInfo;
+
+typedef
+HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle HWCryptoHook_Init_t(const HWCryptoHook_InitInfo *initinfo,
+                                               size_t initinfosize,
+                                               const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors,
+                                               HWCryptoHook_CallerContext *cactx);
+extern HWCryptoHook_Init_t HWCryptoHook_Init;
+
+/* Caller should set initinfosize to the size of the HWCryptoHook struct,
+ * so it can be extended later.
+ *
+ * On success, a message for display or logging by the server,
+ * including the name and version number of the plugin, will be filled
+ * in into *errors; on failure *errors is used for error handling, as
+ * usual.
+ */
+
+/* All these functions return 0 on success, HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_FAILED
+ * on most failures.  HWCRYPTOHOOK_ERROR_MPISIZE means at least one of
+ * the output MPI buffer(s) was too small; the sizes of all have been
+ * set to the desired size (and for those where the buffer was large
+ * enough, the value may have been copied in), and no error message
+ * has been recorded.
+ *
+ * You may pass 0 for the errors struct.  In any case, unless you set
+ * _NoStderr at init time then messages may be reported to stderr.
+ */
+
+/* The RSAImmed* functions (and key managed RSA) only work with
+ * modules which have an RSA patent licence - currently that means KM
+ * units; the ModExp* ones work with all modules, so you need a patent
+ * licence in the software in the US.  They are otherwise identical.
+ */
+
+typedef
+void HWCryptoHook_Finish_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx);
+extern HWCryptoHook_Finish_t HWCryptoHook_Finish;
+/* You must not have any calls going or keys loaded when you call this. */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                               unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
+                               const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes_t HWCryptoHook_RandomBytes;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI a,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI p,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI n,
+                          HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                          const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_ModExp_t HWCryptoHook_ModExp;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPub_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI m,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI e,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI n,
+                               HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                               const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPub_t HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPub;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI a,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI p,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI q,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI dmp1,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI dmq1,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI iqmp,
+                             HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                             const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT_t HWCryptoHook_ModExpCRT;
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPriv_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI m,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI p,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI q,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI dmp1,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI dmq1,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI iqmp,
+                                HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                                const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPriv_t HWCryptoHook_RSAImmedPriv;
+
+/* The RSAImmed* and ModExp* functions may return E_FAILED or
+ * E_FALLBACK for failure.
+ *
+ * E_FAILED means the failure is permanent and definite and there
+ *    should be no attempt to fall back to software.  (Eg, for some
+ *    applications, which support only the acceleration-only
+ *    functions, the `key material' may actually be an encoded key
+ *    identifier, and doing the operation in software would give wrong
+ *    answers.)
+ *
+ * E_FALLBACK means that doing the computation in software would seem
+ *    reasonable.  If an application pays attention to this and is
+ *    able to fall back, it should also set the Fallback init flags.
+ */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t(HWCryptoHook_ContextHandle hwctx,
+                              const char *key_ident,
+                              HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle *keyhandle_r,
+                              const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors,
+                              HWCryptoHook_PassphraseContext *ppctx);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey_t HWCryptoHook_RSALoadKey;
+/* The key_ident is a null-terminated string configured by the
+ * user via the application's usual configuration mechanisms.
+ * It is provided to the user by the crypto provider's key management
+ * system.  The user must be able to enter at least any string of between
+ * 1 and 1023 characters inclusive, consisting of printable 7-bit
+ * ASCII characters.  The provider should avoid using
+ * any characters except alphanumerics and the punctuation
+ * characters  _ - + . / @ ~  (the user is expected to be able
+ * to enter these without quoting).  The string may be case-sensitive.
+ * The application may allow the user to enter other NULL-terminated strings,
+ * and the provider must cope (returning an error if the string is not
+ * valid).
+ *
+ * If the key does not exist, no error is recorded and 0 is returned;
+ * keyhandle_r will be set to 0 instead of to a key handle.
+ */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle k,
+                                   HWCryptoHook_MPI *n,
+                                   HWCryptoHook_MPI *e,
+                                   const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey_t HWCryptoHook_RSAGetPublicKey;
+/* The crypto plugin will not store certificates.
+ *
+ * Although this function for acquiring the public key value is
+ * provided, it is not the purpose of this API to deal fully with the
+ * handling of the public key.
+ *
+ * It is expected that the crypto supplier's key generation program
+ * will provide general facilities for producing X.509
+ * self-certificates and certificate requests in PEM format.  These
+ * will be given to the user so that they can configure them in the
+ * application, send them to CAs, or whatever.
+ *
+ * In case this kind of certificate handling is not appropriate, the
+ * crypto supplier's key generation program should be able to be
+ * configured not to generate such a self-certificate or certificate
+ * request.  Then the application will need to do all of this, and
+ * will need to store and handle the public key and certificates
+ * itself.
+ */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t(HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle k,
+                                const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey_t HWCryptoHook_RSAUnloadKey;
+/* Might fail due to locking problems, or other serious internal problems. */
+
+typedef
+int HWCryptoHook_RSA_t(HWCryptoHook_MPI m,
+                       HWCryptoHook_RSAKeyHandle k,
+                       HWCryptoHook_MPI *r,
+                       const HWCryptoHook_ErrMsgBuf *errors);
+extern HWCryptoHook_RSA_t HWCryptoHook_RSA;
+/* RSA private key operation (sign or decrypt) - raw, unpadded. */
+
+#endif /*HWCRYPTOHOOK_H*/
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/vendor_defns/sureware.h b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/vendor_defns/sureware.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d3789219d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/engine/vendor_defns/sureware.h
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+/*
+* Written by Corinne Dive-Reclus(cdive@baltimore.com)
+*
+* Copyright@2001 Baltimore Technologies Ltd.
+*                                                                                                                                                                                               *       
+*               THIS FILE IS PROVIDED BY BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES ``AS IS'' AND                                                                                                                                                   *
+*               ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE                                   * 
+*               IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE                              *
+*               ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES BE LIABLE                                             *
+*               FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL                              *
+*               DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS                                 *
+*               OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)                                   *
+*               HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT                              *
+*               LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY                               *
+*               OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF                                  *
+*               SUCH DAMAGE.                                                                                                                                                    *
+*
+* 
+*/
+#ifdef WIN32
+#define SW_EXPORT       __declspec ( dllexport )
+#else
+#define SW_EXPORT
+#endif
+
+/*
+*       List of exposed SureWare errors
+*/
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_FAILED               -1
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK             -2
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE -3
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE -4
+#define SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_INVALID_PAD -5
+/*
+* -----------------WARNING-----------------------------------
+* In all the following functions:
+* msg is a string with at least 24 bytes free.
+* A 24 bytes string will be concatenated to the existing content of msg. 
+*/
+/*
+*       SureWare Initialisation function
+*       in param threadsafe, if !=0, thread safe enabled
+*       return SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if failure, 1 if success
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Init_t(char*const msg,int threadsafe);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Init_t SureWareHook_Init;
+/*
+*       SureWare Finish function
+*/
+typedef void SureWareHook_Finish_t();
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Finish_t SureWareHook_Finish;
+/*
+*        PRE_CONDITION:
+*               DO NOT CALL ANY OF THE FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS IN CASE OF INIT FAILURE
+*/
+/*
+*       SureWare RAND Bytes function
+*       In case of failure, the content of buf is unpredictable.
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK if function not available in hardware
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in/out param buf : a num bytes long buffer where random bytes will be put
+*       in param num : the number of bytes into buf
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t(char*const msg,unsigned char *buf, int num);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes_t SureWareHook_Rand_Bytes;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare RAND Seed function
+*       Adds some seed to the Hardware Random Number Generator
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FALLBACK if function not available in hardware
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in param buf : the seed to add into the HRNG
+*       in param num : the number of bytes into buf
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t(char*const msg,const void *buf, int num);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Rand_Seed_t SureWareHook_Rand_Seed;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Load Private Key function
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*       No hardware is contact for this function.
+*
+*       in param key_id :the name of the private protected key file without the extension
+                                                ".sws"
+*       out param hptr : a pointer to a buffer allocated by SureWare_Hook
+*       out param num: the effective key length in bytes
+*       out param keytype: 1 if RSA 2 if DSA
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t(char*const msg,const char *key_id,char **hptr,unsigned long *num,char *keytype);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Load_Privkey_t SureWareHook_Load_Privkey;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Info Public Key function
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*       No hardware is contact for this function.
+*
+*       in param key_id :the name of the private protected key file without the extension
+                                                ".swp"
+*       out param hptr : a pointer to a buffer allocated by SureWare_Hook
+*       out param num: the effective key length in bytes
+*       out param keytype: 1 if RSA 2 if DSA
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t(char*const msg,const char *key_id,unsigned long *num,
+                                                                                char *keytype);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey_t SureWareHook_Info_Pubkey;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Load Public Key function
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*       No hardware is contact for this function.
+*
+*       in param key_id :the name of the public protected key file without the extension
+                                                ".swp"
+*       in param num : the bytes size of n and e
+*       out param n: where to write modulus in bn format
+*       out param e: where to write exponent in bn format
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t(char*const msg,const char *key_id,unsigned long num,
+                                                                                unsigned long *n, unsigned long *e);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey_t SureWareHook_Load_Rsa_Pubkey;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Load DSA Public Key function
+*       return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*       No hardware is contact for this function.
+*
+*       in param key_id :the name of the public protected key file without the extension
+                                                ".swp"
+*       in param num : the bytes size of n and e
+*       out param pub: where to write pub key in bn format
+*       out param p: where to write prime in bn format
+*       out param q: where to write sunprime (length 20 bytes) in bn format
+*       out param g: where to write base in bn format
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t(char*const msg,const char *key_id,unsigned long num,
+                                                                                unsigned long *pub, unsigned long *p,unsigned long*q,
+                                                                                unsigned long *g);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey_t SureWareHook_Load_Dsa_Pubkey;
+
+/*
+*       SureWare Free function
+*       Destroy the key into the hardware if destroy==1
+*/
+typedef void SureWareHook_Free_t(char *p,int destroy);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Free_t SureWareHook_Free;
+
+#define SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD 1
+#define SUREWARE_ISO9796_PAD 2
+#define SUREWARE_NO_PAD 0
+/*
+* SureWare RSA Private Decryption
+* return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in param flen : byte size of from and to
+*       in param from : encrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*       out param tlen: byte size of decrypted data, if error, unexpected value
+*       out param to : decrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*   in param prsa: a protected key pointer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*   int padding: padding id as follow
+*                                       SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD
+*                                       SUREWARE_NO_PAD
+*
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t(char*const msg,int flen,unsigned char *from,
+                                                                                int *tlen,unsigned char *to,
+                                                                                char *prsa,int padding);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec_t SureWareHook_Rsa_Priv_Dec;
+/*
+* SureWare RSA Signature
+* return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in param flen : byte size of from and to
+*       in param from : encrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*       out param tlen: byte size of decrypted data, if error, unexpected value
+*       out param to : decrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*   in param prsa: a protected key pointer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*   int padding: padding id as follow
+*                                       SUREWARE_PKCS1_PAD
+*                                       SUREWARE_ISO9796_PAD
+*
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t(char*const msg,int flen,unsigned char *from,
+                                                                                int *tlen,unsigned char *to,
+                                                                                char *prsa,int padding);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign_t SureWareHook_Rsa_Sign;
+/*
+* SureWare DSA Signature
+* return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       in param flen : byte size of from and to
+*       in param from : encrypted data buffer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*       out param to : decrypted data buffer, should be a 40bytes valid pointer
+*   in param pdsa: a protected key pointer, should be a not-null valid pointer
+*
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t(char*const msg,int flen,const unsigned char *from,
+                                                                                unsigned long *r,unsigned long *s,char *pdsa);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign_t SureWareHook_Dsa_Sign;
+
+
+/*
+* SureWare Mod Exp
+* return 1 if success
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_FAILED if error while processing
+*                       SureWareHOOK_ERROR_UNIT_FAILURE if hardware failure
+*                       SUREWAREHOOK_ERROR_DATA_SIZE wrong size for buf
+*
+*       mod and res are mlen bytes long.
+*       exp is elen bytes long
+*       data is dlen bytes long
+*       mlen,elen and dlen are all multiple of sizeof(unsigned long)
+*/
+typedef int SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t(char*const msg,int mlen,const unsigned long *mod,
+                                                                        int elen,const unsigned long *exp,
+                                                                        int dlen,unsigned long *data,
+                                                                        unsigned long *res);
+extern SW_EXPORT SureWareHook_Mod_Exp_t SureWareHook_Mod_Exp;
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/idea/version b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/idea/version
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..3f22293795
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/idea/version
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+1.1 07/12/95 - eay
+        Many thanks to Rhys Weatherley <rweather@us.oracle.com>
+        for pointing out that I was assuming little endian byte
+        order for all quantities what idea actually used
+        bigendian.  No where in the spec does it mention
+        this, it is all in terms of 16 bit numbers and even the example
+        does not use byte streams for the input example :-(.
+        If you byte swap each pair of input, keys and iv, the functions
+        would produce the output as the old version :-(.
+
+1.0 ??/??/95 - eay
+        First version.
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9abe99d92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+/* crypto/mdc2/mdc2test.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../e_os.h"
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2)
+#define OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+    printf("No MDC2 support\n");
+    return(0);
+}
+#else
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+#include <openssl/ebcdic.h>
+#endif
+
+static unsigned char pad1[16]={
+        0x42,0xE5,0x0C,0xD2,0x24,0xBA,0xCE,0xBA,
+        0x76,0x0B,0xDD,0x2B,0xD4,0x09,0x28,0x1A
+        };
+
+static unsigned char pad2[16]={
+        0x2E,0x46,0x79,0xB5,0xAD,0xD9,0xCA,0x75,
+        0x35,0xD8,0x7A,0xFE,0xAB,0x33,0xBE,0xE2
+        };
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+        {
+        int ret=0;
+        unsigned char md[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+        int i;
+        EVP_MD_CTX c;
+        static char *text="Now is the time for all ";
+
+#ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+        ebcdic2ascii(text,text,strlen(text));
+#endif
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c);
+        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,EVP_mdc2(), NULL);
+        EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,(unsigned char *)text,strlen(text));
+        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c,&(md[0]),NULL);
+
+        if (memcmp(md,pad1,MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
+                {
+                for (i=0; i<MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                        printf("%02X",md[i]);
+                printf(" <- generated\n");
+                for (i=0; i<MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                        printf("%02X",pad1[i]);
+                printf(" <- correct\n");
+                ret=1;
+                }
+        else
+                printf("pad1 - ok\n");
+
+        EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,EVP_mdc2(), NULL);
+        /* FIXME: use a ctl function? */
+        ((MDC2_CTX *)c.md_data)->pad_type=2;
+        EVP_DigestUpdate(&c,(unsigned char *)text,strlen(text));
+        EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c,&(md[0]),NULL);
+
+        if (memcmp(md,pad2,MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH) != 0)
+                {
+                for (i=0; i<MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                        printf("%02X",md[i]);
+                printf(" <- generated\n");
+                for (i=0; i<MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++)
+                        printf("%02X",pad2[i]);
+                printf(" <- correct\n");
+                ret=1;
+                }
+        else
+                printf("pad2 - ok\n");
+
+        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c);
+        EXIT(ret);
+        return(ret);
+        }
+#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/mem_clr.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/mem_clr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e4b7f540b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/mem_clr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/* crypto/mem_clr.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
+/* Written by Geoff Thorpe (geoff@geoffthorpe.net) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2002.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+unsigned char cleanse_ctr = 0;
+
+void OPENSSL_cleanse(void *ptr, size_t len)
+        {
+        unsigned char *p = ptr;
+        size_t loop = len;
+        while(loop--)
+                {
+                *(p++) = cleanse_ctr;
+                cleanse_ctr += (17 + (unsigned char)((int)p & 0xF));
+                }
+        if(memchr(ptr, cleanse_ctr, len))
+                cleanse_ctr += 63;
+        }
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rc5/rc5s.cpp b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rc5/rc5s.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1c5518bc80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/crypto/rc5/rc5s.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+//
+// gettsc.inl
+//
+// gives access to the Pentium's (secret) cycle counter
+//
+// This software was written by Leonard Janke (janke@unixg.ubc.ca)
+// in 1996-7 and is entered, by him, into the public domain.
+
+#if defined(__WATCOMC__)
+void GetTSC(unsigned long&);
+#pragma aux GetTSC = 0x0f 0x31 "mov [edi], eax" parm [edi] modify [edx eax];
+#elif defined(__GNUC__)
+inline
+void GetTSC(unsigned long& tsc)
+{
+  asm volatile(".byte 15, 49\n\t"
+               : "=eax" (tsc)
+               :
+               : "%edx", "%eax");
+}
+#elif defined(_MSC_VER)
+inline
+void GetTSC(unsigned long& tsc)
+{
+  unsigned long a;
+  __asm _emit 0fh
+  __asm _emit 31h
+  __asm mov a, eax;
+  tsc=a;
+}
+#endif      
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <openssl/rc5.h>
+
+void main(int argc,char *argv[])
+        {
+        RC5_32_KEY key;
+        unsigned long s1,s2,e1,e2;
+        unsigned long data[2];
+        int i,j;
+        static unsigned char d[16]={0x01,0x23,0x45,0x67,0x89,0xAB,0xCD,0xEF};
+
+        RC5_32_set_key(&key, 16,d,12);
+
+        for (j=0; j<6; j++)
+                {
+                for (i=0; i<1000; i++) /**/
+                        {
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        GetTSC(s1);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        GetTSC(e1);
+                        GetTSC(s2);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        GetTSC(e2);
+                        RC5_32_encrypt(&data[0],&key);
+                        }
+
+                printf("cast %d %d (%d)\n",
+                        e1-s1,e2-s2,((e2-s2)-(e1-s1)));
+                }
+        }
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/cluster_labs/hw_cluster_labs.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/cluster_labs/hw_cluster_labs.c
index 00c14f2755..036f48bafa 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/cluster_labs/hw_cluster_labs.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/cluster_labs/hw_cluster_labs.c
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ static int cluster_labs_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa);
 
 /* DSA stuff */
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
-DSA_SIG *cluster_labs_dsa_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
+static DSA_SIG *cluster_labs_dsa_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa);
 static int cluster_labs_dsa_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
                                 DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
 static int cluster_labs_dsa_mod_exp(DSA *dsa, BIGNUM *rr, BIGNUM *a1,
@@ -245,6 +245,9 @@ static ENGINE *engine_cluster_labs(void)
         return ret;
         }
 
+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+static
+#endif
 void ENGINE_load_cluster_labs(void)
         {
 
@@ -504,7 +507,7 @@ static int cluster_labs_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa)
 
         }
         
-DSA_SIG *cluster_labs_dsa_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
+static DSA_SIG *cluster_labs_dsa_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
         {
 
         if(cluster_labs_dso == NULL)
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
index 881b16a7cb..0c2c39b8a7 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/ibmca/hw_ibmca.c
@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ static ENGINE *engine_ibmca(void)
         return ret;

         }

 

+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT

+static

+#endif

 void ENGINE_load_ibmca(void)

         {

         /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/rsaref/Makefile b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/rsaref/Makefile
index 003e35df2e..63b8c79d27 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/rsaref/Makefile
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/rsaref/Makefile
@@ -34,13 +34,17 @@ update:		FORCE.update
                 perl ../../../util/mkerr.pl -conf rsaref.ec \
                         -nostatic -staticloader -write rsaref.c
 
+darwin:         install $(SHLIB).darwin
+cygwin:         install $(SHLIB).cygwin
 gnu:            install $(SHLIB).gnu
+alpha-osf1:     install $(SHLIB).alpha-osf1
 tru64:          install $(SHLIB).tru64
 solaris:        install $(SHLIB).solaris
 irix:           install $(SHLIB).irix
 hpux32:         install $(SHLIB).hpux32
 hpux64:         install $(SHLIB).hpux64
 aix:            install $(SHLIB).aix
+reliantunix:    install $(SHLIB).reliantunix
 
 $(LIB):         $(OBJ)
                 $(AR) $(LIB) $(OBJ)
@@ -51,6 +55,18 @@ LINK_SO=	\
   (nm -Pg $(LIBNAME).o | grep ' [BDT] ' | cut -f1 -d' ' > $(LIBNAME).exp; \
    $$SHAREDCMD $$SHAREDFLAGS -o $(SHLIB) $(LIBNAME).o -L ../../.. -lcrypto -lc)
 
+$(SHLIB).darwin:        $(LIB) install/librsaref.a
+                ALLSYMSFLAGS='-all_load' \
+                SHAREDFLAGS='-dynamiclib -install_name $(SHLIB)' \
+                SHAREDCMD='$(CC)'; \
+                $(LINK_SO)
+                touch $(SHLIB).darwin
+$(SHLIB).cygwin:        $(LIB) install/librsaref.a
+                ALLSYMSFLAGS='--whole-archive' \
+                SHAREDFLAGS='-shared -Wl,-Bsymbolic -Wl,--out-implib,$(LIBNAME).dll.a' \
+                SHAREDCMD='$(CC)'; \
+                $(LINK_SO)
+                touch $(SHLIB).cygwin
 $(SHLIB).gnu:   $(LIB) install/librsaref.a
                 ALLSYMSFLAGS='--whole-archive' \
                 SHAREDFLAGS='-shared -Wl,-soname=$(SHLIB)' \
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/rsaref/rsaref.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/rsaref/rsaref.c
index f092acbf3f..872811b8f7 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/rsaref/rsaref.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/rsaref/rsaref.c
@@ -3,11 +3,14 @@
    be found a little here and there. */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
 #include "./source/global.h"
 #include "./source/rsaref.h"
 #include "./source/rsa.h"
 #include "./source/des.h"
 #include <openssl/err.h>
+#define OPENSSL_NO_MD2
+#define OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/engine.h>
@@ -93,21 +96,21 @@ static int rsaref_digest_nids[] =
 /*****************************************************************************
  * DES functions
  **/
-int cipher_des_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+static int cipher_des_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
         const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-int cipher_des_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+static int cipher_des_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-int cipher_des_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
-int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+static int cipher_des_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+static int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
         const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+static int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
-int cipher_desx_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+static int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+static int cipher_desx_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
         const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
-int cipher_desx_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+static int cipher_desx_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
-int cipher_desx_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
+static int cipher_desx_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *);
 
 /*****************************************************************************
  * Our DES ciphers
@@ -400,7 +403,7 @@ static int rsaref_private_decrypt(int len, const unsigned char *from, unsigned c
 
         if (!RSAref_Private_eay2ref(rsa,&RSAkey))
                 goto err;
-        if ((i=RSAPrivateDecrypt(to,&outlen,(unsigned char *)from,len,&RSAkey)) != 0)
+        if ((i=RSAPrivateDecrypt(to,(unsigned int *)&outlen,(unsigned char *)from,len,&RSAkey)) != 0)
                 {
                 RSAREFerr(RSAREF_F_RSAREF_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,i);
                 outlen= -1;
@@ -423,7 +426,7 @@ static int rsaref_private_encrypt(int len, const unsigned char *from, unsigned c
         }
         if (!RSAref_Private_eay2ref(rsa,&RSAkey))
                 goto err;
-        if ((i=RSAPrivateEncrypt(to,&outlen,(unsigned char *)from,len,&RSAkey)) != 0)
+        if ((i=RSAPrivateEncrypt(to,(unsigned int)&outlen,(unsigned char *)from,len,&RSAkey)) != 0)
                 {
                 RSAREFerr(RSAREF_F_RSAREF_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,i);
                 outlen= -1;
@@ -441,7 +444,7 @@ static int rsaref_public_decrypt(int len, const unsigned char *from, unsigned ch
 
         if (!RSAref_Public_eay2ref(rsa,&RSAkey))
                 goto err;
-        if ((i=RSAPublicDecrypt(to,&outlen,(unsigned char *)from,len,&RSAkey)) != 0)
+        if ((i=RSAPublicDecrypt(to,(unsigned int)&outlen,(unsigned char *)from,len,&RSAkey)) != 0)
                 {
                 RSAREFerr(RSAREF_F_RSAREF_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,i);
                 outlen= -1;
@@ -478,7 +481,7 @@ static int rsaref_public_encrypt(int len, const unsigned char *from, unsigned ch
 
         if (!RSAref_Public_eay2ref(rsa,&RSAkey))
                 goto err;
-        if ((i=RSAPublicEncrypt(to,&outlen,(unsigned char *)from,len,&RSAkey,&rnd)) != 0)
+        if ((i=RSAPublicEncrypt(to,(unsigned int)&outlen,(unsigned char *)from,len,&RSAkey,&rnd)) != 0)
                 {
                 RSAREFerr(RSAREF_F_RSAREF_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,i);
                 outlen= -1;
@@ -550,13 +553,13 @@ static int rsaref_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
  **/
 #undef data
 #define data(ctx) ((DES_CBC_CTX *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
-int cipher_des_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+static int cipher_des_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
         const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
         {
         DES_CBCInit(data(ctx), (unsigned char *)key, (unsigned char *)iv, enc);
         return 1;
         }
-int cipher_des_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+static int cipher_des_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
         {
         int ret = DES_CBCUpdate(data(ctx), out, (unsigned char *)in, inl);
@@ -572,7 +575,7 @@ int cipher_des_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                 }
         return !ret;
         }
-int cipher_des_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+static int cipher_des_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
         {
         memset(data(ctx), 0, ctx->cipher->ctx_size);
         return 1;
@@ -580,14 +583,14 @@ int cipher_des_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 
 #undef data
 #define data(ctx) ((DES3_CBC_CTX *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
-int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+static int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
         const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
         {
         DES3_CBCInit(data(ctx), (unsigned char *)key, (unsigned char *)iv,
                 enc);
         return 1;
         }
-int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+static int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
         {
         int ret = DES3_CBCUpdate(data(ctx), out, (unsigned char *)in, inl);
@@ -603,7 +606,7 @@ int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                 }
         return !ret;
         }
-int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+static int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
         {
         memset(data(ctx), 0, ctx->cipher->ctx_size);
         return 1;
@@ -611,14 +614,14 @@ int cipher_des_ede3_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 
 #undef data
 #define data(ctx) ((DESX_CBC_CTX *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
-int cipher_desx_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
+static int cipher_desx_cbc_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
         const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
         {
         DESX_CBCInit(data(ctx), (unsigned char *)key, (unsigned char *)iv,
                 enc);
         return 1;
         }
-int cipher_desx_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
+static int cipher_desx_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
         const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
         {
         int ret = DESX_CBCUpdate(data(ctx), out, (unsigned char *)in, inl);
@@ -634,7 +637,7 @@ int cipher_desx_cbc_code(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
                 }
         return !ret;
         }
-int cipher_desx_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+static int cipher_desx_cbc_clean(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
         {
         memset(data(ctx), 0, ctx->cipher->ctx_size);
         return 1;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c
index 308e18710f..29206b4a29 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/demos/engines/zencod/hw_zencod.c
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int bind_helper ( ENGINE *e )
 /* As this is only ever called once, there's no need for locking
  * (indeed - the lock will already be held by our caller!!!)
  */
-ENGINE *ENGINE_zencod ( void )
+static ENGINE *ENGINE_zencod ( void )
 {
 
         ENGINE *eng = ENGINE_new () ;
@@ -383,6 +383,9 @@ ENGINE *ENGINE_zencod ( void )
 }
 
 
+#ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
+static
+#endif
 void ENGINE_load_zencod ( void )
 {
         /* Copied from eng_[openssl|dyn].c */
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45f42eaaf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/HOWTO/keys.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+<DRAFT!>
+                        HOWTO keys
+
+1. Introduction
+
+Keys are the basis of public key algorithms and PKI.  Keys usually
+come in pairs, with one half being the public key and the other half
+being the private key.  With OpenSSL, the private key contains the
+public key information as well, so a public key doesn't need to be
+generated separately.
+
+Public keys come in several flavors, using different cryptographic
+algorithms.  The most popular ones associated with certificates are
+RSA and DSA, and this HOWTO will show how to generate each of them.
+
+
+2. To generate a RSA key
+
+A RSA key can be used both for encryption and for signing.
+
+Generating a key for the RSA algorithm is quite easy, all you have to
+do is the following:
+
+  openssl genrsa -des3 -out privkey.pem 2048
+
+With this variant, you will be prompted for a protecting password.  If
+you don't want your key to be protected by a password, remove the flag
+'-des3' from the command line above.
+
+    NOTE: if you intend to use the key together with a server
+    certificate, it may be a good thing to avoid protecting it
+    with a password, since that would mean someone would have to
+    type in the password every time the server needs to access
+    the key.
+
+The number 2048 is the size of the key, in bits.  Today, 2048 or
+higher is recommended for RSA keys, as fewer amount of bits is
+consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon.
+
+
+3. To generate a DSA key
+
+A DSA key can be used both for signing only.  This is important to
+keep in mind to know what kind of purposes a certificate request with
+a DSA key can really be used for.
+
+Generating a key for the DSA algorithm is a two-step process.  First,
+you have to generate parameters from which to generate the key:
+
+  openssl dsaparam -out dsaparam.pem 2048
+
+The number 2048 is the size of the key, in bits.  Today, 2048 or
+higher is recommended for DSA keys, as fewer amount of bits is
+consider insecure or to be insecure pretty soon.
+
+When that is done, you can generate a key using the parameters in
+question (actually, several keys can be generated from the same
+parameters):
+
+  openssl gendsa -des3 -out privkey.pem dsaparam.pem
+
+With this variant, you will be prompted for a protecting password.  If
+you don't want your key to be protected by a password, remove the flag
+'-des3' from the command line above.
+
+    NOTE: if you intend to use the key together with a server
+    certificate, it may be a good thing to avoid protecting it
+    with a password, since that would mean someone would have to
+    type in the password every time the server needs to access
+    the key.
+
+-- 
+Richard Levitte
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51679bfcd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_OBJECT_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_OBJECT_new, ASN1_OBJECT_free, - object allocation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_new(void);
+ void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The ASN1_OBJECT allocation routines, allocate and free an
+ASN1_OBJECT structure, which represents an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER.
+
+ASN1_OBJECT_new() allocates and initializes a ASN1_OBJECT structure.
+
+ASN1_OBJECT_free() frees up the B<ASN1_OBJECT> structure B<a>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Although ASN1_OBJECT_new() allocates a new ASN1_OBJECT structure it
+is almost never used in applications. The ASN1 object utility functions
+such as OBJ_nid2obj() are used instead.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If the allocation fails, ASN1_OBJECT_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error
+code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
+Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+ASN1_OBJECT_free() returns no value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(3)|d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+ASN1_OBJECT_new() and ASN1_OBJECT_free() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c4ec693f17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_length.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_STRING_dup, ASN1_STRING_cmp, ASN1_STRING_set, ASN1_STRING_length,
+ASN1_STRING_length_set, ASN1_STRING_type, ASN1_STRING_data -
+ASN1_STRING utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_length(ASN1_STRING *x);
+ unsigned char * ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x);
+
+ ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_dup(ASN1_STRING *a);
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_cmp(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_STRING *b);
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *data, int len);
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_type(ASN1_STRING *x);
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions allow an B<ASN1_STRING> structure to be manipulated.
+
+ASN1_STRING_length() returns the length of the content of B<x>.
+
+ASN1_STRING_data() returns an internal pointer to the data of B<x>.
+Since this is an internal pointer it should B<not> be freed or
+modified in any way.
+
+ASN1_STRING_dup() returns a copy of the structure B<a>.
+
+ASN1_STRING_cmp() compares B<a> and B<b> returning 0 if the two
+are identical. The string types and content are compared.
+
+ASN1_STRING_set() sets the data of string B<str> to the buffer
+B<data> or length B<len>. The supplied data is copied. If B<len>
+is -1 then the length is determined by strlen(data).
+
+ASN1_STRING_type() returns the type of B<x>, using standard constants
+such as B<V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING>.
+
+ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8() converts the string B<in> to UTF8 format, the
+converted data is allocated in a buffer in B<*out>. The length of
+B<out> is returned or a negative error code. The buffer B<*out>
+should be free using OPENSSL_free().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Almost all ASN1 types in OpenSSL are represented as an B<ASN1_STRING>
+structure. Other types such as B<ASN1_OCTET_STRING> are simply typedefed
+to B<ASN1_STRING> and the functions call the B<ASN1_STRING> equivalents.
+B<ASN1_STRING> is also used for some B<CHOICE> types which consist
+entirely of primitive string types such as B<DirectoryString> and
+B<Time>.
+
+These functions should B<not> be used to examine or modify B<ASN1_INTEGER>
+or B<ASN1_ENUMERATED> types: the relevant B<INTEGER> or B<ENUMERATED>
+utility functions should be used instead.
+
+In general it cannot be assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data()
+is null terminated or does not contain embedded nulls. The actual format
+of the data will depend on the actual string type itself: for example
+for and IA5String the data will be ASCII, for a BMPString two bytes per
+character in big endian format, UTF8String will be in UTF8 format.
+
+Similar care should be take to ensure the data is in the correct format
+when calling ASN1_STRING_set().
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5b1bbb7eb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_STRING_new, ASN1_STRING_type_new, ASN1_STRING_free -
+ASN1_STRING allocation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_new(void);
+ ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type);
+ void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+ASN1_STRING_new() returns an allocated B<ASN1_STRING> structure. Its type
+is undefined.
+
+ASN1_STRING_type_new() returns an allocated B<ASN1_STRING> structure of
+type B<type>.
+
+ASN1_STRING_free() frees up B<a>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Other string types call the B<ASN1_STRING> functions. For example
+ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new() calls ASN1_STRING_type(V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+ASN1_STRING_new() and ASN1_STRING_type_new() return a valid
+ASN1_STRING structure or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+ASN1_STRING_free() does not return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fbf9a1f141
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/ASN1_STRING_print_ex.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+ASN1_STRING_print_ex, ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp - ASN1_STRING output routines.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/asn1.h>
+
+ int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags);
+ int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags);
+ int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions output an B<ASN1_STRING> structure. B<ASN1_STRING> is used to
+represent all the ASN1 string types.
+
+ASN1_STRING_print_ex() outputs B<str> to B<out>, the format is determined by
+the options B<flags>. ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp() is identical except it outputs
+to B<fp> instead.
+
+ASN1_STRING_print() prints B<str> to B<out> but using a different format to
+ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). It replaces unprintable characters (other than CR, LF)
+with '.'.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+ASN1_STRING_print() is a legacy function which should be avoided in new applications.
+
+Although there are a large number of options frequently B<ASN1_STRFLAGS_RFC2253> is 
+suitable, or on UTF8 terminals B<ASN1_STRFLAGS_RFC2253 & ~ASN1_STRFLAGS_ESC_MSB>.
+
+The complete set of supported options for B<flags> is listed below.
+
+Various characters can be escaped. If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253> is set the characters
+determined by RFC2253 are escaped. If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL> is set control
+characters are escaped. If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB> is set characters with the
+MSB set are escaped: this option should B<not> be used if the terminal correctly
+interprets UTF8 sequences.
+
+Escaping takes several forms.
+
+If the character being escaped is a 16 bit character then the form "\WXXXX" is used
+using exactly four characters for the hex representation. If it is 32 bits then
+"\UXXXXXXXX" is used using eight characters of its hex representation. These forms
+will only be used if UTF8 conversion is not set (see below).
+
+Printable characters are normally escaped using the backslash '\' character. If
+B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE> is set then the whole string is instead surrounded by
+double quote characters: this is arguably more readable than the backslash
+notation. Other characters use the "\XX" using exactly two characters of the hex
+representation.
+
+If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT> is set then characters are converted to UTF8
+format first. If the terminal supports the display of UTF8 sequences then this
+option will correctly display multi byte characters.
+
+If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE> is set then the string type is not interpreted at
+all: everything is assumed to be one byte per character. This is primarily for
+debugging purposes and can result in confusing output in multi character strings.
+
+If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE> is set then the string type itself is printed out
+before its value (for example "BMPSTRING"), this actually uses ASN1_tag2str().
+
+The content of a string instead of being interpreted can be "dumped": this just
+outputs the value of the string using the form #XXXX using hex format for each
+octet.
+
+If B<ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL> is set then any type is dumped.
+
+Normally non character string types (such as OCTET STRING) are assumed to be
+one byte per character, if B<ASN1_STRFLAGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN> is set then they will
+be dumped instead.
+
+When a type is dumped normally just the content octets are printed, if 
+B<ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER> is set then the complete encoding is dumped
+instead (including tag and length octets).
+
+B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253> includes all the flags required by RFC2253. It is
+equivalent to:
+ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB |
+ ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<X509_NAME_print_ex(3)|X509_NAME_print_ex(3)>,
+L<ASN1_tag2str(3)|ASN1_tag2str(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..10687e458d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_new, EVP_PKEY_free - private key allocation functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void);
+ void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *key);
+
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The EVP_PKEY_new() function allocates an empty B<EVP_PKEY> 
+structure which is used by OpenSSL to store private keys.
+
+EVP_PKEY_free() frees up the private key B<key>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<EVP_PKEY> structure is used by various OpenSSL functions
+which require a general private key without reference to any
+particular algorithm.
+
+The structure returned by EVP_PKEY_new() is empty. To add a
+private key to this empty structure the functions described in
+L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)|EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)> should be used.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_new() returns either the newly allocated B<EVP_PKEY>
+structure of B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+EVP_PKEY_free() does not return a value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)|EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2db692e271
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA, EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA, EVP_PKEY_set1_DH, EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY,
+EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA, EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA, EVP_PKEY_get1_DH, EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY,
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA, EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA, EVP_PKEY_assign_DH, EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY,
+EVP_PKEY_type - EVP_PKEY assignment functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey,RSA *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey,DSA *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey,DH *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey,EC_KEY *key);
+
+ RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+ EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey,RSA *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey,DSA *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey,DH *key);
+ int EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey,EC_KEY *key);
+
+ int EVP_PKEY_type(int type);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DH() and
+EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY() set the key referenced by B<pkey> to B<key>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and
+EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key in B<pkey> or
+B<NULL> if the key is not of the correct type.
+
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
+and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() also set the referenced key to B<key>
+however these use the supplied B<key> internally and so B<key>
+will be freed when the parent B<pkey> is freed.
+
+EVP_PKEY_type() returns the type of key corresponding to the value
+B<type>. The type of a key can be obtained with
+EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type). The return value will be EVP_PKEY_RSA,
+EVP_PKEY_DSA, EVP_PKEY_DH or EVP_PKEY_EC for the corresponding
+key types or NID_undef if the key type is unassigned.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+In accordance with the OpenSSL naming convention the key obtained
+from or assigned to the B<pkey> using the B<1> functions must be
+freed as well as B<pkey>.
+
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
+EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() are implemented as macros.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_set1_DH() and
+EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY() return 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_get1_DH() and
+EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY() return the referenced key or B<NULL> if 
+an error occurred.
+
+EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA() EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(), EVP_PKEY_assign_DH()
+and EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY() return 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<EVP_PKEY_new(3)|EVP_PKEY_new(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7dcc07923f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/OBJ_nid2obj.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+OBJ_nid2obj, OBJ_nid2ln, OBJ_nid2sn, OBJ_obj2nid, OBJ_txt2nid, OBJ_ln2nid, OBJ_sn2nid,
+OBJ_cmp, OBJ_dup, OBJ_txt2obj, OBJ_obj2txt, OBJ_create, OBJ_cleanup - ASN1 object utility
+functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_nid2obj(int n);
+ const char *  OBJ_nid2ln(int n);
+ const char *  OBJ_nid2sn(int n);
+
+ int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o);
+ int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *ln);
+ int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *sn);
+
+ int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s);
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name);
+ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name);
+
+ int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a,const ASN1_OBJECT *b);
+ ASN1_OBJECT * OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o);
+
+ int OBJ_create(const char *oid,const char *sn,const char *ln);
+ void OBJ_cleanup(void);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The ASN1 object utility functions process ASN1_OBJECT structures which are
+a representation of the ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) type.
+
+OBJ_nid2obj(), OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() convert the NID B<n> to 
+an ASN1_OBJECT structure, its long name and its short name respectively,
+or B<NULL> is an error occurred.
+
+OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() return the corresponding NID
+for the object B<o>, the long name <ln> or the short name <sn> respectively
+or NID_undef if an error occurred.
+
+OBJ_txt2nid() returns NID corresponding to text string <s>. B<s> can be
+a long name, a short name or the numerical respresentation of an object.
+
+OBJ_txt2obj() converts the text string B<s> into an ASN1_OBJECT structure.
+If B<no_name> is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted
+as well as numerical forms. If B<no_name> is 1 only the numerical form
+is acceptable.
+
+OBJ_obj2txt() converts the B<ASN1_OBJECT> B<a> into a textual representation.
+The representation is written as a null terminated string to B<buf>
+at most B<buf_len> bytes are written, truncating the result if necessary.
+The total amount of space required is returned. If B<no_name> is 0 then
+if the object has a long or short name then that will be used, otherwise
+the numerical form will be used. If B<no_name> is 1 then the numerical
+form will always be used.
+
+OBJ_cmp() compares B<a> to B<b>. If the two are identical 0 is returned.
+
+OBJ_dup() returns a copy of B<o>.
+
+OBJ_create() adds a new object to the internal table. B<oid> is the 
+numerical form of the object, B<sn> the short name and B<ln> the
+long name. A new NID is returned for the created object.
+
+OBJ_cleanup() cleans up OpenSSLs internal object table: this should
+be called before an application exits if any new objects were added
+using OBJ_create().
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Objects in OpenSSL can have a short name, a long name and a numerical
+identifier (NID) associated with them. A standard set of objects is
+represented in an internal table. The appropriate values are defined
+in the header file B<objects.h>.
+
+For example the OID for commonName has the following definitions:
+
+ #define SN_commonName                   "CN"
+ #define LN_commonName                   "commonName"
+ #define NID_commonName                  13
+
+New objects can be added by calling OBJ_create().
+
+Table objects have certain advantages over other objects: for example
+their NIDs can be used in a C language switch statement. They are
+also static constant structures which are shared: that is there
+is only a single constant structure for each table object.
+
+Objects which are not in the table have the NID value NID_undef.
+
+Objects do not need to be in the internal tables to be processed,
+the functions OBJ_txt2obj() and OBJ_obj2txt() can process the numerical
+form of an OID.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Create an object for B<commonName>:
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT *o;
+ o = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_commonName);
+
+Check if an object is B<commonName>
+
+ if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_commonName)
+        /* Do something */
+
+Create a new NID and initialize an object from it:
+
+ int new_nid;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
+ new_nid = OBJ_create("1.2.3.4", "NewOID", "New Object Identifier");
+
+ obj = OBJ_nid2obj(new_nid);
+ 
+Create a new object directly:
+
+ obj = OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.3.4", 1);
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+OBJ_obj2txt() is awkward and messy to use: it doesn't follow the 
+convention of other OpenSSL functions where the buffer can be set
+to B<NULL> to determine the amount of data that should be written.
+Instead B<buf> must point to a valid buffer and B<buf_len> should
+be set to a positive value. A buffer length of 80 should be more
+than enough to handle any OID encountered in practice.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+OBJ_nid2obj() returns an B<ASN1_OBJECT> structure or B<NULL> is an
+error occurred.
+
+OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() returns a valid string or B<NULL>
+on error.
+
+OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() and OBJ_txt2nid() return
+a NID or B<NID_undef> on error.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..48f3bb8cb8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS12_create.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS12_create - create a PKCS#12 structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+ PKCS12 *PKCS12_create(char *pass, char *name, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *ca,
+                                int nid_key, int nid_cert, int iter, int mac_iter, int keytype);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS12_create() creates a PKCS#12 structure.
+
+B<pass> is the passphrase to use. B<name> is the B<friendlyName> to use for
+the supplied certifictate and key. B<pkey> is the private key to include in
+the structure and B<cert> its corresponding certificates. B<ca>, if not B<NULL>
+is an optional set of certificates to also include in the structure.
+
+B<nid_key> and B<nid_cert> are the encryption algorithms that should be used
+for the key and certificate respectively. B<iter> is the encryption algorithm
+iteration count to use and B<mac_iter> is the MAC iteration count to use.
+B<keytype> is the type of key.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The parameters B<nid_key>, B<nid_cert>, B<iter>, B<mac_iter> and B<keytype>
+can all be set to zero and sensible defaults will be used.
+
+These defaults are: 40 bit RC2 encryption for certificates, triple DES
+encryption for private keys, a key iteration count of PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER
+(currently 2048) and a MAC iteration count of 1.
+
+The default MAC iteration count is 1 in order to retain compatibility with
+old software which did not interpret MAC iteration counts. If such compatibility
+is not required then B<mac_iter> should be set to PKCS12_DEFAULT_ITER.
+
+B<keytype> adds a flag to the store private key. This is a non standard extension
+that is only currently interpreted by MSIE. If set to zero the flag is omitted,
+if set to B<KEY_SIG> the key can be used for signing only, if set to B<KEY_EX>
+it can be used for signing and encryption. This option was useful for old
+export grade software which could use signing only keys of arbitrary size but
+had restrictions on the permissible sizes of keys which could be used for
+encryption.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_PKCS12(3)|d2i_PKCS12(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+PKCS12_create was added in OpenSSL 0.9.3
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..51344f883a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS12_parse.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS12_parse - parse a PKCS#12 structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
+
+int PKCS12_parse(PKCS12 *p12, const char *pass, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS12_parse() parses a PKCS12 structure.
+
+B<p12> is the B<PKCS12> structure to parse. B<pass> is the passphrase to use.
+If successful the private key will be written to B<*pkey>, the corresponding
+certificate to B<*cert> and any additional certificates to B<*ca>.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The parameters B<pkey> and B<cert> cannot be B<NULL>. B<ca> can be <NULL>
+in which case additional certificates will be discarded. B<*ca> can also
+be a valid STACK in which case additional certificates are appended to
+B<*ca>. If B<*ca> is B<NULL> a new STACK will be allocated.
+
+The B<friendlyName> and B<localKeyID> attributes (if present) on each certificate
+will be stored in the B<alias> and B<keyid> attributes of the B<X509> structure.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+Only a single private key and corresponding certificate is returned by this function.
+More complex PKCS#12 files with multiple private keys will only return the first
+match.
+
+Only B<friendlyName> and B<localKeyID> attributes are currently stored in certificates.
+Other attributes are discarded.
+
+Attributes currently cannot be store in the private key B<EVP_PKEY> structure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_PKCS12(3)|d2i_PKCS12(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+PKCS12_parse was added in OpenSSL 0.9.3
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b0ca067b89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_decrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS7_decrypt - decrypt content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+int PKCS7_decrypt(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509 *cert, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS7_decrypt() extracts and decrypts the content from a PKCS#7 envelopedData
+structure. B<pkey> is the private key of the recipient, B<cert> is the
+recipients certificate, B<data> is a BIO to write the content to and
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() (or equivalent) should be called before using this
+function or errors about unknown algorithms will occur.
+
+Although the recipients certificate is not needed to decrypt the data it is needed
+to locate the appropriate (of possible several) recipients in the PKCS#7 structure.
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
+returned.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS7_decrypt() returns either 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3)
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+PKCS7_decrypt() must be passed the correct recipient key and certificate. It would
+be better if it could look up the correct key and certificate from a database.
+
+The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as
+mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)|PKCS7_encrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+PKCS7_decrypt() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1a507b22a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_encrypt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS7_encrypt - create a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+PKCS7 *PKCS7_encrypt(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *in, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS7_encrypt() creates and returns a PKCS#7 envelopedData structure. B<certs>
+is a list of recipient certificates. B<in> is the content to be encrypted.
+B<cipher> is the symmetric cipher to use. B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Only RSA keys are supported in PKCS#7 and envelopedData so the recipient certificates
+supplied to this function must all contain RSA public keys, though they do not have to
+be signed using the RSA algorithm.
+
+EVP_des_ede3_cbc() (triple DES) is the algorithm of choice for S/MIME use because
+most clients will support it.
+
+Some old "export grade" clients may only support weak encryption using 40 or 64 bit
+RC2. These can be used by passing EVP_rc2_40_cbc() and EVP_rc2_64_cbc() respectively.
+
+The algorithm passed in the B<cipher> parameter must support ASN1 encoding of its
+parameters. 
+
+Many browsers implement a "sign and encrypt" option which is simply an S/MIME 
+envelopedData containing an S/MIME signed message. This can be readily produced
+by storing the S/MIME signed message in a memory BIO and passing it to
+PKCS7_encrypt().
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are prepended
+to the data.
+
+Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required
+by the S/MIME specifications) if B<PKCS7_BINARY> is set no translation occurs. This
+option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation
+will corrupt it. If B<PKCS7_BINARY> is set then B<PKCS7_TEXT> is ignored.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS7_encrypt() returns either a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error occurred.
+The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as
+mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)|PKCS7_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+PKCS7_decrypt() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fc7e649b34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_sign.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS7_sign - create a PKCS#7 signedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+PKCS7 *PKCS7_sign(X509 *signcert, EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS7_sign() creates and returns a PKCS#7 signedData structure. B<signcert>
+is the certificate to sign with, B<pkey> is the corresponsding private key.
+B<certs> is an optional additional set of certificates to include in the
+PKCS#7 structure (for example any intermediate CAs in the chain). 
+
+The data to be signed is read from BIO B<data>.
+
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+Many S/MIME clients expect the signed content to include valid MIME headers. If
+the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are prepended
+to the data.
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOCERTS> is set the signer's certificate will not be included in the
+PKCS7 structure, the signer's certificate must still be supplied in the B<signcert>
+parameter though. This can reduce the size of the signature if the signers certificate
+can be obtained by other means: for example a previously signed message.
+
+The data being signed is included in the PKCS7 structure, unless B<PKCS7_DETACHED> 
+is set in which case it is omitted. This is used for PKCS7 detached signatures
+which are used in S/MIME plaintext signed messages for example.
+
+Normally the supplied content is translated into MIME canonical format (as required
+by the S/MIME specifications) if B<PKCS7_BINARY> is set no translation occurs. This
+option should be used if the supplied data is in binary format otherwise the translation
+will corrupt it.
+
+The signedData structure includes several PKCS#7 autenticatedAttributes including
+the signing time, the PKCS#7 content type and the supported list of ciphers in
+an SMIMECapabilities attribute. If B<PKCS7_NOATTR> is set then no authenticatedAttributes
+will be used. If B<PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP> is set then just the SMIMECapabilities are
+omitted.
+
+If present the SMIMECapabilities attribute indicates support for the following
+algorithms: triple DES, 128 bit RC2, 64 bit RC2, DES and 40 bit RC2. If any
+of these algorithms is disabled then it will not be included.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+PKCS7_sign() is somewhat limited. It does not support multiple signers, some
+advanced attributes such as counter signatures are not supported.
+
+The SHA1 digest algorithm is currently always used.
+
+When the signed data is not detached it will be stored in memory within the
+B<PKCS7> structure. This effectively limits the size of messages which can be
+signed due to memory restraints. There should be a way to sign data without
+having to hold it all in memory, this would however require fairly major
+revisions of the OpenSSL ASN1 code.
+
+Clear text signing does not store the content in memory but the way PKCS7_sign()
+operates means that two passes of the data must typically be made: one to compute
+the signatures and a second to output the data along with the signature. There
+should be a way to process the data with only a single pass.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS7_sign() returns either a valid PKCS7 structure or NULL if an error occurred.
+The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_verify(3)|PKCS7_verify(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+PKCS7_sign() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..07c9fdad40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/PKCS7_verify.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+PKCS7_verify - verify a PKCS#7 signedData structure
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+int PKCS7_verify(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509_STORE *store, BIO *indata, BIO *out, int flags);
+
+int PKCS7_get0_signers(PKCS7 *p7, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+PKCS7_verify() verifies a PKCS#7 signedData structure. B<p7> is the PKCS7
+structure to verify. B<certs> is a set of certificates in which to search for
+the signer's certificate. B<store> is a trusted certficate store (used for
+chain verification). B<indata> is the signed data if the content is not
+present in B<p7> (that is it is detached). The content is written to B<out>
+if it is not NULL.
+
+B<flags> is an optional set of flags, which can be used to modify the verify
+operation.
+
+PKCS7_get0_signers() retrieves the signer's certificates from B<p7>, it does
+B<not> check their validity or whether any signatures are valid. The B<certs>
+and B<flags> parameters have the same meanings as in PKCS7_verify().
+
+=head1 VERIFY PROCESS
+
+Normally the verify process proceeds as follows.
+
+Initially some sanity checks are performed on B<p7>. The type of B<p7> must
+be signedData. There must be at least one signature on the data and if
+the content is detached B<indata> cannot be B<NULL>.
+
+An attempt is made to locate all the signer's certificates, first looking in
+the B<certs> parameter (if it is not B<NULL>) and then looking in any certificates
+contained in the B<p7> structure itself. If any signer's certificates cannot be
+located the operation fails.
+
+Each signer's certificate is chain verified using the B<smimesign> purpose and
+the supplied trusted certificate store. Any internal certificates in the message
+are used as untrusted CAs. If any chain verify fails an error code is returned.
+
+Finally the signed content is read (and written to B<out> is it is not NULL) and
+the signature's checked.
+
+If all signature's verify correctly then the function is successful.
+
+Any of the following flags (ored together) can be passed in the B<flags> parameter
+to change the default verify behaviour. Only the flag B<PKCS7_NOINTERN> is
+meaningful to PKCS7_get0_signers().
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOINTERN> is set the certificates in the message itself are not 
+searched when locating the signer's certificate. This means that all the signers
+certificates must be in the B<certs> parameter.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain> are deleted
+from the content. If the content is not of type B<text/plain> then an error is
+returned.
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOVERIFY> is set the signer's certificates are not chain verified.
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOCHAIN> is set then the certificates contained in the message are
+not used as untrusted CAs. This means that the whole verify chain (apart from
+the signer's certificate) must be contained in the trusted store.
+
+If B<PKCS7_NOSIGS> is set then the signatures on the data are not checked.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+One application of B<PKCS7_NOINTERN> is to only accept messages signed by
+a small number of certificates. The acceptable certificates would be passed
+in the B<certs> parameter. In this case if the signer is not one of the
+certificates supplied in B<certs> then the verify will fail because the
+signer cannot be found.
+
+Care should be taken when modifying the default verify behaviour, for example
+setting B<PKCS7_NOVERIFY|PKCS7_NOSIGS> will totally disable all verification 
+and any signed message will be considered valid. This combination is however
+useful if one merely wishes to write the content to B<out> and its validity
+is not considered important.
+
+Chain verification should arguably be performed  using the signing time rather
+than the current time. However since the signing time is supplied by the
+signer it cannot be trusted without additional evidence (such as a trusted
+timestamp).
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+PKCS7_verify() returns 1 for a successful verification and zero or a negative
+value if an error occurs.
+
+PKCS7_get0_signers() returns all signers or B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+The error can be obtained from L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The trusted certificate store is not searched for the signers certificate,
+this is primarily due to the inadequacies of the current B<X509_STORE>
+functionality.
+
+The lack of single pass processing and need to hold all data in memory as
+mentioned in PKCS7_sign() also applies to PKCS7_verify().
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)|PKCS7_sign(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+PKCS7_verify() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..ffafa37887
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/SMIME_read_PKCS7.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SMIME_read_PKCS7 - parse S/MIME message.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+PKCS7 *SMIME_read_PKCS7(BIO *in, BIO **bcont);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SMIME_read_PKCS7() parses a message in S/MIME format.
+
+B<in> is a BIO to read the message from.
+
+If cleartext signing is used then the content is saved in
+a memory bio which is written to B<*bcont>, otherwise
+B<*bcont> is set to B<NULL>.
+
+The parsed PKCS#7 structure is returned or B<NULL> if an
+error occurred.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+If B<*bcont> is not B<NULL> then the message is clear text
+signed. B<*bcont> can then be passed to PKCS7_verify() with
+the B<PKCS7_DETACHED> flag set.
+
+Otherwise the type of the returned structure can be determined
+using PKCS7_type().
+
+To support future functionality if B<bcont> is not B<NULL>
+B<*bcont> should be initialized to B<NULL>. For example:
+
+ BIO *cont = NULL;
+ PKCS7 *p7;
+
+ p7 = SMIME_read_PKCS7(in, &cont);
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+The MIME parser used by SMIME_read_PKCS7() is somewhat primitive.
+While it will handle most S/MIME messages more complex compound
+formats may not work.
+
+The parser assumes that the PKCS7 structure is always base64
+encoded and will not handle the case where it is in binary format
+or uses quoted printable format.
+
+The use of a memory BIO to hold the signed content limits the size
+of message which can be processed due to memory restraints: a
+streaming single pass option should be available.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SMIME_read_PKCS7() returns a valid B<PKCS7> structure or B<NULL>
+is an error occurred. The error can be obtained from ERR_get_error(3).
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_type(3)|PKCS7_type(3)>
+L<SMIME_read_PKCS7(3)|SMIME_read_PKCS7(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)|PKCS7_sign(3)>,
+L<PKCS7_verify(3)|PKCS7_verify(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)|PKCS7_encrypt(3)>
+L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)|PKCS7_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SMIME_read_PKCS7() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2cfad2e049
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/SMIME_write_PKCS7.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+SMIME_write_PKCS7 - convert PKCS#7 structure to S/MIME format.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+int SMIME_write_PKCS7(BIO *out, PKCS7 *p7, BIO *data, int flags);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+SMIME_write_PKCS7() adds the appropriate MIME headers to a PKCS#7
+structure to produce an S/MIME message.
+
+B<out> is the BIO to write the data to. B<p7> is the appropriate
+B<PKCS7> structure. If cleartext signing (B<multipart/signed>) is
+being used then the signed data must be supplied in the B<data> 
+argument. B<flags> is an optional set of flags.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The following flags can be passed in the B<flags> parameter.
+
+If B<PKCS7_DETACHED> is set then cleartext signing will be used,
+this option only makes sense for signedData where B<PKCS7_DETACHED>
+is also set when PKCS7_sign() is also called.
+
+If the B<PKCS7_TEXT> flag is set MIME headers for type B<text/plain>
+are added to the content, this only makes sense if B<PKCS7_DETACHED>
+is also set.
+
+If cleartext signing is being used then the data must be read twice:
+once to compute the signature in PKCS7_sign() and once to output the
+S/MIME message.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+SMIME_write_PKCS7() always base64 encodes PKCS#7 structures, there
+should be an option to disable this.
+
+There should really be a way to produce cleartext signing using only
+a single pass of the data.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+SMIME_write_PKCS7() returns 1 for success or 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<PKCS7_sign(3)|PKCS7_sign(3)>,
+L<PKCS7_verify(3)|PKCS7_verify(3)>, L<PKCS7_encrypt(3)|PKCS7_encrypt(3)>
+L<PKCS7_decrypt(3)|PKCS7_decrypt(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+SMIME_write_PKCS7() was added to OpenSSL 0.9.5
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d287c18564
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object, X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data,
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object, X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data,
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt, X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID,
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ - X509_NAME_ENTRY utility functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ASN1_OBJECT * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);
+ASN1_STRING * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne);
+
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, ASN1_OBJECT *obj);
+int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, char *field, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid, int type,unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,unsigned char *bytes, int len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() retrieves the field name of B<ne> in
+and B<ASN1_OBJECT> structure.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() retrieves the field value of B<ne> in
+and B<ASN1_STRING> structure.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object() sets the field name of B<ne> to B<obj>.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data() sets the field value of B<ne> to string type
+B<type> and value determined by B<bytes> and B<len>.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID()
+and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an 
+B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data() can be
+used to examine an B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> function as returned by 
+X509_NAME_get_entry() for example.
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(),
+and X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ() create and return an 
+
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(), X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(),
+X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID() and X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data()
+are seldom used in practice because B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structures
+are almost always part of B<X509_NAME> structures and the
+corresponding B<X509_NAME> functions are typically used to
+create and add new entries in a single operation.
+
+The arguments of these functions support similar options to the similarly
+named ones of the corresponding B<X509_NAME> functions such as
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(). So for example B<type> can be set to
+B<MBSTRING_ASC> but in the case of X509_set_data() the field name must be
+set first so the relevant field information can be looked up internally.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>,
+L<OBJ_nid2obj(3),OBJ_nid2obj(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..4472a1c5cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID,
+X509_NAME_add_entry, X509_NAME_delete_entry - X509_NAME modification functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, char *field, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set);
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set);
+int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set);
+int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name,X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int loc, int set);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(), X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ() and
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID() add a field whose name is defined
+by a string B<field>, an object B<obj> or a NID B<nid> respectively.
+The field value to be added is in B<bytes> of length B<len>. If
+B<len> is -1 then the field length is calculated internally using
+strlen(bytes).
+
+The type of field is determined by B<type> which can either be a
+definition of the type of B<bytes> (such as B<MBSTRING_ASC>) or a
+standard ASN1 type (such as B<V_ASN1_IA5STRING>). The new entry is
+added to a position determined by B<loc> and B<set>.
+
+X509_NAME_add_entry() adds a copy of B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> structure B<ne>
+to B<name>. The new entry is added to a position determined by B<loc>
+and B<set>. Since a copy of B<ne> is added B<ne> must be freed up after
+the call.
+
+X509_NAME_delete_entry() deletes an entry from B<name> at position
+B<loc>. The deleted entry is returned and must be freed up.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The use of string types such as B<MBSTRING_ASC> or B<MBSTRING_UTF8>
+is strongly recommened for the B<type> parameter. This allows the
+internal code to correctly determine the type of the field and to
+apply length checks according to the relevant standards. This is
+done using ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID().
+
+If instead an ASN1 type is used no checks are performed and the
+supplied data in B<bytes> is used directly.
+
+In X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt() the B<field> string represents
+the field name using OBJ_txt2obj(field, 0).
+
+The B<loc> and B<set> parameters determine where a new entry should
+be added. For almost all applications B<loc> can be set to -1 and B<set>
+to 0. This adds a new entry to the end of B<name> as a single valued
+RelativeDistinguishedName (RDN).
+
+B<loc> actually determines the index where the new entry is inserted:
+if it is -1 it is appended. 
+
+B<set> determines how the new type is added. If it is zero a
+new RDN is created.
+
+If B<set> is -1 or 1 it is added to the previous or next RDN
+structure respectively. This will then be a multivalued RDN:
+since multivalues RDNs are very seldom used B<set> is almost
+always set to zero.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Create an B<X509_NAME> structure:
+
+"C=UK, O=Disorganized Organization, CN=Joe Bloggs"
+
+ X509_NAME *nm;
+ nm = X509_NAME_new();
+ if (nm == NULL)
+        /* Some error */
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
+                        "C", "UK", -1, -1, 0))
+        /* Error */
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
+                        "O", "Disorganized Organization", -1, -1, 0))
+        /* Error */
+ if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, MBSTRING_ASC,
+                        "CN", "Joe Bloggs", -1, -1, 0))
+        /* Error */
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(), X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(),
+X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID() and X509_NAME_add_entry() return 1 for
+success of 0 if an error occurred.
+
+X509_NAME_delete_entry() returns either the deleted B<X509_NAME_ENTRY>
+structure of B<NULL> if an error occurred.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+B<type> can still be set to B<V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE> to use a
+different algorithm to determine field types. Since this form does
+not understand multicharacter types, performs no length checks and
+can result in invalid field types its use is strongly discouraged.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..333323d734
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_get_entry,
+X509_NAME_entry_count, X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID, X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ -
+X509_NAME lookup and enumeration functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name,int nid,int lastpos);
+int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name,ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos);
+
+int X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_NAME *name);
+X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc);
+
+int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf,int len);
+int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf,int len);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions allow an B<X509_NAME> structure to be examined. The
+B<X509_NAME> structure is the same as the B<Name> type defined in
+RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used for example in certificate subject
+and issuer names.
+
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() retrieve
+the next index matching B<nid> or B<obj> after B<lastpos>. B<lastpos>
+should initially be set to -1. If there are no more entries -1 is returned.
+
+X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries in B<name>.
+
+X509_NAME_get_entry() retrieves the B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> from B<name>
+corresponding to index B<loc>. Acceptable values for B<loc> run from
+0 to (X509_NAME_entry_count(name) - 1). The value returned is an
+internal pointer which must not be freed.
+
+X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(), X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() retrieve
+the "text" from the first entry in B<name> which matches B<nid> or
+B<obj>, if no such entry exists -1 is returned. At most B<len> bytes
+will be written and the text written to B<buf> will be null
+terminated. The length of the output string written is returned
+excluding the terminating null. If B<buf> is <NULL> then the amount
+of space needed in B<buf> (excluding the final null) is returned. 
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ() are
+legacy functions which have various limitations which make them
+of minimal use in practice. They can only find the first matching
+entry and will copy the contents of the field verbatim: this can
+be highly confusing if the target is a muticharacter string type
+like a BMPString or a UTF8String.
+
+For a more general solution X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() or
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ() should be used followed by
+X509_NAME_get_entry() on any matching indices and then the
+various B<X509_NAME_ENTRY> utility functions on the result.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Process all entries:
+
+ int i;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < X509_NAME_entry_count(nm); i++)
+        {
+        e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i);
+        /* Do something with e */
+        }
+
+Process all commonName entries:
+
+ int loc;
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY *e;
+
+ loc = -1;
+ for (;;)
+        {
+        lastpos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, lastpos);
+        if (lastpos == -1)
+                break;
+        e = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, lastpos);
+        /* Do something with e */
+        }
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() and X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ()
+return the index of the next matching entry or -1 if not found.
+
+X509_NAME_entry_count() returns the total number of entries.
+
+X509_NAME_get_entry() returns an B<X509_NAME> pointer to the
+requested entry or B<NULL> if the index is invalid.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509_NAME(3)|d2i_X509_NAME(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..907c04f684
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_NAME_print_ex.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_NAME_print_ex, X509_NAME_print_ex_fp, X509_NAME_print,
+X509_NAME_oneline - X509_NAME printing routines.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags);
+ int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags);
+ char * X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a,char *buf,int size);
+ int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, X509_NAME *name, int obase);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+X509_NAME_print_ex() prints a human readable version of B<nm> to BIO B<out>. Each
+line (for multiline formats) is indented by B<indent> spaces. The output format
+can be extensively customised by use of the B<flags> parameter.
+
+X509_NAME_print_ex_fp() is identical to X509_NAME_print_ex() except the output is
+written to FILE pointer B<fp>.
+
+X509_NAME_oneline() prints an ASCII version of B<a> to B<buf>. At most B<size>
+bytes will be written. If B<buf> is B<NULL> then a buffer is dynamically allocated
+and returned, otherwise B<buf> is returned.
+
+X509_NAME_print() prints out B<name> to B<bp> indenting each line by B<obase> 
+characters. Multiple lines are used if the output (including indent) exceeds
+80 characters.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The functions X509_NAME_oneline() and X509_NAME_print() are legacy functions which
+produce a non standard output form, they don't handle multi character fields and
+have various quirks and inconsistencies. Their use is strongly discouraged in new
+applications.
+
+Although there are a large number of possible flags for most purposes
+B<XN_FLAG_ONELINE>, B<XN_FLAG_MULTILINE> or B<XN_FLAG_RFC2253> will suffice.
+As noted on the L<ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)|ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)> manual page
+for UTF8 terminals the B<ASN1_STRFLAGS_ESC_MSB> should be unset: so for example
+B<XN_FLAG_ONELINE & ~ASN1_STRFLAGS_ESC_MSB> would be used.
+
+The complete set of the flags supported by X509_NAME_print_ex() is listed below.
+
+Several options can be ored together.
+
+The options B<XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS>, B<XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC>,
+B<XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC> and B<XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE> determine the field separators
+to use. Two distinct separators are used between distinct RelativeDistinguishedName
+components and separate values in the same RDN for a multi-valued RDN. Multi-valued
+RDNs are currently very rare so the second separator will hardly ever be used.
+
+B<XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS> uses comma and plus as separators. B<XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC>
+uses comma and plus with spaces: this is more readable that plain comma and plus.
+B<XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC> uses spaced semicolon and plus. B<XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE> uses
+spaced newline and plus respectively.
+
+If B<XN_FLAG_DN_REV> is set the whole DN is printed in reversed order.
+
+The fields B<XN_FLAG_FN_SN>, B<XN_FLAG_FN_LN>, B<XN_FLAG_FN_OID>,
+B<XN_FLAG_FN_NONE> determine how a field name is displayed. It will
+use the short name (e.g. CN) the long name (e.g. commonName) always
+use OID numerical form (normally OIDs are only used if the field name is not
+recognised) and no field name respectively.
+
+If B<XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ> is set then spaces will be placed around the '=' character
+separating field names and values.
+
+If B<XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS> is set then the encoding of unknown fields is
+printed instead of the values.
+
+If B<XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN> is set then field names are padded to 20 characters: this
+is only of use for multiline format.
+
+Additionally all the options supported by ASN1_STRING_print_ex() can be used to 
+control how each field value is displayed.
+
+In addition a number options can be set for commonly used formats.
+
+B<XN_FLAG_RFC2253> sets options which produce an output compatible with RFC2253 it
+is equivalent to:
+ B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS | XN_FLAG_DN_REV | XN_FLAG_FN_SN | XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS>
+
+
+B<XN_FLAG_ONELINE> is a more readable one line format it is the same as:
+ B<ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC | XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | XN_FLAG_FN_SN>
+
+B<XN_FLAG_MULTILINE> is a multiline format is is the same as:
+ B<ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE | XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | XN_FLAG_FN_LN | XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN>
+
+B<XN_FLAG_COMPAT> uses a format identical to X509_NAME_print(): in fact it calls X509_NAME_print() internally.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)|ASN1_STRING_print_ex(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fd5fc65ce1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/X509_new.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+X509_new, X509_free - X509 certificate ASN1 allocation functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ X509 *X509_new(void);
+ void X509_free(X509 *a);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The X509 ASN1 allocation routines, allocate and free an
+X509 structure, which represents an X509 certificate.
+
+X509_new() allocates and initializes a X509 structure.
+
+X509_free() frees up the B<X509> structure B<a>.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+If the allocation fails, X509_new() returns B<NULL> and sets an error
+code that can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>.
+Otherwise it returns a pointer to the newly allocated structure.
+
+X509_free() returns no value.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>, L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+X509_new() and X509_free() are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..45bb18492c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_ASN1_OBJECT.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_ASN1_OBJECT, i2d_ASN1_OBJECT - ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/objects.h>
+
+ ASN1_OBJECT *d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER.
+
+Othewise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
+described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_DSAPublicKey.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_DSAPublicKey.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6ebd30427b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_DSAPublicKey.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_DSAPublicKey, i2d_DSAPublicKey, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, i2d_DSAPrivateKey,
+d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, d2i_DSA_SIG, i2d_DSA_SIG - DSA key encoding
+and parsing functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+
+ DSA * d2i_DSAPublicKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+
+ int i2d_DSAPublicKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+ DSA * d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+
+ int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+ DSA * d2i_DSAPrivateKey(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+
+ int i2d_DSAPrivateKey(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+ DSA * d2i_DSAparams(DSA **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+
+ int i2d_DSAparams(const DSA *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+ DSA * d2i_DSA_SIG(DSA_SIG **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length);
+
+ int i2d_DSA_SIG(const DSA_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+d2i_DSAPublicKey() and i2d_DSAPublicKey() decode and encode the DSA public key
+components structure.
+
+d2i_DSA_PUKEY() and i2d_DSA_PUKEY() decode and encode an DSA public key using a
+SubjectPublicKeyInfo (certificate public key) structure.
+
+d2i_DSAPrivateKey(), i2d_DSAPrivateKey() decode and encode the DSA private key
+components.
+
+d2i_DSAparams(), i2d_DSAparams() decode and encode the DSA parameters using
+a B<Dss-Parms> structure as defined in RFC2459.
+
+d2i_DSA_SIG(), i2d_DSA_SIG() decode and encode a DSA signature using a
+B<Dss-Sig-Value> structure as defined in RFC2459.
+
+The usage of all of these functions is similar to the d2i_X509() and
+i2d_X509() described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The B<DSA> structure passed to the private key encoding functions should have
+all the private key components present.
+
+The data encoded by the private key functions is unencrypted and therefore 
+offers no private key security.
+
+The B<DSA_PUBKEY> functions should be used in preference to the B<DSAPublicKey>
+functions when encoding public keys because they use a standard format.
+
+The B<DSAPublicKey> functions use an non standard format the actual data encoded
+depends on the value of the B<write_params> field of the B<a> key parameter.
+If B<write_params> is zero then only the B<pub_key> field is encoded as an
+B<INTEGER>. If B<write_params> is 1 then a B<SEQUENCE> consisting of the
+B<p>, B<q>, B<g> and B<pub_key> respectively fields are encoded.
+
+The B<DSAPrivateKey> functions also use a non standard structure consiting
+consisting of a SEQUENCE containing the B<p>, B<q>, B<g> and B<pub_key> and
+B<priv_key> fields respectively.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a54b779088
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio, d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp,
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp,
+i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp - PKCS#8 format private key functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+ EVP_PKEY *d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+ int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *x, int nid,
+                                  char *kstr, int klen,
+                                  pem_password_cb *cb, void *u);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The PKCS#8 functions encode and decode private keys in PKCS#8 format using both
+PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption algorithms.
+
+Other than the use of DER as opposed to PEM these functions are identical to the
+corresponding B<PEM> function as described in the L<pem(3)|pem(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+Before using these functions L<OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)|OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(3)>
+should be called to initialize the internal algorithm lookup tables otherwise errors about
+unknown algorithms will occur if an attempt is made to decrypt a private key. 
+
+These functions are currently the only way to store encrypted private keys using DER format.
+
+Currently all the functions use BIOs or FILE pointers, there are no functions which
+work directly on memory: this can be readily worked around by converting the buffers
+to memory BIOs, see L<BIO_s_mem(3)|BIO_s_mem(3)> for details.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<pem(3)|pem(3)>
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5e3c3d0985
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_X509, i2d_X509, d2i_X509_bio, d2i_X509_fp, i2d_X509_bio,
+i2d_X509_fp - X509 encode and decode functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509 *d2i_X509(X509 **px, unsigned char **in, int len);
+ int i2d_X509(X509 *x, unsigned char **out);
+
+ X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x);
+ X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x);
+
+ int i2d_X509_bio(X509 *x, BIO *bp);
+ int i2d_X509_fp(X509 *x, FILE *fp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+The X509 encode and decode routines encode and parse an
+B<X509> structure, which represents an X509 certificate.
+
+d2i_X509() attempts to decode B<len> bytes at B<*out>. If 
+successful a pointer to the B<X509> structure is returned. If an error
+occurred then B<NULL> is returned. If B<px> is not B<NULL> then the
+returned structure is written to B<*px>. If B<*px> is not B<NULL>
+then it is assumed that B<*px> contains a valid B<X509>
+structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. If the call is
+successful B<*out> is incremented to the byte following the
+parsed data.
+
+i2d_X509() encodes the structure pointed to by B<x> into DER format.
+If B<out> is not B<NULL> is writes the DER encoded data to the buffer
+at B<*out>, and increments it to point after the data just written.
+If the return value is negative an error occurred, otherwise it
+returns the length of the encoded data. 
+
+For OpenSSL 0.9.7 and later if B<*out> is B<NULL> memory will be
+allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this
+case B<*out> is not incremented and it points to the start of the
+data just written.
+
+d2i_X509_bio() is similar to d2i_X509() except it attempts
+to parse data from BIO B<bp>.
+
+d2i_X509_fp() is similar to d2i_X509() except it attempts
+to parse data from FILE pointer B<fp>.
+
+i2d_X509_bio() is similar to i2d_X509() except it writes
+the encoding of the structure B<x> to BIO B<bp> and it
+returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+i2d_X509_fp() is similar to i2d_X509() except it writes
+the encoding of the structure B<x> to BIO B<bp> and it
+returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
+
+=head1 NOTES
+
+The letters B<i> and B<d> in for example B<i2d_X509> stand for
+"internal" (that is an internal C structure) and "DER". So that
+B<i2d_X509> converts from internal to DER.
+
+The functions can also understand B<BER> forms.
+
+The actual X509 structure passed to i2d_X509() must be a valid
+populated B<X509> structure it can B<not> simply be fed with an
+empty structure such as that returned by X509_new().
+
+The encoded data is in binary form and may contain embedded zeroes.
+Therefore any FILE pointers or BIOs should be opened in binary mode.
+Functions such as B<strlen()> will B<not> return the correct length
+of the encoded structure.
+
+The ways that B<*in> and B<*out> are incremented after the operation
+can trap the unwary. See the B<WARNINGS> section for some common
+errors.
+
+The reason for the auto increment behaviour is to reflect a typical
+usage of ASN1 functions: after one structure is encoded or decoded
+another will processed after it.
+
+=head1 EXAMPLES
+
+Allocate and encode the DER encoding of an X509 structure:
+
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+
+ len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+
+ if (buf == NULL)
+        /* error */
+
+ p = buf;
+
+ i2d_X509(x, &p);
+
+If you are using OpenSSL 0.9.7 or later then this can be
+simplified to:
+
+
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ buf = NULL;
+
+ len = i2d_X509(x, &buf);
+
+ if (len < 0)
+        /* error */
+
+Attempt to decode a buffer:
+
+ X509 *x;
+
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+
+ int len;
+
+ /* Something to setup buf and len */
+
+ p = buf;
+
+ x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, len);
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+    /* Some error */
+
+Alternative technique:
+
+ X509 *x;
+
+ unsigned char *buf, *p;
+
+ int len;
+
+ /* Something to setup buf and len */
+
+ p = buf;
+
+ x = NULL;
+
+ if(!d2i_X509(&x, &p, len))
+    /* Some error */
+
+
+=head1 WARNINGS
+
+The use of temporary variable is mandatory. A common
+mistake is to attempt to use a buffer directly as follows:
+
+ int len;
+ unsigned char *buf;
+
+ len = i2d_X509(x, NULL);
+
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+
+ if (buf == NULL)
+        /* error */
+
+ i2d_X509(x, &buf);
+
+ /* Other stuff ... */
+
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+
+This code will result in B<buf> apparently containing garbage because
+it was incremented after the call to point after the data just written.
+Also B<buf> will no longer contain the pointer allocated by B<OPENSSL_malloc()>
+and the subsequent call to B<OPENSSL_free()> may well crash.
+
+The auto allocation feature (setting buf to NULL) only works on OpenSSL
+0.9.7 and later. Attempts to use it on earlier versions will typically
+cause a segmentation violation.
+
+Another trap to avoid is misuse of the B<xp> argument to B<d2i_X509()>:
+
+ X509 *x;
+
+ if (!d2i_X509(&x, &p, len))
+        /* Some error */
+
+This will probably crash somewhere in B<d2i_X509()>. The reason for this
+is that the variable B<x> is uninitialized and an attempt will be made to
+interpret its (invalid) value as an B<X509> structure, typically causing
+a segmentation violation. If B<x> is set to NULL first then this will not
+happen.
+
+=head1 BUGS
+
+In some versions of OpenSSL the "reuse" behaviour of d2i_X509() when 
+B<*px> is valid is broken and some parts of the reused structure may
+persist if they are not present in the new one. As a result the use
+of this "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged.
+
+i2d_X509() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL,
+if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error
+then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the
+fields entirely and will not be parsed by d2i_X509(). This may be
+fixed in future so code should not assume that i2d_X509() will
+always succeed.
+
+=head1 RETURN VALUES
+
+d2i_X509(), d2i_X509_bio() and d2i_X509_fp() return a valid B<X509> structure
+or B<NULL> if an error occurs. The error code that can be obtained by
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. 
+
+i2d_X509(), i2d_X509_bio() and i2d_X509_fp() return a the number of bytes
+successfully encoded or a negative value if an error occurs. The error code
+can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. 
+
+i2d_X509_bio() and i2d_X509_fp() returns 1 for success and 0 if an error 
+occurs The error code can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>. 
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<ERR_get_error(3)|ERR_get_error(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+d2i_X509, i2d_X509, d2i_X509_bio, d2i_X509_fp, i2d_X509_bio and i2d_X509_fp
+are available in all versions of SSLeay and OpenSSL.
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_ALGOR.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_ALGOR.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..9e5cd92ca7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_ALGOR.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_X509_ALGOR, i2d_X509_ALGOR - AlgorithmIdentifier functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509_ALGOR *d2i_X509_ALGOR(X509_ALGOR **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_X509_ALGOR(X509_ALGOR *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode an B<X509_ALGOR> structure which is
+equivalent to the B<AlgorithmIdentifier> structure.
+
+Othewise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
+described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_CRL.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_CRL.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..06c5b23c09
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_CRL.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_X509_CRL, i2d_X509_CRL, d2i_X509_CRL_bio, d2i_509_CRL_fp,
+i2d_X509_CRL_bio, i2d_X509_CRL_fp - PKCS#10 certificate request functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL(X509_CRL **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_X509_CRL(X509_CRL *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+ X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **x);
+ X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **x);
+
+ int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(X509_CRL *x, BIO *bp);
+ int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(X509_CRL *x, FILE *fp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode an X509 CRL (certificate revocation
+list).
+
+Othewise the functions behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
+described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..343ffe1519
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_NAME.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_X509_NAME, i2d_X509_NAME - X509_NAME encoding functions
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509_NAME *d2i_X509_NAME(X509_NAME **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_X509_NAME(X509_NAME *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode an B<X509_NAME> structure which is the
+the same as the B<Name> type defined in RFC2459 (and elsewhere) and used
+for example in certificate subject and issuer names.
+
+Othewise the functions behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
+described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_REQ.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_REQ.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..be4ad68257
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_REQ.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_X509_REQ, i2d_X509_REQ, d2i_X509_REQ_bio, d2i_X509_REQ_fp,
+i2d_X509_REQ_bio, i2d_X509_REQ_fp - PKCS#10 certificate request functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ(X509_REQ **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_X509_REQ(X509_REQ *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+ X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **x);
+ X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **x);
+
+ int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(X509_REQ *x, BIO *bp);
+ int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(X509_REQ *x, FILE *fp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode a PKCS#10 certificate request.
+
+Othewise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
+described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_SIG.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_SIG.pod
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..e48fd79a51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/d2i_X509_SIG.pod
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+=pod
+
+=head1 NAME
+
+d2i_X509_SIG, i2d_X509_SIG - DigestInfo functions.
+
+=head1 SYNOPSIS
+
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+ X509_SIG *d2i_X509_SIG(X509_SIG **a, unsigned char **pp, long length);
+ int i2d_X509_SIG(X509_SIG *a, unsigned char **pp);
+
+=head1 DESCRIPTION
+
+These functions decode and encode an X509_SIG structure which is
+equivalent to the B<DigestInfo> structure defined in PKCS#1 and PKCS#7.
+
+Othewise these behave in a similar way to d2i_X509() and i2d_X509()
+described in the L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)> manual page.
+
+=head1 SEE ALSO
+
+L<d2i_X509(3)|d2i_X509(3)>
+
+=head1 HISTORY
+
+TBA
+
+=cut
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/engine.pod b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/engine.pod
index 61e0264bb7..c77dad5562 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/engine.pod
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/crypto/engine.pod
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ tell which one you are dealing with at any given point in time (after all
 they are both simply (ENGINE *) pointers, the difference is in the way they
 are used).
 
-=head3 Structural references
+I<Structural references>
 
 This basic type of reference is typically used for creating new ENGINEs
 dynamically, iterating across OpenSSL's internal linked-list of loaded
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ To clarify a particular function's handling of references, one should
 always consult that function's documentation "man" page, or failing that
 the openssl/engine.h header file includes some hints.
 
-=head3 Functional references
+I<Functional references>
 
 As mentioned, functional references exist when the cryptographic
 functionality of an ENGINE is required to be available. A functional
@@ -386,7 +386,7 @@ things, so we will simply illustrate the consequences as they apply to a
 couple of simple cases and leave developers to consider these and the
 source code to openssl's builtin utilities as guides.
 
-=head3 Using a specific ENGINE implementation
+I<Using a specific ENGINE implementation>
 
 Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin
 to want to use the "ACME" ENGINE if it is available in the version of
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ illustrates how to approach this;
  /* Release the structural reference from ENGINE_by_id() */
  ENGINE_free(e);
 
-=head3 Automatically using builtin ENGINE implementations
+I<Automatically using builtin ENGINE implementations>
 
 Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations
 bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ in same cases both. ENGINE implementations should provide indications of
 this in the descriptions attached to builtin control commands and/or in
 external product documentation.
 
-=head3 Issuing control commands to an ENGINE
+I<Issuing control commands to an ENGINE>
 
 Let's illustrate by example; a function for which the caller supplies the
 name of the ENGINE it wishes to use, a table of string-pairs for use before
@@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ return success without doing anything. In this case we assume the user is
 only supplying commands specific to the given ENGINE so we set this to
 FALSE.
 
-=head3 Discovering supported control commands
+I<Discovering supported control commands>
 
 It is possible to discover at run-time the names, numerical-ids, descriptions
 and input parameters of the control commands supported from a structural
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/openssl-shared.txt b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/openssl-shared.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5cf84a054f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/doc/openssl-shared.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+The OpenSSL  shared libraries are often installed in a directory like
+/usr/local/ssl/lib.
+
+If this directory is not in a standard system path for dynamic/shared
+libraries, then you will have problems linking and executing
+applications that use OpenSSL libraries UNLESS:
+
+* you link with static (archive) libraries.  If you are truly
+  paranoid about security, you should use static libraries.
+* you use the GNU libtool code during linking
+  (http://www.gnu.org/software/libtool/libtool.html)
+* you use pkg-config during linking (this requires that
+  PKG_CONFIG_PATH includes the path to the OpenSSL shared
+  library directory), and make use of -R or -rpath.
+  (http://www.freedesktop.org/software/pkgconfig/)
+* you specify the system-wide link path via a command such
+  as crle(1) on Solaris systems.
+* you add the OpenSSL shared library directory to /etc/ld.so.conf
+  and run ldconfig(8) on Linux systems.
+* you define the LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LIBPATH, SHLIB_PATH (HP),
+  DYLD_LIBRARY_PATH (MacOS X) or PATH (Cygwin and DJGPP)
+  environment variable and add the OpenSSL shared library
+  directory to it.
+
+One common tool to check the dynamic dependencies of an executable
+or dynamic library is ldd(1) on most UNIX systems.
+
+See any operating system documentation and manpages about shared
+libraries for your version of UNIX.  The following manpages may be
+helpful: ld(1), ld.so(1), ld.so.1(1) [Solaris], dld.sl(1) [HP],
+ldd(1), crle(1) [Solaris], pldd(1) [Solaris], ldconfig(8) [Linux],
+chatr(1) [HP].
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/tencce.bat b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/tencce.bat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6a944d7671
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/tencce.bat
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+rem called by testencce

+

+echo test %1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 

+cecopy %input% CE:\OpenSSL

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%ssleay% %1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 -e -bufsize 113 -k test -in \OpenSSL\%input% -out \OpenSSL\%tmp1%

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%ssleay% %1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 -d -bufsize 157 -k test -in \OpenSSL\%tmp1% -out \OpenSSL\%out1%

+del %out1% >nul 2>&1

+cecopy CE:\OpenSSL\%out1% .

+%cmp% %input% %out1%

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+echo test base64 %1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%ssleay% %1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 -a -e -bufsize 113 -k test -in \OpenSSL\%input% -out \OpenSSL\%tmp1%

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%ssleay% %1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 -a -d -bufsize 157 -k test -in \OpenSSL\%tmp1% -out \OpenSSL\%out1%

+del %out1% >nul 2>&1

+cecopy CE:\OpenSSL\%out1% .

+%cmp% %input% %out1%

+

+:err

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testce.bat b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testce.bat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..2ab010be6a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testce.bat
@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+@echo off
+
+cemkdir CE:\OpenSSL
+
+set test=..\ms
+set opath=%PATH%
+PATH=..\ms;%PATH%
+cecopy ..\apps\openssl.cnf CE:\OpenSSL
+set OPENSSL_CONF=\OpenSSL\openssl.cnf
+set HOME=\OpenSSL
+set CERUN_PASS_ENV=OPENSSL_CONF HOME
+
+rem run this from inside the bin directory
+
+rem Copy the DLL's (though they'll only exist if we're in out32dll)
+if exist libeay32.dll cecopy libeay32.dll CE:\OpenSSL
+if exist ssleay32.dll cecopy ssleay32.dll CE:\OpenSSL
+
+echo rsa_test
+call %test%\testce2 rsa_test
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo destest
+call %test%\testce2 destest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo ideatest
+call %test%\testce2 ideatest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo bftest
+call %test%\testce2 bftest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo shatest
+call %test%\testce2 shatest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo sha1test
+call %test%\testce2 sha1test
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo md5test
+call %test%\testce2 md5test
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo md2test
+call %test%\testce2 md2test
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo mdc2test
+call %test%\testce2 mdc2test
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo rc2test
+call %test%\testce2 rc2test
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo rc4test
+call %test%\testce2 rc4test
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo randtest
+call %test%\testce2 randtest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo dhtest
+call %test%\testce2 dhtest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo exptest
+call %test%\testce2 exptest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo dsatest
+call %test%\testce2 dsatest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo testenc
+call %test%\testencce openssl.exe
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo testpem
+call %test%\testpemce openssl.exe
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+cecopy openssl.exe CE:\OpenSSL
+
+echo verify
+copy ..\certs\*.pem cert.tmp >nul
+cecopy cert.tmp CE:\OpenSSL
+cemkdir CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+rem cecopy ..\certs\*.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\ca-cert.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\dsa-ca.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\dsa-pca.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\factory.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\ICE-CA.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\ICE-root.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\ICE-user.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\nortelCA.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\pca-cert.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\RegTP-4R.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\RegTP-5R.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\RegTP-6R.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\rsa-cca.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\thawteCb.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\thawteCp.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\timCA.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\tjhCA.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\vsign1.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\vsign2.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\vsign3.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\vsignss.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cecopy ..\certs\vsigntca.pem CE:\OpenSSL\certs
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\openssl verify -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp \OpenSSL\certs\*.pem
+
+echo testss
+call %test%\testssce openssl.exe
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+cecopy ssltest.exe CE:\OpenSSL
+cecopy ..\apps\server.pem CE:\OpenSSL
+cecopy ..\apps\client.pem CE:\OpenSSL
+
+echo test sslv2
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -ssl2
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2 with server authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -ssl2 -server_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2 with client authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -ssl2 -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2 with both client and server authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -ssl2 -server_auth -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv3
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -ssl3
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv3 with server authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -ssl3 -server_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv3 with client authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -ssl3 -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv3 with both client and server authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -ssl3 -server_auth -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -server_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with client authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -server_auth -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2 via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with 1024 bit DHE via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -dhe1024dsa -v
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2 with server authentication via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 -server_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2 with client authentication via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -ssl2 -server_auth -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv3 via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv3 with server authentication via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -server_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv3 with client authentication  via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -ssl3 -server_auth -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with server authentication
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with client authentication via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+echo test sslv2/sslv3 with both client and server authentication via BIO pair
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\ssltest -bio_pair -server_auth -client_auth -CAfile \OpenSSL\cert.tmp
+if errorlevel 1 goto done
+
+del cert.tmp
+
+echo passed all tests
+goto end
+:done
+echo problems.....
+:end
+PATH=%opath%
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testce2.bat b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testce2.bat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..24265b948f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testce2.bat
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+cecopy %1.exe CE:\OpenSSL
+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%1 %2 %3 %4 %5 %6 %7 %8 %9
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testencce.bat b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testencce.bat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..04faa5d99b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testencce.bat
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+@echo off

+echo start testenc

+

+path=..\ms;%path%

+set ssleay=%1%

+copy ..\ms\testenc.bat >nul

+set input=testenc.bat

+set tmp1=cipher.out

+set out1=clear.out

+set cmp=perl ..\ms\cmp.pl

+

+cecopy %ssleay% CE:\OpenSSL

+

+cd

+call tencce.bat enc

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat rc4

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-cfb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ede-cfb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ede3-cfb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ofb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ede-ofb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ede3-ofb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ecb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ede

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ede3

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-cbc

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ede-cbc

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat des-ede3-cbc

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat idea-ecb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat idea-cfb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat idea-ofb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat idea-cbc

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat rc2-ecb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat rc2-cfb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat rc2-ofb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat rc2-cbc

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat bf-ecb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat bf-cfb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat bf-ofb

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+call tencce.bat bf-cbc

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+echo OK

+del %out1% >nul 2>&1

+del %tmp1% >nul 2>&1

+:err

+

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testpemce.bat b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testpemce.bat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c793c3e514
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testpemce.bat
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+@echo off

+set ssleay=%1%

+set tmp1=pem.out

+set cmp=fc.exe

+

+cecopy %ssleay% CE:\OpenSSL

+

+copy ..\test\testcrl.pem >nul

+call tpemce.bat crl testcrl.pem

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+copy ..\test\testp7.pem >nul

+call tpemce.bat pkcs7 testp7.pem

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+copy ..\test\testreq2.pem >nul

+call tpemce.bat req testreq2.pem

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+copy ..\test\testrsa.pem >nul

+call tpemce.bat rsa testrsa.pem

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+copy ..\test\testx509.pem >nul

+call tpemce.bat x509 testx509.pem

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+copy ..\test\v3-cert1.pem >nul

+call tpemce.bat x509 v3-cert1.pem

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+copy ..\test\v3-cert1.pem >nul

+call tpemce.bat x509 v3-cert1.pem

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+copy ..\test\testsid.pem >nul

+call tpemce.bat sess_id testsid.pem

+if errorlevel 1 goto err

+

+echo OK

+del %tmp1% >nul 2>&1

+:err

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testssce.bat b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testssce.bat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dbb25abdb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/testssce.bat
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+rem set ssleay=..\out\ssleay

+set ssleay=%1

+

+set reqcmd=%ssleay% req

+set x509cmd=%ssleay% x509

+set verifycmd=%ssleay% verify

+

+set CAkey=\OpenSSL\keyCA.ss

+set CAcert=\OpenSSL\certCA.ss

+set CAserial=\OpenSSL\certCA.srl

+set CAreq=\OpenSSL\reqCA.ss

+cecopy ..\test\CAss.cnf CE:\OpenSSL

+set CAconf=\OpenSSL\CAss.cnf

+set CAreq2=\OpenSSL\req2CA.ss   

+

+cecopy ..\test\Uss.cnf CE:\OpenSSL

+set Uconf=\OpenSSL\Uss.cnf

+set Ukey=\OpenSSL\keyU.ss

+set Ureq=\OpenSSL\reqU.ss

+set Ucert=\OpenSSL\certU.ss

+

+echo make a certificate request using 'req'

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%reqcmd% -config %CAconf% -out %CAreq% -keyout %CAkey% -new

+if errorlevel 1 goto e_req

+

+echo convert the certificate request into a self signed certificate using 'x509'

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%x509cmd% -CAcreateserial -in %CAreq% -days 30 -req -out %CAcert% -signkey %CAkey% "> \OpenSSL\err.ss"

+if errorlevel 1 goto e_x509

+

+echo --

+echo convert a certificate into a certificate request using 'x509'

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%x509cmd% -in %CAcert% -x509toreq -signkey %CAkey% -out %CAreq2% "> \OpenSSL\err.ss"

+if errorlevel 1 goto e_x509_2

+

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%reqcmd% -verify -in %CAreq% -noout

+if errorlevel 1 goto e_vrfy_1

+

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%reqcmd% -verify -in %CAreq2% -noout

+if errorlevel 1 goto e_vrfy_2

+

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%verifycmd% -CAfile %CAcert% %CAcert%

+if errorlevel 1 goto e_vrfy_3

+

+echo --

+echo make another certificate request using 'req'

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%reqcmd% -config %Uconf% -out %Ureq% -keyout %Ukey% -new "> \OpenSSL\err.ss"

+if errorlevel 1 goto e_req_gen

+

+echo --

+echo sign certificate request with the just created CA via 'x509'

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%x509cmd% -CAcreateserial -in %Ureq% -days 30 -req -out %Ucert% -CA %CAcert% -CAkey %CAkey% -CAserial %CAserial%

+if errorlevel 1 goto e_x_sign

+

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%verifycmd% -CAfile %CAcert% %Ucert%

+echo --

+echo Certificate details

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%x509cmd% -subject -issuer -startdate -enddate -noout -in %Ucert%

+

+cecopy CE:%CAcert% .

+cecopy CE:%CAkey% .

+cecopy CE:%CAserial% .

+cecopy CE:%Ucert% .

+cecopy CE:%Ukey% .

+

+echo Everything appeared to work

+echo --

+echo The generated CA certificate is %CAcert%

+echo The generated CA private key is %CAkey%

+echo The current CA signing serial number is in %CAserial%

+

+echo The generated user certificate is %Ucert%

+echo The generated user private key is %Ukey%

+echo --

+

+cedel CE:\OpenSSL\err.ss

+

+goto end

+

+:e_req

+echo error using 'req' to generate a certificate request

+goto end

+:e_x509

+echo error using 'x509' to self sign a certificate request

+goto end

+:e_x509_2

+echo error using 'x509' convert a certificate to a certificate request

+goto end

+:e_vrfy_1

+echo first generated request is invalid

+goto end

+:e_vrfy_2

+echo second generated request is invalid

+goto end

+:e_vrfy_3

+echo first generated cert is invalid

+goto end

+:e_req_gen

+echo error using 'req' to generate a certificate request

+goto end

+:e_x_sign

+echo error using 'x509' to sign a certificate request

+goto end

+

+:end

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/tpemce.bat b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/tpemce.bat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..17b2acd390
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/ms/tpemce.bat
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+rem called by testpemce

+

+echo test %1 %2

+cecopy %2 CE:\OpenSSL

+cerun CE:\OpenSSL\%ssleay% %1 -in \OpenSSL\%2 -out \OpenSSL\%tmp1%

+del %tmp1% >nul 2>&1

+cecopy CE:\OpenSSL\%tmp1% .

+%cmp% %2 %tmp1%

diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/shlib/sco5-shared-gcc.sh b/src/lib/libssl/src/shlib/sco5-shared-gcc.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..fe4a457b52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/shlib/sco5-shared-gcc.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+major="0"
+minor="9.7b"
+
+slib=libssl
+sh_slib=$slib.so.$major.$minor
+
+clib=libcrypto
+sh_clib=$clib.so.$major.$minor
+
+FLAGS="-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer"
+SHFLAGS="-DPIC -fPIC"
+
+touch $sh_clib
+touch $sh_slib
+
+echo collecting all object files for $clib.so
+OBJS=
+find . -name \*.o -print > allobjs
+for obj in `ar t libcrypto.a`
+do
+        OBJS="$OBJS `grep $obj allobjs`"
+done
+
+echo linking $clib.so
+gcc -G -o $sh_clib -h $sh_clib $OBJS -lnsl -lsocket
+
+rm -f $clib.so
+ln -s $sh_clib $clib.so
+
+echo collecting all object files for $slib.so
+OBJS=
+for obj in `ar t libssl.a`
+do
+        OBJS="$OBJS `grep $obj allobjs`"
+done
+
+echo linking $slib.so
+gcc -G -o $sh_slib -h $sh_slib $OBJS -L. -lcrypto
+
+rm -f $slib.so
+ln -s $sh_slib $slib.so
+
+mv libRSAglue.a libRSAglue.a.orig
+mv libcrypto.a  libcrypto.a.orig
+mv libssl.a     libssl.a.orig
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/shlib/sco5-shared-installed b/src/lib/libssl/src/shlib/sco5-shared-installed
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..509902833f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/shlib/sco5-shared-installed
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+major="0"
+minor="9.7b"
+
+slib=libssl
+sh_slib=$slib.so.$major.$minor
+
+clib=libcrypto
+sh_clib=$clib.so.$major.$minor
+
+# If you want them in /usr/local/lib then change INSTALLTOP to point there.
+#INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl/lib
+INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/lib
+
+cp -p $sh_clib $INSTALLTOP
+cp -p $sh_slib $INSTALLTOP
+
+PWD=`pwd`
+cd $INSTALLTOP
+rm -f $INSTALLTOP/$clib.so
+ln -s $INSTALLTOP/$sh_clib $clib.so
+
+rm -f $INSTALLTOP/$slib.so
+ln -s $INSTALLTOP/$sh_slib $slib.so
+
+cd $PWD
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/shlib/sco5-shared.sh b/src/lib/libssl/src/shlib/sco5-shared.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b3365d9f51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/shlib/sco5-shared.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+major="0"
+minor="9.7b"
+
+slib=libssl
+sh_slib=$slib.so.$major.$minor
+
+clib=libcrypto
+sh_clib=$clib.so.$major.$minor
+
+FLAGS="-O -DFILIO_H -Kalloca"
+SHFLAGS="-Kpic -DPIC"
+
+touch $sh_clib
+touch $sh_slib
+
+echo collecting all object files for $clib.so
+OBJS=
+find . -name \*.o -print > allobjs
+for obj in `ar t libcrypto.a`
+do
+        OBJS="$OBJS `grep $obj allobjs`"
+done
+
+echo linking $clib.so
+cc -G -o $sh_clib -h $sh_clib $OBJS -lnsl -lsocket
+
+rm -f $clib.so
+ln -s $sh_clib $clib.so
+
+echo collecting all object files for $slib.so
+OBJS=
+for obj in `ar t libssl.a`
+do
+        OBJS="$OBJS `grep $obj allobjs`"
+done
+
+echo linking $slib.so
+cc -G -o $sh_slib -h $sh_slib $OBJS -L. -lcrypto
+
+rm -f $slib.so
+ln -s $sh_slib $slib.so
+
+mv libRSAglue.a libRSAglue.a.orig
+mv libcrypto.a  libcrypto.a.orig
+mv libssl.a     libssl.a.orig
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/test/evptests.txt b/src/lib/libssl/src/test/evptests.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80bd9c7765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/test/evptests.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+#cipher:key:iv:plaintext:ciphertext:0/1(decrypt/encrypt)
+#digest:::input:output
+
+# SHA(1) tests (from shatest.c)
+SHA1:::616263:a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d
+
+# MD5 tests (from md5test.c)
+MD5::::d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
+MD5:::61:0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661
+MD5:::616263:900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72
+MD5:::6d65737361676520646967657374:f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0
+MD5:::6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a:c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b
+MD5:::4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839:d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f
+MD5:::3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930:57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a
+
+# AES 128 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
+
+AES-128-ECB:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F::00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF:69C4E0D86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A:1
+
+# AES 192 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
+
+AES-192-ECB:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617::00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF:DDA97CA4864CDFE06EAF70A0EC0D7191:1
+
+# AES 256 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
+
+AES-256-ECB:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F::00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF:8EA2B7CA516745BFEAFC49904B496089:1
+
+# AES 128 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-128-ECB:00000000000000000000000000000000::00000000000000000000000000000000:C34C052CC0DA8D73451AFE5F03BE297F:1
+
+# AES 128 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-128-ECB:00000000000000000000000000000000::44416AC2D1F53C583303917E6BE9EBE0:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES 192 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-192-ECB:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000::48E31E9E256718F29229319C19F15BA4:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES 256 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-256-ECB:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000::058CCFFDBBCB382D1F6F56585D8A4ADE:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES 128 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-128-CBC:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:8A05FC5E095AF4848A08D328D3688E3D:1
+
+# AES 192 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-192-CBC:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:7BD966D53AD8C1BB85D2ADFAE87BB104:1
+
+# AES 256 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-256-CBC:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:FE3C53653E2F45B56FCD88B2CC898FF0:1
+
+# AES 128 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-128-CBC:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:FACA37E0B0C85373DF706E73F7C9AF86:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES tests from NIST document SP800-38A
+# For all ECB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-ECB:key::plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# ECB-AES128.Encrypt and ECB-AES128.Decrypt
+AES-128-ECB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C::6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3AD77BB40D7A3660A89ECAF32466EF97
+AES-128-ECB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C::AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:F5D3D58503B9699DE785895A96FDBAAF
+AES-128-ECB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C::30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:43B1CD7F598ECE23881B00E3ED030688
+AES-128-ECB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C::F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:7B0C785E27E8AD3F8223207104725DD4
+# ECB-AES192.Encrypt and ECB-AES192.Decrypt 
+AES-192-ECB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B::6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:BD334F1D6E45F25FF712A214571FA5CC
+AES-192-ECB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B::AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:974104846D0AD3AD7734ECB3ECEE4EEF
+AES-192-ECB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B::30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:EF7AFD2270E2E60ADCE0BA2FACE6444E
+AES-192-ECB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B::F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:9A4B41BA738D6C72FB16691603C18E0E
+# ECB-AES256.Encrypt and ECB-AES256.Decrypt 
+AES-256-ECB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4::6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:F3EED1BDB5D2A03C064B5A7E3DB181F8
+AES-256-ECB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4::AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:591CCB10D410ED26DC5BA74A31362870
+AES-256-ECB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4::30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:B6ED21B99CA6F4F9F153E7B1BEAFED1D
+AES-256-ECB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4::F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:23304B7A39F9F3FF067D8D8F9E24ECC7
+# For all CBC encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-CBC:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# CBC-AES128.Encrypt and CBC-AES128.Decrypt 
+AES-128-CBC:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:7649ABAC8119B246CEE98E9B12E9197D
+AES-128-CBC:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:7649ABAC8119B246CEE98E9B12E9197D:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:5086CB9B507219EE95DB113A917678B2
+AES-128-CBC:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:5086CB9B507219EE95DB113A917678B2:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:73BED6B8E3C1743B7116E69E22229516
+AES-128-CBC:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:73BED6B8E3C1743B7116E69E22229516:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:3FF1CAA1681FAC09120ECA307586E1A7
+# CBC-AES192.Encrypt and CBC-AES192.Decrypt 
+AES-192-CBC:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:4F021DB243BC633D7178183A9FA071E8
+AES-192-CBC:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:4F021DB243BC633D7178183A9FA071E8:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:B4D9ADA9AD7DEDF4E5E738763F69145A
+AES-192-CBC:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:B4D9ADA9AD7DEDF4E5E738763F69145A:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:571B242012FB7AE07FA9BAAC3DF102E0
+AES-192-CBC:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:571B242012FB7AE07FA9BAAC3DF102E0:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:08B0E27988598881D920A9E64F5615CD
+# CBC-AES256.Encrypt and CBC-AES256.Decrypt 
+AES-256-CBC:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:F58C4C04D6E5F1BA779EABFB5F7BFBD6
+AES-256-CBC:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:F58C4C04D6E5F1BA779EABFB5F7BFBD6:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:9CFC4E967EDB808D679F777BC6702C7D
+AES-256-CBC:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:9CFC4E967EDB808D679F777BC6702C7D:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:39F23369A9D9BACFA530E26304231461
+AES-256-CBC:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:39F23369A9D9BACFA530E26304231461:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:B2EB05E2C39BE9FCDA6C19078C6A9D1B
+# We don't support CFB{1,8}-AESxxx.{En,De}crypt
+# For all CFB128 encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-CFB:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# CFB128-AES128.Encrypt 
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:1
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B:1
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF:1
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:C04B05357C5D1C0EEAC4C66F9FF7F2E6:1
+# CFB128-AES128.Decrypt 
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:0
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B:0
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF:0
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:C04B05357C5D1C0EEAC4C66F9FF7F2E6:0
+# CFB128-AES192.Encrypt
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:1
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A:1
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9:1
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:C05F9F9CA9834FA042AE8FBA584B09FF:1
+# CFB128-AES192.Decrypt
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:0
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A:0
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9:0
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:C05F9F9CA9834FA042AE8FBA584B09FF:0
+# CFB128-AES256.Encrypt 
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:1
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B:1
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9:1
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:75A385741AB9CEF82031623D55B1E471:1
+# CFB128-AES256.Decrypt 
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:0
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B:0
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9:0
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:75A385741AB9CEF82031623D55B1E471:0
+# For all OFB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-CFB:key:IV/output':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# OFB-AES128.Encrypt 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:1 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:7789508D16918F03F53C52DAC54ED825:1 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:9740051E9C5FECF64344F7A82260EDCC:1 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:304C6528F659C77866A510D9C1D6AE5E:1 
+# OFB-AES128.Decrypt 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:0
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:7789508D16918F03F53C52DAC54ED825:0
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:9740051E9C5FECF64344F7A82260EDCC:0
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:304C6528F659C77866A510D9C1D6AE5E:0
+# OFB-AES192.Encrypt 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:1 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:FCC28B8D4C63837C09E81700C1100401:1 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:8D9A9AEAC0F6596F559C6D4DAF59A5F2:1 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:6D9F200857CA6C3E9CAC524BD9ACC92A:1 
+# OFB-AES192.Decrypt 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:0 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:FCC28B8D4C63837C09E81700C1100401:0 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:8D9A9AEAC0F6596F559C6D4DAF59A5F2:0 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:6D9F200857CA6C3E9CAC524BD9ACC92A:0 
+# OFB-AES256.Encrypt 
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:1
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:4FEBDC6740D20B3AC88F6AD82A4FB08D:1
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:71AB47A086E86EEDF39D1C5BBA97C408:1
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:0126141D67F37BE8538F5A8BE740E484:1
+# OFB-AES256.Decrypt 
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:0
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:4FEBDC6740D20B3AC88F6AD82A4FB08D:0
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:71AB47A086E86EEDF39D1C5BBA97C408:0
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:0126141D67F37BE8538F5A8BE740E484:0
+
+# DES ECB tests (from destest)
+
+DES-ECB:0000000000000000::0000000000000000:8CA64DE9C1B123A7
+DES-ECB:FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF::FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF:7359B2163E4EDC58
+DES-ECB:3000000000000000::1000000000000001:958E6E627A05557B
+DES-ECB:1111111111111111::1111111111111111:F40379AB9E0EC533
+DES-ECB:0123456789ABCDEF::1111111111111111:17668DFC7292532D
+DES-ECB:1111111111111111::0123456789ABCDEF:8A5AE1F81AB8F2DD
+DES-ECB:FEDCBA9876543210::0123456789ABCDEF:ED39D950FA74BCC4
+
+# DESX-CBC tests (from destest)
+DESX-CBC:0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210:fedcba9876543210:37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000:846B2914851E9A2954732F8AA0A611C115CDC2D7951B1053A63C5E03B21AA3C4
+
+# DES EDE3 CBC tests (from destest)
+DES-EDE3-CBC:0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210:fedcba9876543210:37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000:3FE301C962AC01D02213763C1CBD4CDC799657C064ECF5D41C673812CFDE9675
+
+# RC4 tests (from rc4test)
+RC4:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef::0123456789abcdef:75b7878099e0c596
+RC4:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef::0000000000000000:7494c2e7104b0879
+RC4:00000000000000000000000000000000::0000000000000000:de188941a3375d3a
+RC4:ef012345ef012345ef012345ef012345::0000000000000000000000000000000000000000:d6a141a7ec3c38dfbd615a1162e1c7ba36b67858
+RC4:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef::123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF012345678:66a0949f8af7d6891f7f832ba833c00c892ebe30143ce28740011ecf
+RC4:ef012345ef012345ef012345ef012345::00000000000000000000:d6a141a7ec3c38dfbd61
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/util/bat.sh b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/bat.sh
index c6f48e8a7b..4d9a8287d0 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/util/bat.sh
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/bat.sh
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ sub var_add
         local($dir,$val)=@_;
         local(@a,$_,$ret);
 
+        return("") if $no_engine && $dir =~ /\/engine/;
         return("") if $no_idea && $dir =~ /\/idea/;
         return("") if $no_rc2  && $dir =~ /\/rc2/;
         return("") if $no_rc4  && $dir =~ /\/rc4/;
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@ sub var_add
         @a=grep(!/(^sha1)|(_sha1$)|(m_dss1$)/,@a) if $no_sha1;
         @a=grep(!/_mdc2$/,@a) if $no_mdc2;
 
+        @a=grep(!/^engine$/,@a) if $no_engine;
         @a=grep(!/(^rsa$)|(^genrsa$)|(^req$)|(^ca$)/,@a) if $no_rsa;
         @a=grep(!/(^dsa$)|(^gendsa$)|(^dsaparam$)/,@a) if $no_dsa;
         @a=grep(!/^gendsa$/,@a) if $no_sha1;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/util/extract-names.pl b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/extract-names.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d413a045cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/extract-names.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+
+$/ = "";                        # Eat a paragraph at once.
+while(<STDIN>) {
+    chop;
+    s/\n/ /gm;
+    if (/^=head1 /) {
+        $name = 0;
+    } elsif ($name) {
+        if (/ - /) {
+            s/ - .*//;
+            s/[ \t,]+/ /g;
+            push @words, split ' ';
+        }
+    }
+    if (/^=head1 *NAME *$/) {
+        $name = 1;
+    }
+}
+
+print join("\n", @words),"\n";
+
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/util/mkcerts.sh b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/mkcerts.sh
index 5f8a1dae73..0184fcb70e 100644
--- a/src/lib/libssl/src/util/mkcerts.sh
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/mkcerts.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!bin/sh
+#!/bin/sh
 
 # This script will re-make all the required certs.
 # cd apps
@@ -12,8 +12,8 @@
 #
  
 CAbits=1024
-SSLEAY="../apps/ssleay"
-CONF="-config ../apps/ssleay.cnf"
+SSLEAY="../apps/openssl"
+CONF="-config ../apps/openssl.cnf"
 
 # create pca request.
 echo creating $CAbits bit PCA cert request
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/src/util/pl/VC-CE.pl b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/pl/VC-CE.pl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1805ef9d97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/src/util/pl/VC-CE.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+#!/usr/local/bin/perl
+# VC-CE.pl - the file for eMbedded Visual C++ 3.0 for windows CE, static libraries
+#
+
+$ssl=   "ssleay32";
+$crypto="libeay32";
+$RSAref="RSAref32";
+
+$o='\\';
+$cp='copy nul+';        # Timestamps get stuffed otherwise
+$rm='del';
+
+# C compiler stuff
+$cc='$(CC)';
+$cflags=' /W3 /WX /Ox /O2 /Ob2 /Gs0 /GF /Gy /nologo $(WCETARGETDEFS) -DUNICODE -D_UNICODE -DWIN32 -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DL_ENDIAN -DDSO_WIN32 -DNO_CHMOD -I$(WCECOMPAT)/include';
+$lflags='/nologo /subsystem:windowsce,$(WCELDVERSION) /machine:$(WCELDMACHINE) /opt:ref';
+$mlflags='';
+
+$out_def='out32_$(TARGETCPU)';
+$tmp_def='tmp32_$(TARGETCPU)';
+$inc_def="inc32";
+
+if ($debug)
+        {
+        $cflags=" /MDd /W3 /WX /Zi /Yd /Od /nologo -DWIN32 -D_DEBUG -DL_ENDIAN -DWIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN -DDEBUG -DDSO_WIN32";
+        $lflags.=" /debug";
+        $mlflags.=' /debug';
+        }
+
+$obj='.obj';
+$ofile="/Fo";
+
+# EXE linking stuff
+$link="link";
+$efile="/out:";
+$exep='.exe';
+if ($no_sock)
+        { $ex_libs=""; }
+else    { $ex_libs='winsock.lib $(WCECOMPAT)/lib/wcecompatex.lib $(WCELDFLAGS)'; }
+
+# static library stuff
+$mklib='lib';
+$ranlib='';
+$plib="";
+$libp=".lib";
+$shlibp=($shlib)?".dll":".lib";
+$lfile='/out:';
+
+$shlib_ex_obj="";
+#$app_ex_obj="setargv.obj";
+$app_ex_obj="";
+
+$bn_asm_obj='';
+$bn_asm_src='';
+$des_enc_obj='';
+$des_enc_src='';
+$bf_enc_obj='';
+$bf_enc_src='';
+
+if ($shlib)
+        {
+        $mlflags.=" $lflags /dll";
+#       $cflags =~ s| /MD| /MT|;
+        $lib_cflag=" -D_WINDLL -D_DLL";
+        $out_def='out32dll_$(TARGETCPU)';
+        $tmp_def='tmp32dll_$(TARGETCPU)';
+        }
+
+$cflags.=" /Fd$out_def";
+
+sub do_lib_rule
+        {
+        local($objs,$target,$name,$shlib)=@_;
+        local($ret,$Name);
+
+        $taget =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
+        ($Name=$name) =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/;
+
+#       $target="\$(LIB_D)$o$target";
+        $ret.="$target: $objs\n";
+        if (!$shlib)
+                {
+#               $ret.="\t\$(RM) \$(O_$Name)\n";
+                $ex =' ';
+                $ret.="\t\$(MKLIB) $lfile$target @<<\n  $objs $ex\n<<\n";
+                }
+        else
+                {
+                local($ex)=($target =~ /O_SSL/)?' $(L_CRYPTO)':'';
+#               $ex.=' winsock.lib coredll.lib $(WCECOMPAT)/lib/wcecompatex.lib';
+                $ex.=' winsock.lib $(WCECOMPAT)/lib/wcecompatex.lib';
+                $ret.="\t\$(LINK) \$(MLFLAGS) $efile$target /def:ms/${Name}.def @<<\n  \$(SHLIB_EX_OBJ) $objs $ex\n<<\n";
+                }
+        $ret.="\n";
+        return($ret);
+        }
+
+sub do_link_rule
+        {
+        local($target,$files,$dep_libs,$libs)=@_;
+        local($ret,$_);
+        
+        $file =~ s/\//$o/g if $o ne '/';
+        $n=&bname($targer);
+        $ret.="$target: $files $dep_libs\n";
+        $ret.="  \$(LINK) \$(LFLAGS) $efile$target @<<\n";
+        $ret.="  \$(APP_EX_OBJ) $files $libs\n<<\n\n";
+        return($ret);
+        }
+
+1;
diff --git a/src/lib/libssl/test/evptests.txt b/src/lib/libssl/test/evptests.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..80bd9c7765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/libssl/test/evptests.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+#cipher:key:iv:plaintext:ciphertext:0/1(decrypt/encrypt)
+#digest:::input:output
+
+# SHA(1) tests (from shatest.c)
+SHA1:::616263:a9993e364706816aba3e25717850c26c9cd0d89d
+
+# MD5 tests (from md5test.c)
+MD5::::d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e
+MD5:::61:0cc175b9c0f1b6a831c399e269772661
+MD5:::616263:900150983cd24fb0d6963f7d28e17f72
+MD5:::6d65737361676520646967657374:f96b697d7cb7938d525a2f31aaf161d0
+MD5:::6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a:c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b
+MD5:::4142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a30313233343536373839:d174ab98d277d9f5a5611c2c9f419d9f
+MD5:::3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930:57edf4a22be3c955ac49da2e2107b67a
+
+# AES 128 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
+
+AES-128-ECB:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F::00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF:69C4E0D86A7B0430D8CDB78070B4C55A:1
+
+# AES 192 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
+
+AES-192-ECB:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617::00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF:DDA97CA4864CDFE06EAF70A0EC0D7191:1
+
+# AES 256 ECB tests (from FIPS-197 test vectors, encrypt)
+
+AES-256-ECB:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F::00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF:8EA2B7CA516745BFEAFC49904B496089:1
+
+# AES 128 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-128-ECB:00000000000000000000000000000000::00000000000000000000000000000000:C34C052CC0DA8D73451AFE5F03BE297F:1
+
+# AES 128 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-128-ECB:00000000000000000000000000000000::44416AC2D1F53C583303917E6BE9EBE0:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES 192 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-192-ECB:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000::48E31E9E256718F29229319C19F15BA4:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES 256 ECB tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-256-ECB:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000::058CCFFDBBCB382D1F6F56585D8A4ADE:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES 128 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-128-CBC:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:8A05FC5E095AF4848A08D328D3688E3D:1
+
+# AES 192 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-192-CBC:000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:7BD966D53AD8C1BB85D2ADFAE87BB104:1
+
+# AES 256 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, encrypt)
+
+#AES-256-CBC:0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:FE3C53653E2F45B56FCD88B2CC898FF0:1
+
+# AES 128 CBC tests (from NIST test vectors, decrypt)
+
+#AES-128-CBC:00000000000000000000000000000000:00000000000000000000000000000000:FACA37E0B0C85373DF706E73F7C9AF86:00000000000000000000000000000000:0
+
+# AES tests from NIST document SP800-38A
+# For all ECB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-ECB:key::plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# ECB-AES128.Encrypt and ECB-AES128.Decrypt
+AES-128-ECB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C::6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3AD77BB40D7A3660A89ECAF32466EF97
+AES-128-ECB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C::AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:F5D3D58503B9699DE785895A96FDBAAF
+AES-128-ECB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C::30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:43B1CD7F598ECE23881B00E3ED030688
+AES-128-ECB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C::F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:7B0C785E27E8AD3F8223207104725DD4
+# ECB-AES192.Encrypt and ECB-AES192.Decrypt 
+AES-192-ECB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B::6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:BD334F1D6E45F25FF712A214571FA5CC
+AES-192-ECB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B::AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:974104846D0AD3AD7734ECB3ECEE4EEF
+AES-192-ECB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B::30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:EF7AFD2270E2E60ADCE0BA2FACE6444E
+AES-192-ECB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B::F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:9A4B41BA738D6C72FB16691603C18E0E
+# ECB-AES256.Encrypt and ECB-AES256.Decrypt 
+AES-256-ECB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4::6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:F3EED1BDB5D2A03C064B5A7E3DB181F8
+AES-256-ECB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4::AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:591CCB10D410ED26DC5BA74A31362870
+AES-256-ECB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4::30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:B6ED21B99CA6F4F9F153E7B1BEAFED1D
+AES-256-ECB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4::F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:23304B7A39F9F3FF067D8D8F9E24ECC7
+# For all CBC encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-CBC:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# CBC-AES128.Encrypt and CBC-AES128.Decrypt 
+AES-128-CBC:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:7649ABAC8119B246CEE98E9B12E9197D
+AES-128-CBC:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:7649ABAC8119B246CEE98E9B12E9197D:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:5086CB9B507219EE95DB113A917678B2
+AES-128-CBC:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:5086CB9B507219EE95DB113A917678B2:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:73BED6B8E3C1743B7116E69E22229516
+AES-128-CBC:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:73BED6B8E3C1743B7116E69E22229516:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:3FF1CAA1681FAC09120ECA307586E1A7
+# CBC-AES192.Encrypt and CBC-AES192.Decrypt 
+AES-192-CBC:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:4F021DB243BC633D7178183A9FA071E8
+AES-192-CBC:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:4F021DB243BC633D7178183A9FA071E8:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:B4D9ADA9AD7DEDF4E5E738763F69145A
+AES-192-CBC:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:B4D9ADA9AD7DEDF4E5E738763F69145A:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:571B242012FB7AE07FA9BAAC3DF102E0
+AES-192-CBC:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:571B242012FB7AE07FA9BAAC3DF102E0:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:08B0E27988598881D920A9E64F5615CD
+# CBC-AES256.Encrypt and CBC-AES256.Decrypt 
+AES-256-CBC:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:F58C4C04D6E5F1BA779EABFB5F7BFBD6
+AES-256-CBC:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:F58C4C04D6E5F1BA779EABFB5F7BFBD6:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:9CFC4E967EDB808D679F777BC6702C7D
+AES-256-CBC:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:9CFC4E967EDB808D679F777BC6702C7D:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:39F23369A9D9BACFA530E26304231461
+AES-256-CBC:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:39F23369A9D9BACFA530E26304231461:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:B2EB05E2C39BE9FCDA6C19078C6A9D1B
+# We don't support CFB{1,8}-AESxxx.{En,De}crypt
+# For all CFB128 encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-CFB:key:IV/ciphertext':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# CFB128-AES128.Encrypt 
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:1
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B:1
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF:1
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:C04B05357C5D1C0EEAC4C66F9FF7F2E6:1
+# CFB128-AES128.Decrypt 
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:0
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B:0
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:C8A64537A0B3A93FCDE3CDAD9F1CE58B:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF:0
+AES-128-CFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:26751F67A3CBB140B1808CF187A4F4DF:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:C04B05357C5D1C0EEAC4C66F9FF7F2E6:0
+# CFB128-AES192.Encrypt
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:1
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A:1
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9:1
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:C05F9F9CA9834FA042AE8FBA584B09FF:1
+# CFB128-AES192.Decrypt
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:0
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A:0
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:67CE7F7F81173621961A2B70171D3D7A:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9:0
+AES-192-CFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:2E1E8A1DD59B88B1C8E60FED1EFAC4C9:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:C05F9F9CA9834FA042AE8FBA584B09FF:0
+# CFB128-AES256.Encrypt 
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:1
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B:1
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9:1
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:75A385741AB9CEF82031623D55B1E471:1
+# CFB128-AES256.Decrypt 
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:0
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B:0
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:39FFED143B28B1C832113C6331E5407B:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9:0
+AES-256-CFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:DF10132415E54B92A13ED0A8267AE2F9:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:75A385741AB9CEF82031623D55B1E471:0
+# For all OFB encrypts and decrypts, the transformed sequence is
+#   AES-bits-CFB:key:IV/output':plaintext:ciphertext:encdec
+# OFB-AES128.Encrypt 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:1 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:7789508D16918F03F53C52DAC54ED825:1 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:9740051E9C5FECF64344F7A82260EDCC:1 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:304C6528F659C77866A510D9C1D6AE5E:1 
+# OFB-AES128.Decrypt 
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:3B3FD92EB72DAD20333449F8E83CFB4A:0
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:50FE67CC996D32B6DA0937E99BAFEC60:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:7789508D16918F03F53C52DAC54ED825:0
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:D9A4DADA0892239F6B8B3D7680E15674:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:9740051E9C5FECF64344F7A82260EDCC:0
+AES-128-OFB:2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C:A78819583F0308E7A6BF36B1386ABF23:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:304C6528F659C77866A510D9C1D6AE5E:0
+# OFB-AES192.Encrypt 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:1 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:FCC28B8D4C63837C09E81700C1100401:1 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:8D9A9AEAC0F6596F559C6D4DAF59A5F2:1 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:6D9F200857CA6C3E9CAC524BD9ACC92A:1 
+# OFB-AES192.Decrypt 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:CDC80D6FDDF18CAB34C25909C99A4174:0 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:A609B38DF3B1133DDDFF2718BA09565E:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:FCC28B8D4C63837C09E81700C1100401:0 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:52EF01DA52602FE0975F78AC84BF8A50:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:8D9A9AEAC0F6596F559C6D4DAF59A5F2:0 
+AES-192-OFB:8E73B0F7DA0E6452C810F32B809079E562F8EAD2522C6B7B:BD5286AC63AABD7EB067AC54B553F71D:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:6D9F200857CA6C3E9CAC524BD9ACC92A:0 
+# OFB-AES256.Encrypt 
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:1
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:4FEBDC6740D20B3AC88F6AD82A4FB08D:1
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:71AB47A086E86EEDF39D1C5BBA97C408:1
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:0126141D67F37BE8538F5A8BE740E484:1
+# OFB-AES256.Decrypt 
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F:6BC1BEE22E409F96E93D7E117393172A:DC7E84BFDA79164B7ECD8486985D3860:0
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:B7BF3A5DF43989DD97F0FA97EBCE2F4A:AE2D8A571E03AC9C9EB76FAC45AF8E51:4FEBDC6740D20B3AC88F6AD82A4FB08D:0
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:E1C656305ED1A7A6563805746FE03EDC:30C81C46A35CE411E5FBC1191A0A52EF:71AB47A086E86EEDF39D1C5BBA97C408:0
+AES-256-OFB:603DEB1015CA71BE2B73AEF0857D77811F352C073B6108D72D9810A30914DFF4:41635BE625B48AFC1666DD42A09D96E7:F69F2445DF4F9B17AD2B417BE66C3710:0126141D67F37BE8538F5A8BE740E484:0
+
+# DES ECB tests (from destest)
+
+DES-ECB:0000000000000000::0000000000000000:8CA64DE9C1B123A7
+DES-ECB:FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF::FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF:7359B2163E4EDC58
+DES-ECB:3000000000000000::1000000000000001:958E6E627A05557B
+DES-ECB:1111111111111111::1111111111111111:F40379AB9E0EC533
+DES-ECB:0123456789ABCDEF::1111111111111111:17668DFC7292532D
+DES-ECB:1111111111111111::0123456789ABCDEF:8A5AE1F81AB8F2DD
+DES-ECB:FEDCBA9876543210::0123456789ABCDEF:ED39D950FA74BCC4
+
+# DESX-CBC tests (from destest)
+DESX-CBC:0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210:fedcba9876543210:37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000:846B2914851E9A2954732F8AA0A611C115CDC2D7951B1053A63C5E03B21AA3C4
+
+# DES EDE3 CBC tests (from destest)
+DES-EDE3-CBC:0123456789abcdeff1e0d3c2b5a49786fedcba9876543210:fedcba9876543210:37363534333231204E6F77206973207468652074696D6520666F722000000000:3FE301C962AC01D02213763C1CBD4CDC799657C064ECF5D41C673812CFDE9675
+
+# RC4 tests (from rc4test)
+RC4:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef::0123456789abcdef:75b7878099e0c596
+RC4:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef::0000000000000000:7494c2e7104b0879
+RC4:00000000000000000000000000000000::0000000000000000:de188941a3375d3a
+RC4:ef012345ef012345ef012345ef012345::0000000000000000000000000000000000000000:d6a141a7ec3c38dfbd615a1162e1c7ba36b67858
+RC4:0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef::123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF012345678:66a0949f8af7d6891f7f832ba833c00c892ebe30143ce28740011ecf
+RC4:ef012345ef012345ef012345ef012345::00000000000000000000:d6a141a7ec3c38dfbd61