2 files changed, 110 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/man/EVP_aes_128_ccm.3 b/src/lib/libcrypto/man/EVP_aes_128_ccm.3
index c1faf9e325..e9023a5b67 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/man/EVP_aes_128_ccm.3
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/man/EVP_aes_128_ccm.3
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: EVP_aes_128_ccm.3,v 1.4 2024/12/23 22:06:00 jsg Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: EVP_aes_128_ccm.3,v 1.5 2024/12/29 12:27:28 schwarze Exp $
 .\" full merge up to:
 .\" OpenSSL EVP_EncryptInit.pod 0874d7f2 Oct 11 13:13:47 2022 +0100
 .\" OpenSSL EVP_aes.pod a1ec85c1 Apr 21 10:49:12 2020 +0100
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
 .\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 .\" OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 23 2024 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 29 2024 $
 .Dt EVP_AES_128_CCM 3
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -105,6 +105,11 @@ For CCM mode ciphers, the behaviour of the EVP interface is subtly
 altered and several additional
 .Xr EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl 3
 operations are required to function correctly.
+Some of the
+.Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_*
+control commands are older aliases for corresponding
+.Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_*
+constants as indicated below.
 .Pp
 The less cumbersome and less error-prone
 .Xr EVP_AEAD_CTX_new 3
@@ -145,7 +150,7 @@ for the length field reduces des maximum size of messages that can be sent,
 but in return allows transmitting more messages with the same key.
 It is an error to pass less than 2 or more than the default value of 8 for
 .Fa arg .
-.It Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN
+.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN
 Set the size of the nonce to
 .Fa arg
 bytes and the size
@@ -170,7 +175,7 @@ argument, with the other two arguments pointing to the desired AES key
 and to the desired nonce.
 .Ss Encryption controls
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
+.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
 If the
 .Fa ptr
 argument is
@@ -195,7 +200,7 @@ when
 is not configured for encrypting.
 Issuing this control command when an encryption key is already configured
 silently causes data corruption.
-.It Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG
+.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG
 Store the
 .Fa arg
 bytes of the tag in the memory provided by the caller starting at
@@ -248,7 +253,7 @@ argument set to
 .Dv NULL .
 .Ss Decryption controls
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
+.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
 If the
 .Fa ptr
 argument is not
@@ -456,6 +461,94 @@ putchar('\en');
 
 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
 .Ed
+.Pp
+The reverse operation for the same test vector,
+i.e. decrypting and comparing the digest,
+is implemented by the following code.
+.Pp
+The variable declarations and definitions up to the call of
+.Xr EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new 3
+are the same as above.
+The chief differences are:
+.Bl -dash -width 1n -compact
+.It
+The tag is not part of the output,
+so the total output length is shorter.
+.It
+No
+.Xr memcmp 3
+of the tag takes place.
+Instead, the control command
+.Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
+requires the tag that is going to be verified as an additional argument.
+.It
+While
+.Xr EVP_EncryptFinal 3
+is an optional no-op,
+.Xr EVP_DecryptFinal 3
+is not called and would fail.
+.El
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+const int out_len = aad_len + text_len;
+
+/* configuration */
+ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+if (ctx == NULL)
+        err(1, "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new");
+
+if (EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, EVP_aes_128_ccm(), NULL, NULL) != 1)
+        err(1, "EVP_DecryptInit(NULL)");
+
+if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L, size_len, NULL) <= 0)
+        err(1, "EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L(%d)", size_len);
+
+if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
+    tag_len, (void *)wanted_tag) <= 0)
+        err(1, "EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG(%d)", tag_len);
+
+/* process input data */
+if (EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, NULL, key, nonce) != 1)
+        err(1, "EVP_DecryptInit(key, nonce)");
+
+if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &irv, NULL, text_len) != 1)
+        err(1, "EVP_DecryptUpdate(len = %d)", text_len);
+if (irv != text_len)
+        errx(1, "text length: want %d, got %d", text_len, irv);
+
+irv = -1;
+if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &irv, aad, aad_len) != 1)
+        err(1, "EVP_DecryptUpdate(AAD)");
+memcpy(out_p, aad, aad_len);
+out_p += aad_len;
+
+irv = -1;
+if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out_p, &irv, ciphertext, text_len) != 1)
+        err(1, "EVP_DecryptUpdate(ciphertext)");
+if (irv != text_len)
+        errx(1, "text_len: want %d, got %d", text_len, irv);
+out_p += irv;
+
+/* Do not call EVP_DecryptFinal(3); it would fail and do nothing. */
+
+/* check output data */
+if (memcmp(out_buf + aad_len, plaintext, text_len) != 0)
+        errx(1, "plaintext mismatch");
+if (out_p != out_end)
+        errx(1, "end of output: want %p, got %p", out_end, out_p);
+
+printf("Total packet length = %d.", out_len);
+printf(" [Decrypted and Authenticated Input]");
+for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
+        if (i % 16 == 0)
+                printf("\n         ");
+        if (i % 4 == 0)
+                putchar(' ');
+        printf(" %02X", out_buf[i]);
+}
+putchar('\n');
+
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
+.Ed
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr AES_encrypt 3 ,
 .Xr evp 3 ,
diff --git a/src/lib/libcrypto/man/EVP_aes_128_gcm.3 b/src/lib/libcrypto/man/EVP_aes_128_gcm.3
index 1e15cb79aa..53c41ea162 100644
--- a/src/lib/libcrypto/man/EVP_aes_128_gcm.3
+++ b/src/lib/libcrypto/man/EVP_aes_128_gcm.3
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: EVP_aes_128_gcm.3,v 1.1 2024/12/17 18:11:44 schwarze Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: EVP_aes_128_gcm.3,v 1.2 2024/12/29 12:27:28 schwarze Exp $
 .\" full merge up to:
 .\" OpenSSL EVP_EncryptInit.pod 0874d7f2 Oct 11 13:13:47 2022 +0100
 .\" OpenSSL EVP_aes.pod a1ec85c1 Apr 21 10:49:12 2020 +0100
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
 .\" ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
 .\" OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 17 2024 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 29 2024 $
 .Dt EVP_AES_128_GCM 3
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -97,6 +97,11 @@ For GCM mode ciphers, the behaviour of the EVP interface is subtly
 altered and several additional
 .Xr EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl 3
 operations are required to function correctly.
+Some of the
+.Dv EVP_CTRL_GCM_*
+control commands are older aliases for corresponding
+.Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_*
+constants as indicated below.
 .Pp
 To avoid using the cumbersome and error-prone API documented
 in the present manual page, consider using the functions documented in
@@ -109,7 +114,7 @@ instead.
 .\" EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN and EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN (used internally
 .\" only in aes_gcm_tls_cipher(), which is unused)
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
-.It Dv EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN
+.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN
 Set the length of the initialization vector to
 .Fa arg
 bytes; the
@@ -124,7 +129,7 @@ Using this control command is discouraged because section 5.2.1.1 of the
 specification explicitly recommends that implementations of GCM restrict
 support to the default IV length of 12 bytes for interoperability,
 efficiency, and simplicity of design.
-.It Dv EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED
+.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IV_FIXED Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED
 Usually, \-1 is passed for
 .Fa arg .
 In that case, the complete initialization vector is copied from
@@ -158,7 +163,7 @@ that may have been configured earlier and always operates on the
 last eight bytes of the initialization vector.
 It is an error to issue this command
 when no key or no initialization vector is set.
-.It Dv EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG
+.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG
 Write
 .Fa arg
 bytes of the tag value to the location pointed to by
@@ -194,7 +199,7 @@ When default lengths are in use, pass 8 for
 In that case, this control command sets the invocation field.
 It is an error to issue this command
 when no key or no initialization vector is set, or when encrypting.
-.It Dv EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG
+.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG
 Set the expected tag to the
 .Fa arg
 bytes located at