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* Add FIPS 180-4 references for SHA-256 constants.HEADmasterjsing2026-04-251-1/+6
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* Simplify PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial()tb2026-04-241-9/+6
| | | | | | | | | The i variable is unused. Likewise for the first assignment to ri. Instead of an incomplete check that idx is in range, which still results in a NULL deref if idx < 0, check if ri is not NULL before accessing, as sk_value() checks the index correctly. ok jsing kenjiro
* mlkem: use <openssl/mlkem.h> instead of "mlkem.h"tb2026-04-201-2/+3
| | | | patch from portable
* ec_pmeth: fix 20yo comment: *outlen -> *keylentb2026-04-201-2/+2
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* Prior to this we substring matched and allowed a leading .beck2026-04-132-5/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | on a SAN DNSname constraint. This is not correct, as with a DNSname constraint, it may exacly match or match zero or more additional components on the front of the candidte to match. Spotted by Haruto Kimura <hkimura2026@gmail.com> ok tb@ kenjiro@
* Bump LibreSSL version for the releasetb2026-04-081-3/+3
| | | | ok deraadt
* Rename labellen to label_lentb2026-04-072-24/+24
| | | | Requested by jsing, ok beck
* Fix NULL deref for malformed OAEP parameters in CMS decryptiontb2026-04-072-11/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This converts rsa_cms_decrypt() to use X509_ALGOR_get0() and fixes a NULL deref when a parameter is (invalidly) omitted similar to the fix in ec/ec_ameth.c r1.66 from a couple years back. There is currently an XXX annotating a hairy leak due to trying to be smart and stealing the parameters from the oaep object. Instead, just make a copy of the label string and free it in the exit path. The diff adds an error for labellen == 0 since that is an invalid encoding of pSpecifiedEmpty (see RFC 8017) -- per the DER the default must be omitted. This way we avoid a malloc(0) implementation-defined behavior. This minor issue was assigned CVE-2026-28390 by OpenSSL and was reported by too many to list. The fix is my own. It is similar to OpenSSL's fix only because I rewiewed theirs and suggested an improvement or two. This is the last of the "security fixes" in today's OpenSSL release that "affect" LibreSSL. All the other bugs were already fixed a few years back or we didn't have the code/bugs in the first place. ok beck jsing
* Refactor and fix ocsp_find_signer_sk()tb2026-04-071-12/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of reaching deep inside the OCSP_BASICRESP and ignoring its semantics and then try to untangle things in ocsp_find_signer_sk(), pass the OCSP_BASICRESP and use OCSP_resp_get0_id() which has the logic built in. Avoids a crash if you call OCSP_basic_verify() after OCSP_BASICRESP_new() without OCSP_basic_sign(). This cannot happen on a deserialized OCSP object. Prompted by a report by Kamil Frankowicz, Jan Kaminski, Bartosz Michalowski. ok jsing
* Add a few to-do items to the crl_cb()tb2026-04-071-1/+6
| | | | | | | | Prompted by the "fix" fighting symptoms of misdesign in Delta CRL processing rather than addressing the root cause. Probably the best fix is to remove support for Indirect CRLs and Delta CRLs outright. ok jsing
* Stop Delta CRL processing if a CRL number is misssingtb2026-04-071-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A malformed Delta CRL could cause a crash. Funnily enough the deserializer recognizes this and marks such a CRL as invalid, but nothing ever checks the EXFLAG_INVALID for CRLs. For certificates this would usually result in verification failure due to x509v3_cache_extensions() failing. This is only reachable if the X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS is used, which only a handful of ports do, plus openssl(1) does if you use the undocumented -use_deltas flag. Reported by Igor Morgenstern to OpenSSL who then sat on this since Jan 8 and assigned CVE-2026-28388. ok jsing
* x509v3.h: remove pointless #ifdef HEADER_CONF_Htb2026-04-061-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | x509v3.h has included conf.h since June 20, 1999, OpenSSL commit ba404b5e, so HEADER_CONF_H has been defined since then. Also since then, CONF_VALUE (only available via conf.h) has been used outside of HEADER_CONF_H, making that #ifdef doubly pointless. ok bcook jsing kenjiro
* cms_local.h: remove #ifdef X509V3_HEADER_Htb2026-04-061-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | All thirteen files including cms_local.h do that after including cms.h, which already includes x509v3.h, so this is always defined. While here make the cms_local.h a bit more selfstanding by including asn1.h and x509v3.h ok bcook jsing (who had the same diff) kenjiro
* Restore the previous behaviour with maximum verification depth.jsing2026-04-011-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | The maximum depth is not expected to include the leaf certificate - restore the decrement prior to checking, which means the previous behaviour is retained for the callback depth and the maximum depth. Reduce the maximum depth by one in order to avoid the overwrite that could previously occur. Thanks to anton@ for flagging the rust-openssl failure in regress. ok tb@
* Fix an off-by-one error in the X.509 verifier depth checking.jsing2026-03-311-6/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In x509_verify_build_chains(), ensure that we check the current depth against max_depth prior to turning it into a legacy-style depth index. Additionally, add a guard to x509_verify_chain_append() so that we avoid exceeding the maximum certs per chain, even if we fail to handle this correctly elsewhere. Also prevent the legacy callback from being able to override the maximum verification depth. The current off-by-one allows for a 4 byte overwrite to occur on heap allocated memory - this will likely trigger a crash on OpenBSD (but may go unnoticed elsewhere). This is only reachable if a TLS client is talking to a malicious server or if a TLS server has client certificate verification enabled - in both cases the verification depth also needs to be set to the maximum allowed value of 32. It is worth noting that many TLS clients/servers set the maximum verification depth to a value that is much less than the default. A libtls client or server uses a default depth of 6 and is not impacted in this configuration. Thanks to Calif.io in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research, for reporting the issue. ok tb@
* ML-KEM: ensure that key_768 is only dereferenced with 768-bit keystb2026-03-291-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | This looks like a NULL dereference that should crash, but for some reason it doesn't, even with -O0 with all compilers i tried. At the very least it may result in compilers deducing that key_768 != NULL and lead to incorrect optimizations. ok claudio jsing kenjiro miod
* Include crypto_assembly.h instead of manually ensuring _CET_ENDBR exists.jsing2026-03-286-36/+12
| | | | ok kenjiro@ tb@
* Provide a crypto_assembly.h internal header.jsing2026-03-281-0/+30
| | | | | | | | | This will contain defines and macros that we need for assembly code, without polluting other headers that are primarily used for C code. For now, this just unconditionally provides _CET_ENDBR on amd64. ok kenjiro@ tb@
* sync with Mozilla root CA store, ok tb@sthen2026-03-181-174/+42
| | | | | | | | - remove CommScope CA (they requested it themselves; https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1994866) - add new cert: /C=HU/L=Budapest/O=Microsec Ltd./2.5.4.97=VATHU-23584497/CN=e-Szigno TLS Root CA 2023
* libcrypto: prefix EC_KEY methods with ec_key_tb2026-03-185-100/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We received reports that the too generic internal ecdsa_{sign,verify}() symbol names clash in some static links. The naming here is annoying because the EC_KEY_METHOD amalgamated the no longer existing ECDH and ECDSA methods which themselves had poorly chosen method names, still reflected in public API. There are various messes here. The ECDSA verify methods are declared in ec_local.h, whereas the ECDSA sign methods are in ecdsa_local.h (which is itself pretty useless and really only about EC_KEY_METHOD). I therefore merged the ECDSA method declarations into ec_local.h and deleted ecdsa_local.h since I see no real benefit to the latter. ecdsa.c needs ec_local.h anyway. Having the method declarations next to EC_KEY_METHOD seems sensible. I left the order as it was, matching ecdsa.c. The eckey_compute_pubkey() prototype should probably be moved down. With one exception I just added an ec_key_ prefix. This leads to a a repetition of 'key' in ec_key_ecdh_compute_key() which I chose to live with because it matches the public ECDH_compute_key() (mostly used by SSH implementations). The exception is ec_key_generate_key() where I expanded the gen() leading to another _key repetition but this then matches EC_KEY_generate_key(). Thanks to Rosen Penev for reporting and sending an initial diff. See also https://github.com/gsliepen/tinc/issues/478 ok jsing
* Move ECDSA_SIG_st definition to its only consumer, ecdsa.ctb2026-03-162-7/+7
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* Fix BIO_get_mem_data(3) return value documentationtb2026-03-101-3/+18
| | | | pointed out by/ok dlg
* use the "e" flag with fopen() for O_CLOEXEC; ok tbderaadt2026-03-101-3/+3
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* use O_CLOEXEC; ok tbderaadt2026-03-101-2/+2
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* mlkem: use timingsafe_memcmp() in decapsulationkenjiro2026-03-061-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Replace memcmp() with timingsafe_memcmp() when comparing the re-encrypted ciphertext. FIPS 203 Section 6.3 defines this comparison result as a secret piece of intermediate data that must not be revealed in any form. ok tb
* a_bitstr.c: fix includestb2026-02-081-3/+5
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* More ec_point_cmp() turd polishingtb2026-02-081-45/+46
| | | | | | | | jsing prefers doing all computations first and comparing at the end. This means we do more work when we fail and no longer (ab)use err as an out label. Also split out one more helper. ok jsing
* Make truncation in ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() explicittb2026-02-081-9/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of relying on i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING() to determine the "unused" bits on encoding, set them explicitly in abs->flags via a call to asn1_abs_set_unused_bits(). This means ASN1_STRING_FLAGS_BITS_LEFT is now set on a bit string, which was previously explicitly cleared. This also means that the encoding of a non-zero ASN1_BIT_STRING populated by setting the bits individually will now go through the if (a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT) path in i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(). The most prominent usage of this function is in X.509 for the keyUsage extension or the CRL reason codes. There's also the NS cert type, TS PKIFailureInfo and general BITLIST config strings. The reason for the truncation logic comes from the DER for NamedBitLists X.690, 11.2.2 below: X.680, 22.7: When a "NamedBitList" is used in defining a bitstring type ASN.1 encoding rules are free to add (or remove) arbitrarily any trailing 0 bits to (or from) values that are being encoded or decoded. Application designers should therefore ensure that different semantics are not associated with such values which differ only in the number of trailing 0 bits. X.690, 11.2.2 Where ITU-T Rec. X.680 | ISO/IEC 8824-1, 22.7, applies, the bitstring shall have all trailing 0 bits removed before it is encoded. Note 1 - In the case where a size constraint has been applied, the abstract value delivered by a decoder to the application will be one of those satisfying the size constraint and differing from the transmitted value only in the number of trailing zero bits. Note 2 - If a bitstring value has no 1 bits, then an encoder shall encode the value with a length of 1 and an initial octet set to 0. ok kenjiro (on an earlier version) jsing
* replace buggy strncmp with strcmp found with clang-tidybcook2026-02-071-2/+2
| | | | | | Found the same fix from davidben in BoringSSL as well (https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/c/boringssl/+/87927). OpenSSL appears to have accidentally changed the semantics here with the HAS_PREFIX macro, which appears to be incorrect. discussed w/ tb@ & beck@
* EVP_SealInit.3: fix RETURN VALUES sectiontb2026-01-301-2/+12
| | | | | | | | | While normal calls return 0 for error and npubk for success, there is a case where it returns the usual 1/0 thing. Make that explicit. Prompted by a report by Niels Dossche ok jsing kenjiro
* EVP_OpenInit.3: fix RETURN VALUES sectiontb2026-01-301-6/+4
| | | | | | | This has been incorrectly documented since forever. The function only ever returned 0/1. ok jsing kenjiro
* EVP_SealInit(): clear random key on exittb2026-01-301-2/+4
| | | | ok jsing kenjiro
* EVP_{Open,Seal}Init(): remove redundant EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() callstb2026-01-301-5/+1
| | | | | | The subsequent EVP_{Decrypt,Encrypt}Init_ex() calls already do that. pointed out by jsing
* EVP_SealInit(): minor cleanup.tb2026-01-301-11/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Explicitly compare pointers against NULL, turn the function into single exit, add hint at why npubk <= 0 or pubk == NULL are a success path: The documentation briefly explains that EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() is able to initialize the EVP_CIPHER_CTX in two steps exactly like the EVP_CipherInit_ex() API they wrap: the first call with non-NULL cipher (aka type) only sets the cipher on the ctx, then it returns to allow callers to customize the EVP_CIPHER_CTX, and a second call with cipher == NULL skips the initialization and finishes the ctx setup by setting key and iv. Prompted by a report by Niels Dossche. ok jsing kenjiro
* EVP_SealInit: do not return -1 on errortb2026-01-301-2/+2
| | | | | | | | It is documented that EVP_SealInit() returns 0 on error. So -1 is wrong. Reported by Niels Dossche ok jsing kenjiro
* EVP_OpenInit(): minor cleanuptb2026-01-301-9/+16
| | | | | | | | | Explicitly compare pointers against NULL, turn the function into single exit and explain why priv == NULL is a success (hint: muppet API). Prompted by a report by Niels Dossche. ok jsing kenjiro
* Avoid type confusion in the timestamp response parsingtb2026-01-271-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | A malformed v2 signing cert can lead to a type confusion, and the result is a read from an invalid memory address or NULL, so a crash. Unlike for OpenSSL, v1 signing certs aren't affected since miod fixed this in '14. Reported by Luigino Camastra, fix by Bob Beck, via OpenSSL, CVE 2025-69420. ok jsing
* Avoid type confusion in PKCS#12 parsingtb2026-01-271-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | A type confusion can lead to a 1-byte read at address 0x00-0xff, so a crash. Reported by Luigino Camastra, fix by Bob Beck, via OpenSSL, CVE 2025-22795 ok jsing
* Add NULL pointer check to PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i()tb2026-01-271-1/+6
| | | | | | | | Avoids a NULL pointer dereference triggerable by a malformed PCKS#12 file. From Luigino Camastra via OpenSSL (CVE-2025-69421) ok jsing
* Make SHA aarch64 assembly build with gcc.jsing2026-01-253-55/+72
| | | | | | | | | | | | | gcc is extremely fussy about register naming and insists on q and s naming for the ARM CE SHA instructions, even though they're referring to the same register (while LLVM just figures it out). Work around this by mapping registers to their required variant at usage and defining a handful of mappings between v registers and alternate names/views. This is still somewhat ugly, but seems to be one of the cleaner options that will allow portable to enable SHA assembly on platforms that use gcc. ok kenjiro@ tb@
* Tidy instruction separators in SHA assembly.jsing2026-01-247-113/+113
| | | | | Remove unnecessary separators and add a few to macros that call other macros (instead of expecting them to exist).
* DH_check: teach this DoS vector about RFC 7919 primestb2026-01-231-1/+6
| | | | ok beck
* bn_const: add RFC 7919 primestb2026-01-232-2/+300
| | | | | | | | There is no intention to expose these via public API or to use them in TLS. For now these will only be used for short-circuiting pointless expensive computations in DH_check(). ok beck
* Scapy special for DH_check()tb2026-01-231-2/+60
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The latest release of Scapy calls DH_check() on all the well-known Diffie-Hellman parameters for RFCs 2409, 3526, and 7919. It does this via pyca/cryptography at startup. Every single time. This is obviously very expensive, due to our 64 MR rounds (which are complete overkill now that we have BPSW). Instead of pondering the ideal number of rounds for BPSW with FFDH, simply skip the check if the parameter matches a well-known prime. These are known to be safe primes, so we can skip those super-expensive and pointless checks without any risk. This is only done for the public dh->p parameter. It could be further optimized, but with the follow-up commit adding the RFC 7919 primes this reduces the startup time to what it was before Scapy 2.7.0: < 1s. Reverting from 64 MR rounds to BN_check_primes rounds, we would still have ~8s startup time without this optimization, which isn't great for an interactive tool. Clearly, it's not entirely our fault, it's also Scapy and cryptography that do something ... suboptimal, but I think we're better off if DH_check() isn't a complete DoS vector. If you're using non-standard parameters with FFDH, you deserve it. We could consider adding a flag for non-well-known p and thus making DH_check() indicate failure for candidate primes larger than, say, 4k. https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/issues/14048 ok beck kenjiro
* Rewrite ec_point_cmp()tb2026-01-181-59/+97
| | | | | | | | This removes some complications due to handling the fast path for affine points and general points at the same time. The result is a bit more code but both paths should be much easier to follow. ok jsing kenjiro
* mlkem: fix mklem_{generate_key,encap}_external_entropy() declarationstb2026-01-181-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | The prototypes used sized arrays appropriate only for MLKEM768 while the declarations used pointers. For some reason clang doesn't flag this but gcc does. In any case it was wrong. The callers of these functions check that they pass in the correct size. Which is weird but the mlkem directory has an unbelievable amount of mess and bad code. found by/ok jsing
* mlkem: garbage collect the unusd mlkem_{generate_key,encap}()tb2026-01-182-58/+2
| | | | | | | These are flagged by more recent gcc since declarations and definitions don't match (sized array vs pointer). Also an array was checked for NULL. found by/ok jsing
* Provide LIBRESSL_USE_.*_ASSEMBLY defines.jsing2026-01-1717-31/+104
| | | | | | | | | Make life easier for portable by providing LIBRESSL_USE_.*_ASSEMBLY defines, which enable/disable assembly for a specific algorithm. This means that selected platforms can include the assembly files and specify a define, rather than having to try to patch the crypto_arch.h headers. Discussed with tb@
* Replace MD5_ASM with function specific defines.jsing2026-01-175-9/+11
| | | | | Use the same pattern that is now used for most other code - provide HAVE_MD5_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER and use this to selectively enable source code.
* Replace GHASH_ASM with function specific defines.jsing2026-01-1711-22/+41
| | | | | Use the same pattern that is now used for most other code - provide HAVE_* defines for functions and use these to selectively enable source code.
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