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* Merge documentation for SSL_CIPHER_find(3) from OpenSSL 1.1.1.tb2021-05-121-2/+29
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* Install SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher.3tb2021-05-121-1/+2
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* Document SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(3)tb2021-05-121-0/+94
| | | | | | | Based on the OpenSSL 1.1.1 manual written by Rich Salz with a healthy dose of improvements by schwarze. ok schwarze
* Document SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(3)tb2021-05-111-4/+15
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* bump libssl major after struct visibility changes and symbol additiontb2021-05-101-2/+2
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* Make SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CTX, SSL_SESSION, {DTLS1,SSL3}_STATEtb2021-05-103-8/+7
| | | | | | and a few other structs in libssl opaque. from/ok jsing
* Provide SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(3)tb2021-05-103-2/+10
| | | | ok jsing
* Provide SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(3)tb2021-05-103-2/+11
| | | | ok jsing
* Provide SSL_CIPHER_find(3)tb2021-05-103-2/+10
| | | | ok jsing
* Replace DTLS w_epoch with epoch from TLSv1.2 record layer.jsing2021-05-055-29/+20
| | | | ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Rewrite TLSv1.2 key block handling.jsing2021-05-055-134/+247
| | | | | | | | | | | | | For TLSv1.2 a single key block is generated, then partitioned into individual secrets for use as IVs and keys. The previous implementation splits this across two functions tls1_setup_key_block() and tls1_change_cipher_state(), which means that the IV and key sizes have to be known in multiple places. This implementation generates and partitions the key block in a single step, meaning that the secrets are then simply handed out when requested. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Prevent future internal use of some #definestb2021-05-021-1/+3
| | | | | | | | After jsing's recent commits, SSL3_CC_{READ,WRITE,CLIENT,SERVER} and the derived SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_{CLIENT,SERVER}_{READ,WRITE} are no longer used by LibreSSL and should never be used again. discussed with jsing
* Clean up tls1_change_cipher_state().jsing2021-05-025-42/+29
| | | | | | | | Replace flag gymnastics at call sites with separate read and write, functions which call the common code. Condition on s->server instead of using SSL_ST_ACCEPT, for consistency and more readable code. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* In the TLSv1.2 server, set up the key block after sending the CCS.jsing2021-05-021-7/+7
| | | | | | | This avoids calling into the key block setup code multiple times and makes the server code consistent with the client. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up dtls1_reset_seq_numbers().jsing2021-05-025-26/+22
| | | | | | | | | | Rather than doing flag gymnastics, split dtls1_reset_seq_numbers() into separate read and write functions. Move the calls of these functions into tls1_change_cipher_state() so they directly follow the change of cipher state in the record layer, which avoids having to duplicate the calls in the client and server. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Ensure that handshake hash is non-NULL in tls1_transcript_hash_value().jsing2021-05-021-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | There are several paths where a subtle bug could result in tls1_transcript_hash_value() being called with a NULL handshake hash - add an explicit check for this case. As noted by tb@, due to the wonders of the libcrypto EVP APIs, combined with integer promotion, we already have a NULL check - this one is just more obvious. ok tb@
* Harden tls12_finished_verify_data() by checking master key length.jsing2021-05-021-1/+4
| | | | | | | Require master key length to be greater than zero if we're asked to derive verify data for a finished or peer finished message. ok tb@
* Stop deriving peer finished twice for TLSv1.2.jsing2021-05-021-12/+1
| | | | | | | | We already derive the peer finished in ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(), which DTLS relies on. In the case of TLS we've been doing it twice - once in ssl3_get_message() and once in ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(). ok tb@
* Clean up and harden TLSv1.2 master key derivation.jsing2021-04-305-54/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | The master key and its length are only stored in one location, so it makes no sense to handle these outside of the derivation function (the current 'out' argument is unused). This simplifies the various call sites. If derivation fails for some reason, fail hard rather than continuing on and hoping that something deals with this correctly later. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Clean up derivation of finished/peer finished.jsing2021-04-258-116/+147
| | | | | | | | Make this process more readable by having specific client/server functions, calling the correct one based on s->server. This allows to remove various SSL_ST_ACCEPT/SSL_ST_CONNECT checks, along with duplicate code. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* whitespacetb2021-04-231-3/+3
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* Only hash known CH extensionstb2021-04-221-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | RFC 4.1.2 specifies the ways in which the extensions in the first and the second ClientHello may differ. It basically says that extensions not known to a server must not change. This in turn makes it impossible to introduce new extensions that do change. It makes little sense to enforce that extensions we don't know and care about aren't modified, so make the hashing more lenient and restrict it to the extensions we do care about. Arguably, enforcing no change in an unknown extension is incompatible with the requirement that it be ignored. ok bcook jsing
* Clean up TLSv1.2 certificate request handshake data.jsing2021-04-215-43/+27
| | | | | | | | | | Currently cert_req is used by clients and cert_request is used by servers. Replace this by a single cert_request used by either client or server. Remove the certificate types as they are currently unused. This also fixes a bug whereby if the number of certificate types exceeds SSL3_CT_NUMBER the number of bytes read in is insufficient, which will break decoding. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Remove new_sym_enc and new_aead.jsing2021-04-193-10/+19
| | | | | | | These can be replaced with accessors that allow this information to be retrieved from the new record layer. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Move new_mac_secret_size into the TLSv1.2 handshake struct.jsing2021-04-192-5/+7
| | | | | | Drop the 'new_' prefix in the process. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Move reuse_message, message_type, message_size and cert_verify into thejsing2021-04-196-59/+62
| | | | | | TLSv1.2 handshake struct. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Set alpn_selected_len to zero when freeing alpn_selected.jsing2021-04-191-1/+2
| | | | | | | This is not strictly necessary since we proceed to zero the entire struct, however it keeps the code consistent and easily auditable. ok tb@
* mention DTLS1_2_VERSIONtb2021-04-151-3/+4
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* Mention DTLS1_2_VERSION here, tootb2021-04-151-6/+8
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* Document SSL_OP_NO_DTLSv1{,_2}tb2021-04-151-2/+15
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* Document DTLSv1_2_{,client_,server_}method(3)tb2021-04-151-4/+36
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* Merge documentation for SSL_is_dtls() from OpenSSLtb2021-04-151-5/+21
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* Update a stale comment and fix a typo.tb2021-04-111-3/+3
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* Avoid clobbering the error code when sending an alerttb2021-04-071-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | In order to fail gracefully on encountering a self-signed cert, curl looks at the top-most error on the stack and needs specific SSL_R_ error codes. This mechanism was broken when the tls13_alert_sent_cb() was added after people complained about unhelpful unknown errors. Fix this by only setting the error code from a fatal alert if no error has been set previously. Issue reported by Christopher Reid ok jsing
* Update for DTLSv1.2 support.tb2021-03-311-2/+4
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* Bump minors after symbol additiontb2021-03-311-1/+1
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* Expose various DTLSv1.2 specific functions and definestb2021-03-314-27/+7
| | | | ok bcook inoguchi jsing
* Document SSL_set_hostflags(3) and SSL_get0_peername(3)tb2021-03-311-18/+4
| | | | ok bcook inoguchi jsing
* Expose SSL_set_hostflags(3) and SSL_get0_peername(3)tb2021-03-312-3/+3
| | | | ok bcook inoguchi jsing
* Document SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(3)tb2021-03-311-11/+3
| | | | ok bcook inoguchi jsing
* Expose SSL_use_certificate_chain_file(3)tb2021-03-312-3/+2
| | | | ok bcook inoguchi jsing
* whitespace nitstb2021-03-291-4/+4
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* Remove pointless assignment in SSL_get0_alpn_selected().jsing2021-03-291-4/+1
| | | | ok tb@
* Avoid transcript initialisation when sending a TLS HelloRequest.jsing2021-03-291-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | When server side renegotiation is triggered, the TLSv1.2 state machine sends a HelloRequest before going to ST_SW_FLUSH and ST_OK. In this case we do not need the transcript and currently hit the sanity check in ST_OK that ensures the transcript has been freed, breaking server initiated renegotiation. We do however need the transcript in the DTLS case. ok tb@
* Move finished and peer finished to the handshake struct.jsing2021-03-297-44/+44
| | | | | | | | | This moves the finish_md and peer_finish_md from the 'tmp' struct to the handshake struct, renaming to finished and peer_finished in the process. This also allows the remaining S3I(s) references to be removed from the TLSv1.3 client and server. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Move the TLSv1.2 record number increment into the new record layer.jsing2021-03-293-19/+44
| | | | | | | This adds checks (based on the TLSv1.3 implementation) to ensure that the TLS/DTLS sequence numbers do not wrap, as required by the respective RFCs. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Garbage collect s->internal->typetb2021-03-276-18/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This variable is used in the legacy stack to decide whether we are a server or a client. That's what s->server is for... The new TLSv1.3 stack failed to set s->internal->type, which resulted in hilarious mishandling of previous_{client,server}_finished. Indeed, both client and server would first store the client's verify_data in previous_server_finished and later overwrite it with the server's verify_data. Consequently, renegotiation has been completely broken for more than a year. In fact, server side renegotiation was broken during the 6.5 release cycle. Clearly, no-one uses this. This commit fixes client side renegotiation and restores the previous behavior of SSL_get_client_CA_list(). Server side renegotiation will be fixed in a later commit. ok jsing
* Rename new_cipher to cipher.jsing2021-03-2411-64/+64
| | | | | | | | This is in the SSL_HANDSHAKE struct and is what we're currently negotiating, so there is really nothing more "new" about the cipher than there is the key block or other parts of the handshake data. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Add SSL_HANDSHAKE_TLS12 for TLSv1.2 specific handshake data.jsing2021-03-245-40/+48
| | | | | | Move TLSv1.2 specific components over from SSL_HANDSHAKE. ok inoguchi@ tb@
* Fully initialize rrec in tls12_record_layer_open_record_protectedtb2021-03-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | The CBC code path initializes rrec.padding_length in an indirect fashion and later makes use of it for copying the MAC. This is confusing some static analyzers as well as people investigating the whining. Avoid this confusion and add a bit of robustness by clearing the stack variable up front. ok jsing
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