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* bump major for libssl and libtls to match libcryptotb2025-07-161-2/+2
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* The mdoc(7) .Ft macro does not need quoting of its arguments, but aboutschwarze2025-06-131-3/+3
| | | | | | | 10% of our manual pages using this macro employed useless quoting anyway. Remove these quotes such that they do not incite fear, uncertainty, and doubt in developers who happen to look at these pages. jmc@ and tb@ agree with the direction.
* SSL_shutdown(): remove pointless NULL check.tb2025-06-091-2/+2
| | | | | reported by smatch via jsg ok beck
* .Lb libssl libcrypto ; OK tb@schwarze2025-06-08121-244/+365
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* delete an "intentionally undocumented" comment regarding stuffschwarze2025-06-081-8/+3
| | | | | that no longer exists, and add .Lb libssl libcrypto; OK tb@
* add the missing .In line and add .Lb libssl libcrypto ; OK tb@schwarze2025-06-082-4/+8
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* Trim trailing whitespacetb2025-06-071-8/+8
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* Spelling, discussed with jsingtb2025-06-071-1/+1
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* tls13_ctx_new(): fix calloc() incantationtb2025-06-071-2/+2
| | | | | | Switch argument order and use sizeof(*ctx) rather than sizeof(struct ...). ok jsg
* Fix weird calloc() argument ordertb2025-06-071-5/+5
| | | | ok jsg
* correct indentation, no functional changejsg2025-06-022-7/+6
| | | | found with smatch, ok tb@
* zap weird empty added to tls1_ec_nid2group_id() in previoustb2025-05-311-2/+1
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* Simplify SSL_alert_desc_stringtb2025-05-221-67/+2
| | | | | | | | | | SSL_alert_desc_string() is only used by our good old friends M2Crypto and Net::SSLeay. While some of the two-letter combinations can be made sense of without looking at the switch, I guess, this is just a completely useless interface. The same level of uselessness can be acchieved in a single line matching BoringSSL. ok joshua kenjiro
* Don't use the array index as the group_idbeck2025-05-201-51/+97
| | | | | | | | | | | | This is a precursor to adding new group ids for post quantum stuff which are up in the 4000 range, so using the array index as the group id will be silly. Instead we just add the group id to the structure and we walk the list to find it. This should never be a very large list for us, so no need to do anything cuter than linear search for now. ok jsing@, joshua@
* ssl_local.h: stop guarding SYSerror() with an #ifdeftb2025-05-101-3/+1
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* ssl_local: provide an SSL-internal version of SYSerror()tb2025-05-101-1/+4
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* SSL_error_internal: remove a superfluous pair of parenstb2025-05-101-3/+2
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* ssl_local.h: adjust some whitespacetb2025-05-101-3/+3
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* const correct SSL_error_internal()tb2025-05-102-4/+4
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* sigh. pqueue_find() also needs a const treatmenttb2025-05-042-4/+4
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* pqueue.h: zap trailing whitespacetb2025-05-041-3/+3
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* const correct first argument of pitem_new()tb2025-05-042-4/+4
| | | | Makes upcoming changes in regress less ugly.
* tlsext: stop sending SNI before ALPN in clientstb2025-04-301-24/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | All supported releases of LibreSSL ensure that the corresponding callbacks are called in a predefined order rather than honoring the order in which a client sends its extensions. Therefore the ALPN callback for apache-httpd's virtual host setups can rely on SNI information being available and we no longer need to work around this on hte client side. Cuts the amount of code needed for tlsext randomization in half. ok jsing
* SSL_set_tlsext_host_name: as a setter it cannot take a const ssltb2025-04-181-3/+3
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* Remove two unused defines, update standard referencetb2025-04-181-7/+3
| | | | ok jsing
* Fix annoying whitespacetb2025-04-184-52/+52
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* typo: primtive -> primitivetb2025-03-281-2/+2
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* minor libssl bump (SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION/SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION)sthen2025-03-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | code #ifdef'ing these and compiled with new headers won't work as expected on earlier libraries minor libtls bump to match libssl bump ok tb@
* Make srtp.h self-standing by including ssl.htb2025-03-131-1/+3
| | | | ok miod
* Provide SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION and SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION.jsing2025-03-124-6/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In January 2017 we added SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION, which results in a SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION fatal alert if a ClientHello message is seen on an active connection (client initiated renegotation). Then in May 2017 OpenSSL added SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION, which results in a SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION warning alert if a server receives a ClientHello on an active connection (client initiated renegotation), or a client receives a HelloRequest (server requested renegotation). This option also causes calls to SSL_renegotiate() and SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to fail. Then in 2021, OpenSSL also added SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION, which trumps SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION but only for incoming ClientHello messages (apparently unsetting SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION is too hard). Provide SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION and SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION, primarily to make life easier for ports. If SSL_OP_NO_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION is set it will take precedence and render SSL_OP_ALLOW_CLIENT_RENEGOTIATION ineffective. The rest of the behaviour should match OpenSSL, with the exception of ClientHellos triggering fatal alerts instead of warnings. ok tb@
* Give libssl the same bump as libcryptotb2025-03-091-1/+1
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* const correct tls_session_secret_cb_fn()tb2025-03-094-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | Various ports throw a warning since their tls_session_secret_cb's signature doesn't match what we expect. Aligns us with OpenSSL 1.1. This is only useful for RFC 4851 EAP-FAST implementations and surprisingly it's undocumented. ok jsing
* Support OPENSSL_NO_FILENAMEStb2025-03-093-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | Some people are concerned that leaking a user name is a privacy issue. Allow disabling the __FILE__ and __LINE__ argument in the error stack to avoid this. This can be improved a bit in tree. From Viktor Szakats in https://github.com/libressl/portable/issues/761 ok bcook jsing
* SSL_select_next_proto: fix invalid octal escape by switching to hexadecimaltb2025-02-041-3/+3
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* Simplify tls1_check_ec_key()tb2025-01-181-7/+7
| | | | | | | It doesn't need to have optional arguments anymore, so we can pass in values and don't need NULL checks and dereferencing. ok jsing
* Rename grp to group like almost everywhere elsetb2025-01-181-4/+4
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* Remove parentheses in return statementstb2025-01-181-14/+14
| | | | ok cc + sha256
* Remove two pointless NULL checkstb2025-01-181-8/+1
| | | | | The only caller ensures that the EC_KEY is not NULL and passes the address of comp_id on its stack, so neither will be NULL.
* Drop field determination dancetb2025-01-181-9/+2
| | | | | | | | | If we get here, we're in a server and have managed to load the cert. The public key is therefore a point on a built-in curve, and we know the group is defined over some prime field. Now it is just a matter of figuring out whether we support the group in libssl. ok jsing
* Stop pretending we support arbirary explicit groupstb2025-01-181-3/+2
| | | | ok jsing
* Remove SSL_DES and SSL_IDEA remnantstb2025-01-182-6/+2
| | | | ok jsing
* SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list: stop mentioning ancient cipherstb2025-01-181-11/+1
| | | | | | Support was removed nearly a decade ago. No need to mention this anymore. ok jsing
* Remove last uses of SSL_aDSStb2025-01-182-14/+2
| | | | ok jsing
* ssl_seclevel: remove comment pertaining to DSA certstb2025-01-181-6/+1
| | | | ok jsing
* Stop mentioning DSA/DSStb2025-01-186-23/+16
| | | | | | | | Support for this went away in 2017, but a few things still mentioned DSA in various contexts. Replace DSA with ECDSA where appropriate and otherwise delete this. It won't work. ok jsing
* ssl_local.h: does not need to include dsa.htb2025-01-171-2/+1
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* received form the peer -> received from the peerjmc2024-12-191-3/+3
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* Zap a trailing spacetb2024-12-051-2/+2
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* remove duplicate defines; ok tb@jsg2024-10-232-10/+2
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* libssl: rework cert signature security leveltb2024-10-171-24/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This switches to using the X509_get_signature_info() API instead of hand rolling a part of it. This is slightly tangly since the security level API is strange. In particular, some failures are passed to the security level callback so that applications can override them. This makes the security level API handle RSA-PSS and EdDSA certificates correctly and the handshake with such can progress a bit further. Of note, we check that the certs are actually suitable for use in TLS per RFC 8446 contrary to what OpenSSL does. ok beck jsing
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