| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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This is all unhelpful historical cruft.
Discussed with tb@
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We no longer support TLSv1.0 and definitely do not support SSLv3 - remove
the empty fragments workaround for the CBC vulnerability in these
protocols.
ok kenjiro@ tb@
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TLS versions prior to TLSv1.2 were disabled a while ago, however this
was done in the version handling code. Remove TLSv1.1 and earlier from
ssl_get_method() and add an explicit min version check in the legacy
client and server, to provide a stronger guarantee.
ok kenjiro@ tb@
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This has not been reachable since we made the TLSv1.3 stack the default
entry point - tls13_record_layer_read_record() will send a protocol
version alert and raise an error, which means we never transition into
the legacy stack.
ok kenjiro@
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This is a left over from when we accepted SSLv2 ClientHello messages.
ok kenjiro@
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Announce the signature schemes for RSASSA-PSS with pubkey OID RSASSA-PSS
between RSASSA-PSS with pubkey OID rsaEncryption and RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
This is the last step in the everlasting saga for making these signature
schemes and certificates with RSASSA-PSS OID work. Fortunately, these are
rarely used since they are extremely complex and inefficient also due to
the large size of the parameters. This addresses bug reports by Steffen
Ullrich and Tom Lane.
Tested by bluhm.
ok djm jsing kenjiro
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This fixes a long-standing logic error that hasn't been noticed because
we never announced the rsa_pss_pss_sha{256,384,512} SignatureScheme. The
EVP_PKEY_id() of a RSA-PSS pubkey is EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, not EVP_PKEY_RSA.
Thanks to beck for helping me figure out how to fix this correctly. It
drove me nuts for a very long time. Problem also noticed by Tom Lane
due to some PostgreSQL regress failures.
ok djm jsing kenjiro
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RANK768 and RANK1024 are awfully short and generic names for public
constants. Before we make it worse with similarly named constants for
ML-DSA, let's fix this. This follows the naming convention used by the
other macros in the mlkem code.
ok kenjiro jsing
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This does the following:
1) Adds a second key share prediction to the TLS 1.3 handshake.
We only add one as we are unlikely to want to send more than
one PQ one, and one classical one and are unlikely to waste
bytes on a second PQ algorithm (anything that wants something
else that we support can HRR to get it)
2) Adds X25519MLKEM768 (4588) to our list of supported groups.
We add this to our preferred client and server key shares for TLS 1.3
and we now have a separate list for TLS 1.2 which does not do this,
cleaning up the old "full list" from the comments.
3) Updates the golden magic numbers in the regression tests to allow
for the above two things changing the handshake, so the regress
tests pass.
With this you can successfully hybrid PQ with servers and clients
that support it.
ok tb@ kenjiro@
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This implements the currently in use MLKEM768_X25519 hybrid
key share as outlined in
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-ecdhe-mlkem/
This commit does not yet wire this up to anything, that is done
in follow on changes.
ok tb@ jsing@ kenjiro@
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There's no need to pass in the hrr parameter as it is redundant with
the tls13.hrr flag. This avoids boolean blindness in the caller and
removes a leftover from before we had tls13.hrr.
ok jsing kenjiro
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ok kenjiro
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As reported by ajacoutot and sthen, an update to net/neon is blocked on
that missing symbol.
ok kenjiro
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This allows a const correct SSL_SESSION_dup() implementation at the cost
of casting away const due to the const incorrect CRYPTO_dup_ex_data()...
(I should look into fixing that, but things like rust-openssl make that
hard at this point in the release cycle.)
ok kenjiro (as part of a larger diff)
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When processing the client supported groups and key shares extensions,
the group selection is currently based on client preference. However,
when building a HRR the preferred group is identified by calling
tls1_get_supported_group(). If SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE is enabled,
group selection will be based on server instead of client preference. This
in turn can result in the server sending a HRR for a group that the client
has already provided a key share for, violating the RFC.
Avoid this issue by storing the client preferred group when processing
the key share extension, then using this group when creating the HRR.
Thanks to dzwdz for identifying and reporting the issue.
ok beck@ tb@
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Removes another patch in portable
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Adapt the tests to use this API.
This does not yet make the symbols public in Symbols.list
which will happen shortly with a bump.
This includes some partial rototilling of the non-public
interfaces which will be shortly continued when the internal
code is deduplicated to not have multiple copies for ML-KEM
768 and ML-KEM 1024 (which is just an artifact of unravelling
the boring C++ code).
ok jsing@, tb@
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10% of our manual pages using this macro employed useless quoting anyway.
Remove these quotes such that they do not incite fear, uncertainty,
and doubt in developers who happen to look at these pages.
jmc@ and tb@ agree with the direction.
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reported by smatch via jsg
ok beck
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that no longer exists, and add .Lb libssl libcrypto;
OK tb@
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Switch argument order and use sizeof(*ctx) rather than sizeof(struct ...).
ok jsg
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ok jsg
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found with smatch, ok tb@
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SSL_alert_desc_string() is only used by our good old friends M2Crypto
and Net::SSLeay. While some of the two-letter combinations can be made
sense of without looking at the switch, I guess, this is just a
completely useless interface. The same level of uselessness can be
acchieved in a single line matching BoringSSL.
ok joshua kenjiro
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This is a precursor to adding new group ids for post quantum
stuff which are up in the 4000 range, so using the array index
as the group id will be silly. Instead we just add the group
id to the structure and we walk the list to find it.
This should never be a very large list for us, so no need
to do anything cuter than linear search for now.
ok jsing@, joshua@
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Makes upcoming changes in regress less ugly.
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All supported releases of LibreSSL ensure that the corresponding callbacks
are called in a predefined order rather than honoring the order in which a
client sends its extensions. Therefore the ALPN callback for apache-httpd's
virtual host setups can rely on SNI information being available and we no
longer need to work around this on hte client side. Cuts the amount of code
needed for tlsext randomization in half.
ok jsing
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ok jsing
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code #ifdef'ing these and compiled with new headers won't work as expected on
earlier libraries
minor libtls bump to match libssl bump
ok tb@
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