path: root/src/lib/libcrypto/man/EVP_aes_128_ccm.3

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.Dd $Mdocdate: December 29 2024 $
.Dt EVP_AES_128_CCM 3
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm EVP_aes_128_ccm ,
.Nm EVP_aes_192_ccm ,
.Nm EVP_aes_256_ccm
.Nd EVP AES cipher in Counter with CBC-MAC mode
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.In openssl/evp.h
.Ft const EVP_CIPHER *
.Fn EVP_aes_128_ccm void
.Ft const EVP_CIPHER *
.Fn EVP_aes_192_ccm void
.Ft const EVP_CIPHER *
.Fn EVP_aes_256_ccm void
.\" The following #define'd constants are intentionally undocumented:
.\" Completely unused by anything:
.\" EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_MSGLEN, EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN, EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN
.\" Very rarely used and unused in LibreSSL:
.\" EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN, EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Fn EVP_aes_128_ccm ,
.Fn EVP_aes_192_ccm ,
and
.Fn EVP_aes_256_ccm
provide the Advanced Encryption Standard algorithm for 128, 192 and 256-bit
keys in Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM) mode in the
.Xr evp 3
framework.
This mode supports Authenticated Encryption with Additional Data (AEAD)
and can be used in a number of communication protocols.
Longer keys make precomputation attacks harder at a cost in performance.
.Pp
For CCM mode ciphers, the behaviour of the EVP interface is subtly
altered and several additional
.Xr EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl 3
operations are required to function correctly.
Some of the
.Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_*
control commands are older aliases for corresponding
.Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_*
constants as indicated below.
.Pp
The less cumbersome and less error-prone
.Xr EVP_AEAD_CTX_new 3
API does not provide CCM modes.
Some communication protocols support alternatives to CCM, which may
sometimes allow choosing the better API by avoiding CCM.
.Ss Configuration controls
The following two control commands can be issued as soon as
.Xr EVP_EncryptInit 3
has been called with a CCM
.Fa type
and
.Dv NULL
pointers for
.Fa key
and
.Fa iv .
Both commands are optional and override each other.
If issued when a nonce is already set, they silently cause data corruption.
The
.Fa ptr
argument is ignored by both; passing
.Dv NULL
is recommended.
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L
Set the size
.Ms L
of the length field to
.Fa arg
bytes and the size of the nonce to
.No 15 \- Fa arg
bytes.
By default, 8 bytes are used for the length field and 7 for the nonce.
Selecting a smaller size
.Ms L
for the length field reduces des maximum size of messages that can be sent,
but in return allows transmitting more messages with the same key.
It is an error to pass less than 2 or more than the default value of 8 for
.Fa arg .
.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_IVLEN
Set the size of the nonce to
.Fa arg
bytes and the size
.Ms L
of the length field to
.No 15 \- Fa arg
bytes.
By default, 7 bytes are used for the nonce and 8 for the length field.
Selecting a larger size of the nonce allows transmitting more messages with
the same key at the expense of reducing the maximum size for each message.
It is an error to pass more than 13 or less than the default value of 7 for
.Fa arg .
.El
.Pp
After optionally issuing one of the above control commands,
.Xr EVP_EncryptInit 3
can be called a second time, this time passing
.Dv NULL
for the
.Fa type
argument, with the other two arguments pointing to the desired AES key
and to the desired nonce.
.Ss Encryption controls
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
If the
.Fa ptr
argument is
.Dv NULL ,
set the tag length
.Ms M
to
.Fa arg
bytes.
The default value is 12.
Selecting a larger value makes tampering harder for an attacker,
at a small expense of making the messages slightly longer.
Selecting a smaller value is not recommended.
It is an error to pass an odd number for
.Fa arg ,
or a number that is less than 4 or greater than 16, or to pass
.Dv NULL
to
.Fa ptr
when
.Fa ctx
is not configured for encrypting.
Issuing this control command when an encryption key is already configured
silently causes data corruption.
.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG
Store the
.Fa arg
bytes of the tag in the memory provided by the caller starting at
.Fa ptr .
It is an error to issue this control command when
.Fa ctx
is not configured for encrypting, when no data was encrypted yet, with an
.Fa arg
that does not match the configured tag length
.Ms M ,
or when the tag has already been retrieved earlier.
.El
.Pp
Before passing any plaintext data to
.Xr EVP_EncryptUpdate 3 ,
call
.Xr EVP_EncryptUpdate 3
with both
.Fa in
and
.Fa out
set to
.Dv NULL ,
passing the total plaintext length in bytes as
.Fa in_len .
This constructs the first block to be digested with CBC-MAC
and copies the text length to
.Pf * Fa out_len .
It does not check whether
.Fa in_len
exceeds the limit of
.Pf 256\(ha Ms L ;
the most significant bytes of excessive values are silently discarded.
.Pp
It is an error if the
.Fa in_len
argument of the
.Xr EVP_EncryptUpdate 3
call passing the plaintext data does not match the total length
specified earlier.
Splitting the text into more than one chunks to be passed in multiple calls of
.Xr EVP_EncryptUpdate 3
is not supported for CCM.
.Pp
To specify any additional authenticated data (AAD), call
.Xr EVP_EncryptUpdate 3
with the
.Fa out
argument set to
.Dv NULL .
.Ss Decryption controls
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Dv EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG Pq == Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
If the
.Fa ptr
argument is not
.Dv NULL ,
copy
.Fa arg
bytes starting at
.Fa ptr
to the expected CCM tag value.
It is an error to pass an odd number for
.Fa arg ,
or a number that is less than 4 or greater than 16.
Passing a number that does not correspond to the tag length
.Ms M
that was used for encryption does not raise an error right away,
but results in undefined behaviour
and typically causes subsequent authentication failure.
It is also an error to pass a
.Pf non- Dv NULL
.Fa ptr
when
.Fa ctx
is configured for encryption.
.El
.Pp
Before passing any ciphertext data to
.Xr EVP_DecryptUpdate 3 ,
call
.Xr EVP_DecryptUpdate 3
with both
.Fa in
and
.Fa out
set to
.Dv NULL ,
passing the total ciphertext length in bytes as
.Fa in_len .
This constructs the first block to be digested with CBC-MAC
and copies the text length to
.Pf * Fa out_len .
It does not check whether
.Fa in_len
exceeds the limit of
.Pf 256\(ha Ms L ;
the most significant bytes of excessive values are silently discarded.
.Pp
It is an error if the
.Fa in_len
argument of the
.Xr EVP_DecryptUpdate 3
call passing the ciphertext data does not match the total length
specified earlier.
Splitting the text into more than one chunks to be passed in multiple calls of
.Xr EVP_DecryptUpdate 3
is not supported for CCM.
.Pp
To specify any additional authenticated data (AAD), call
.Xr EVP_DecryptUpdate 3
with the
.Fa out
argument set to
.Dv NULL .
.Pp
If the return value of
.Xr EVP_DecryptUpdate 3
does not indicate success, the authentication operation may have failed.
In that case, regard any output data as corrupted.
.Pp
Do not call
.Xr EVP_DecryptFinal 3
when using CCM.
Such a call would not do anything useful, and it would fail
because the tag that was set with
.Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
was already consumed by
.Xr EVP_DecryptUpdate 3 .
.Sh RETURN VALUES
These functions return a static constant
.Vt EVP_CIPHER
structure that provides the implementation of the respective AEAD cipher mode.
.Sh EXAMPLES
The following code encrypts and digests some secret text
and some additional, public data with AES-CCM.
Specifically, it implements the Test Vector #1
given in section 8 of RFC 3610.
.Bd -literal -offset indent
/* input data */
const unsigned char key[] = {
    0xC0, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xC3,  0xC4, 0xC5, 0xC6, 0xC7,
    0xC8, 0xC9, 0xCA, 0xCB,  0xCC, 0xCD, 0xCE, 0xCF
};
const unsigned char nonce[] = {
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03,  0x02, 0x01, 0x00, 0xA0,
    0xA1, 0xA2, 0xA3, 0xA4,  0xA5
};
const int nonce_len = sizeof(nonce);
const int size_len = 15 - nonce_len;

const unsigned char aad[] = {
    0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03,  0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07
};
const int aad_len = sizeof(aad);

const unsigned char plaintext[] = {
    0x08, 0x09, 0x0A, 0x0B,  0x0C, 0x0D, 0x0E, 0x0F,
    0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13,  0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17,
    0x18, 0x19, 0x1A, 0x1B,  0x1C, 0x1D, 0x1E
};
const int text_len = sizeof(plaintext);

/* expected output data */
const unsigned char ciphertext[] = {
    0x58, 0x8C, 0x97, 0x9A,  0x61, 0xC6, 0x63, 0xD2,
    0xF0, 0x66, 0xD0, 0xC2,  0xC0, 0xF9, 0x89, 0x80,
    0x6D, 0x5F, 0x6B, 0x61,  0xDA, 0xC3, 0x84
};

const unsigned char wanted_tag[] = {
    0x17, 0xE8, 0xD1, 0x2C,  0xFD, 0xF9, 0x26, 0xE0
};
const int tag_len = sizeof(wanted_tag);

const int out_len = aad_len + text_len + tag_len;
unsigned char out_buf[out_len];
unsigned char *out_p = out_buf;
unsigned char *out_end = out_buf + out_len;

/* auxiliary variables */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int irv, i;

/* configuration */
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
	err(1, "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new");

if (EVP_EncryptInit(ctx, EVP_aes_128_ccm(), NULL, NULL) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_EncryptInit(NULL)");

if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L,
    size_len, NULL) <= 0)
	err(1, "EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L(%d)", size_len);

if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
    tag_len, NULL) <= 0)
	err(1, "EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG(%d)", tag_len);

/* process input data */
if (EVP_EncryptInit(ctx, NULL, key, nonce) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_EncryptInit(key, nonce)");

if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &irv, NULL, text_len) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_EncryptUpdate(len = %d)", text_len);
if (irv != text_len)
	errx(1, "text length: want %d, got %d", text_len, irv);

irv = -1;
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &irv, aad, aad_len) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_EncryptUpdate(AAD)");
memcpy(out_p, aad, aad_len);
out_p += aad_len;

irv = -1;
if (EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out_p, &irv, plaintext, text_len) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_EncryptUpdate(plaintext)");
if (irv != text_len)
	errx(1, "text_len: want %d, got %d", text_len, irv);
out_p += irv;

/*
 * EVP_EncryptFinal(3) doesn't really do anything for CCM.
 * Call it anyway to stay closer to normal EVP_Encrypt*(3) idioms,
 * to match what the OpenSSL Wiki suggests since 2013, and to ease
 * later migration of the code to a different AEAD algorithm.
 */
irv = -1;
if (EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, out_p, &irv) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_EncryptFinal");
if (irv != 0)
	errx(1, "final_len: want 0, got %d", irv);

/* check output data */
if (memcmp(out_buf + aad_len, ciphertext, text_len) != 0)
	errx(1, "ciphertext mismatch");

if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG,
    tag_len, out_p) <= 0)
	err(1, "EVP_CTRL_CCM_GET_TAG");
if (memcmp(out_p, wanted_tag, tag_len) != 0)
	errx(1, "tag mismatch");
out_p += tag_len;
if (out_p != out_end)
	errx(1, "end of output: want %p, got %p", out_end, out_p);

printf("Total packet length = %d.", out_len);
printf(" [Authenticated and Encrypted Output]");
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
	if (i % 16 == 0)
		printf("\en         ");
	if (i % 4 == 0)
		putchar(' ');
	printf(" %02X", out_buf[i]);
}
putchar('\en');

EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
.Ed
.Pp
The reverse operation for the same test vector,
i.e. decrypting and comparing the digest,
is implemented by the following code.
.Pp
The variable declarations and definitions up to the call of
.Xr EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new 3
are the same as above.
The chief differences are:
.Bl -dash -width 1n -compact
.It
The tag is not part of the output,
so the total output length is shorter.
.It
No
.Xr memcmp 3
of the tag takes place.
Instead, the control command
.Dv EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG
requires the tag that is going to be verified as an additional argument.
.It
While
.Xr EVP_EncryptFinal 3
is an optional no-op,
.Xr EVP_DecryptFinal 3
is not called and would fail.
.El
.Bd -literal -offset indent
const int out_len = aad_len + text_len;

/* configuration */
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
	err(1, "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new");

if (EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, EVP_aes_128_ccm(), NULL, NULL) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_DecryptInit(NULL)");

if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L, size_len, NULL) <= 0)
	err(1, "EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L(%d)", size_len);

if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG,
    tag_len, (void *)wanted_tag) <= 0)
	err(1, "EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_TAG(%d)", tag_len);

/* process input data */
if (EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, NULL, key, nonce) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_DecryptInit(key, nonce)");

if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &irv, NULL, text_len) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_DecryptUpdate(len = %d)", text_len);
if (irv != text_len)
	errx(1, "text length: want %d, got %d", text_len, irv);

irv = -1;
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &irv, aad, aad_len) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_DecryptUpdate(AAD)");
memcpy(out_p, aad, aad_len);
out_p += aad_len;

irv = -1;
if (EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out_p, &irv, ciphertext, text_len) != 1)
	err(1, "EVP_DecryptUpdate(ciphertext)");
if (irv != text_len)
	errx(1, "text_len: want %d, got %d", text_len, irv);
out_p += irv;

/* Do not call EVP_DecryptFinal(3); it would fail and do nothing. */

/* check output data */
if (memcmp(out_buf + aad_len, plaintext, text_len) != 0)
	errx(1, "plaintext mismatch");
if (out_p != out_end)
	errx(1, "end of output: want %p, got %p", out_end, out_p);

printf("Total packet length = %d.", out_len);
printf(" [Decrypted and Authenticated Input]");
for (i = 0; i < out_len; i++) {
	if (i % 16 == 0)
		printf("\n         ");
	if (i % 4 == 0)
		putchar(' ');
	printf(" %02X", out_buf[i]);
}
putchar('\n');

EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr AES_encrypt 3 ,
.Xr evp 3 ,
.Xr EVP_aes_128_cbc 3 ,
.Xr EVP_aes_128_gcm 3 ,
.Xr EVP_EncryptInit 3
.Sh STANDARDS
.Rs
.%A Doug Whiting
.%A Russ Housley
.%A Niels Ferguson
.%T Counter with CBC-MAC (CCM)
.%R RFC 3610
.%D September 2003
.Re
.Sh HISTORY
.Fn EVP_aes_128_ccm ,
.Fn EVP_aes_192_ccm ,
and
.Fn EVP_aes_256_ccm
first appeared in OpenSSL 1.0.1 and have been available since
.Ox 5.3 .