| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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ok jsing@
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This has long been unused code and compilation with -DZLIB was broken
for a long time after BIO was made opaque.
ok jsing
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Libcrypto currently has a mess of *_lcl.h, *_locl.h, and *_local.h names
used for internal headers. Move all these headers we inherited from
OpenSSL to *_local.h, reserving the name *_internal.h for our own code.
Similarly, move dtls_locl.h and ssl_locl.h to dtls_local and ssl_local.h.
constant_time_locl.h is moved to constant_time.h since it's special.
Adjust all .c files in libcrypto, libssl and regress.
The diff is mechanical with the exception of tls13_quic.c, where
#include <ssl_locl.h> was fixed manually.
discussed with jsing,
no objection bcook
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(Note that the CMS code is currently disabled.)
Port of Edlinger's Fix for CVE-2019-1563 from OpenSSL 1.1.1 (old license)
tests from bluhm@
ok jsing
commit e21f8cf78a125cd3c8c0d1a1a6c8bb0b901f893f
Author: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Date: Sun Sep 1 00:16:28 2019 +0200
Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)
(cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)
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Files are identical once whitespace and newlines are removed.
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Whitespace only and no change according to diff -w.
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These were removed in OpenSSL b1322259d93cf6b6286f9febcd468b6a9f577d91.
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Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is a standard for cryptographically
protecting messages, as defined in RFC 5652. It is derived from PKCS #7
version 1.5 and utilises various ASN.1 structures, making it complex and
fairly heavyweight. Various protocols - including RPKI (RFC 6480) - have
been built on top of it, which means it is necessary to support CMS, in
order to support RPKI.
This imports around 6,000 lines of code from OpenSSL 1.1.1, which is still
under the original OpenSSL license. Further work will occur in tree.
Requested by and discussed with many.
ok deraadt@ tb@
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ok beck@, guenther@, tedu@
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unknown hash function OID.
Diff based on OpenSSL.
Fixes CVE-2015-1792 (however, this code is not enabled/built in LibreSSL).
ok doug@ miod@
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instead of returning a random key; OpenSSL PR #3348 via OpenSSL trunk
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Remove the openssl public includes from cryptlib.h and add a small number
of includes into the source files that actually need them. While here,
also sort/group/tidy the includes.
ok beck@ miod@
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ok miod@
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This avoids a lot of ugly gymnastics to do snprintfs before sending the
bag of strings to ERR, and eliminates at least one place in dso_dlfctn.c
where it was being called with the incorrect number of arguments and
using random things off the stack as addresses of strings.
ok krw@, jsing@
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