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path: root/src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_verify.c (follow)
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* Cache CRLs in issuer cachetb2025-02-081-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The issuer cache holds a pair of SHA-512 of parent and child cert plus the result of the signature verification. Since CRLs also have a cached hash of their DER, we can easily add them to the same cache. This way we also avoid the cost of repeated signature verification for CRLs. For ordinary workloads the cache is larger than necessary and it won't currently take up more space than ~8M anyway, so the cost of doing this is negligible. For applications like rpki-client where the same (CA, CRL) pair is used to verify multiple EE certs, the gain is significant. In fact, the current worst case is a single pair being used for > 50k EE certs, responsible for about 20-25% of the total runtime of an ordinary rpki-client run if a hw-accelerated version of SHA-2 is available and even more if it isn't. In both cases the cost of processing of this pair is reduced by more than an order of magnitude. The implementation is a translation of x509_verify_parent_signature() to the case of CRLs and is entirely trivial thanks to the cache's design. Found while investigating a performance bottleneck found by job tested by job ok beck
* x509_verify_parent_signature(): no need to bump pkey's refcounttb2025-02-081-4/+2
| | | | | | | The parent certificate outlives the signature check, so we don't have to take a refcount of its pubkey and then release it again. ok beck
* x509_verify: missing verify error on cached signature mismatchtb2025-02-081-2/+5
| | | | | | | | If a signature mismatch is cached, the same error should be passed to the verify callback as if the mismatch was detected by doing the calculation, rather than falling back to the "unable to find the issuer cert locally". ok beck
* Fix non-xsc path in x509_verify_potential_parent()tb2024-06-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The combination of two bugs made this unexpectedly work as intended. To appreciate this, let's first note that a) check_issued(..., child, parent) checks if child was issued by parent. b) X509_check_issued(child, parent) checks if parent was issued by child. Now like in the real world, b) will only be true in unusual circumstances (child is known not to be self-issued at this point). X509_check_issued() fails by returning something different from X509_V_OK, so return X509_check_issued(child, parent) != X509_V_OK; will return true if child was issued by parent since then parent was indeed not issued by child. On the other hand, if child was not issued by parent, the verifier will notice elsewhere, e.g., in a signature check. Fix this by reversing the order of child and parent in the above return line and check for equality instead. This is nearly impossible to detect in regress. ok beck
* Remove notBefore and notAfter cacheing.beck2024-04-081-35/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This cache was added because our time conversion used timegm() and gmtime() which aren't very cheap. These calls were noticably expensive when profiling things like rpki-client which do many X.509 validations. Now that we convert times using julien seconds from the unix epoch, BoringSSL style, instead of a julien days from a Byzantine date, we no longer use timegm() and gmtime(). Since the julien seconds calculaitons are cheap for conversion, we don't need to bother caching this, it doesn't have a noticable performance impact. While we are at this correct a bug where x509_verify_asn1_time_to_time_t was not NULL safe. Tested for performance regressions by tb@ and job@ ok tb@ job@
* Fix the verifier to use the trust storebeck2024-02-011-1/+13
| | | | the trust store is yet another obscure way to add a trust anchor
* Eliminate the timegm(3) dependency in libcryptotb2023-11-131-11/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | timegm(3) is not available on some operating systems we support in portable. We currently use musl's implementation, for which gcc-13 decided to emit warnings (which seem incorrect in general and are irrelevant in this case anyway). Instead of patching this up and diverge from upstream, we can avoid reports about compiler warnings by simply not depending on this function. Rework the caching of notBefore and notAfter by replacing timegm(3) with asn1_time_tm_to_time_t(3). Also make this API properly error checkable since at the time x509v3_cache_extensions(3) is called, nothing is known about the cert, in particular not whether it isn't malformed one way or the other. suggested by and ok beck
* Remove a misplaced empty linetb2023-05-071-2/+1
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* Enable policy checking by default now that we are DAG implementation based.beck2023-04-281-3/+2
| | | | | | | This ensures that we will no longer silently ignore a certificate with a critical policy extention by default. ok tb@
* Remove some dead code from the new verifiertb2023-04-161-7/+1
| | | | | | | | | The new verifier API is currently unused as we still operate the verifier in legacy mode. Therefore ctx->xsc is always set and the EXFLAG_PROXY will soon be dropped from the library, so this error on encountering proxy certs is effectively doubly dead code. ok jsing
* Refactor x509v3_cache_extensionsjob2023-01-201-10/+2
| | | | | | | Simplify x509v3_cache_extensions() by using a wrapper to avoid duplication of code for locking and checking the EXFLAG_INVALID flag. OK tb@
* Don't do policy checking unless we were asked to do so.beck2023-01-171-2/+3
| | | | ok tb@
* Store errors that result from leaf certificate verification.jsing2022-10-171-8/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the case that a verification callback is installed that tells the verifier to continue when a certificate is invalid (e.g. expired), any error resulting from the leaf certificate verification is not stored and made available post verification, resulting in an incorrect error being returned. Also perform leaf certificate verification prior to adding the chain, which avoids a potential memory leak (as noted by tb@). Issue reported by Ilya Shipitsin, who encountered haproxy regress failures. ok tb@
* Remove overly aggressive trust check in legacy verifier that breaksbeck2022-08-051-15/+4
| | | | | | | | p5-IO-Socket-SSL regress and regress/sbin/iked/live Still passes the mutt regress that this was intended to fix. ok tb@
* Take away bogus error assignment before callback call.beck2022-06-281-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Keep the depth which was needed. This went an error too far, and broke openssl-ruby's callback and error code sensitivity in it's tests. With this removed, both my newly committed regress to verify the same error codes and depths in the callback, and openssl-ruby's tests pass again. ok tb@
* Fix the legacy verifier callback behaviour for untrusted certs.beck2022-06-281-17/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The verifier callback is used by mutt to do a form of certificate pinning where the callback gets fired and depending on a cert saved to a file will decide to accept an untrusted cert. This corrects two problems that affected this. The callback was not getting the correct depth and chain for the error where mutt would save the certificate in the first place, and then the callback was not getting fired to allow it to override the failing certificate validation. thanks to Avon Robertson <avon.r@xtra.co.nz> for the report and sthen@ for analysis. "The callback is not an API, it's a gordian knot - tb@" ok jsing@
* Allow security_level to mestastasize into the verifiertb2022-06-271-1/+4
| | | | | | | | The tentacles are everywhere. This checks that all certs in a chain have keys and signature algorithms matching the requirements of the security_level configured in the verify parameters. ok beck jsing
* Move leaf certificate checks to the last thing after chain validation.beck2022-06-251-19/+32
| | | | | | | | While seemingly illogical and not what is done in Go's validator, this mimics OpenSSL's behavior so that callback overrides for the expiry of a certificate will not "sticky" override a failure to build a chain. ok jsing@
* KNF for a brace and zap trailing blank linetb2022-04-121-3/+3
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* In some situations, the verifier would discard the error on an unvalidatedbeck2021-11-241-46/+83
| | | | | | certificte chain. This would happen when the verification callback was in use, instructing the verifier to continue unconditionally. This could lead to incorrect decisions being made in software.
* Put curly brace on the correct line.jsing2021-11-141-2/+3
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* In X509_STORE_CTX rename the misnamed last_untrusted to num_untrustedtb2021-11-071-3/+3
| | | | ok jsing
* Cache sha512 hash and parsed not_before and not_after with X509 cert.beck2021-11-041-94/+78
| | | | | | | | | | | Replace sha1 hash use with sha512 for certificate comparisons internal to the library. use the cached sha512 for the validator's verification cache. Reduces our recomputation of hashes, and heavy use of time1 time conversion functions noticed bu claudio@ in rpki client. ok jsing@ tb@
* Add RFC 3779 checks to both legacy and new verifierjob2021-10-261-1/+9
| | | | OK beck@
* When calling the legacy callback, ensure we catch the case where itbeck2021-09-091-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | has decided to change a succeess to a failure and change the error code. Fixes a regression in the openssl-ruby tests which expect to test this functionality. ok tb@
* Call the callback on success in new verifier in a compatible waybeck2021-09-031-10/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | when we succeed with a chain, and ensure we do not call the callback twice when the caller doesn't expect it. A refactor of the end of the legacy verify code in x509_vfy is probably overdue, but this should be done based on a piece that works. the important bit here is this allows the perl regression tests in tree to pass. Changes the previously committed regress tests to test the success case callbacks to be known to pass. ok bluhm@ tb@
* Revert previous change that changed our default return for unable tobeck2021-08-301-11/+5
| | | | | | | | find leaf cert issuers. This breaks perl and ruby regress, as noticed by tb that "we tried this before". Jan's regress that cares about 21 vs 20 needs to change ok tb@
* Fix Jan's regress in openssl/x509 to do what it says it does,beck2021-08-301-5/+11
| | | | | | | | then fix the only thing it still has complaints about which is that we don't return the leaf version of the error code when we can't verify the leaf (as opposed to the rest of the chain) ok jan@ tb@
* Don't call the verify callback twice on success.beck2021-08-291-2/+1
| | | | | | | This fixes a problem in the perl regress where it notices the callback is called twice and complains. ok tb@ bluhm@
* Get rid of historical code to extract the roots in the legacy case.beck2021-08-281-26/+29
| | | | | | | | Due to the need to support by_dir, we use the get_issuer stuff when running in x509_vfy compatibility mode amyway - so just use it any time we are doing that. Removes a bunch of yukky stuff and a "Don't Look Ethel" ok tb@ jsing@
* Remove the "dump_chain" flag and code. This was a workaround for a problem wherebeck2021-08-281-14/+3
| | | | | | | roots were not checked correctly before intermediates that has since been fixed and is no longer necessary. It is regress checked by case 2c in regress/lib/libcrypto/x509/verify.c ok jsing@ tb@
* Pull roots out of the trust store in the legacy xsc when building chainsbeck2021-08-191-6/+14
| | | | | | | to handly by_dir and fun things correctly. - fixes dlg@'s case and by_dir regress in openssl-ruby ok jsing@
* Add a check_trust call to the legacy chain validation on chain add, rememberingbeck2021-08-181-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | the result in order to return the same errors as OpenSSL users expect to override the generic "Untrusted cert" error. This fixes the openssl-ruby timestamp test. ok tb@
* Refactor the legacy chain validation from the chain adding code into itsbeck2021-08-181-52/+70
| | | | | | own function, in preparation for subesquent change. No functional change. ok tb@
* Use the x509_verify_cert_cache_extensions fuction instead of manuallybeck2021-07-121-9/+4
| | | | | | | calling the OpenSSL legacy cache extensions goo. Requested by tb@ ok tb@
* Add a bunch of workarond in the verifier to support partial chains andbeck2021-07-101-15/+131
| | | | | | | | | the saving of the first error case so that the "autochain" craziness from openssl will work with the new verifier. This should allow the new verification code to work with a bunch of the autochain using cases in some software. (and should allow us to stop using the legacy verifier with autochain) ok tb@
* Revert "Handle X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE in newtb2021-04-281-4/+1
| | | | | | | | verifier." (r1.27). While this may have "fixed" one corner case, it broke expectations of Perl Net::SSLeay and Ruby OpenSSL regression tests. ok bcook
* Use EXFLAG_INVALID to handle out of memory and parse errors intobhe2021-03-131-1/+5
| | | | | | x509v3_cache_extensions(). ok tb@
* Fix checks of memory caps of constraints namestb2021-03-121-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | x509_internal.h defines caps on the number of name constraints and other names (such as subjectAltNames) that we want to allocate per cert chain. These limits are checked too late. In a particularly silly cert that jan found on ugos.ugm.ac.id 443, we ended up allocating six times 2048 x509_constraint_name structures before deciding that these are more than 512. Fix this by adding a names_max member to x509_constraints_names which is set on allocation against which each addition of a name is checked. cluebat/ok jsing ok inoguchi on earlier version
* Set is_trusted in x509_verify_ctx_add_chain()tb2021-02-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | | If we're about to add a chain we have a trust path, so we have at least one trusted certificate. This fixes a thinko from r1.31 and fixes the openssl(1) cms verify test. ok jsing (who had the same diff)
* Rename depth to num_untrusted so it identifies what it actually represents.jsing2021-02-251-6/+6
| | | | ok tb@
* Avoid passing last and depth to x509_verify_cert_error() on ENOMEM.jsing2021-02-251-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | In x509_verify_ctx_set_xsc_chain(), an ENOMEM case is currently passing the last certificate and depth (which is no longer actually depth) to x509_verify_cert_error(). Given we've hit an ENOMEM situation, neither of these are useful so remove both. ok tb@
* Make the new validator check for EXFLAG_CRITICALtb2021-02-241-8/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As should be obvious from the name and the comment in x509_vfy.h int last_untrusted; /* index of last untrusted cert */ last_untrusted actually counts the number of untrusted certs at the bottom of the chain. Unfortunately, an earlier fix introducing x509_verify_set_xsc_chain() assumed that last_untrusted actually meant the index of the last untrusted cert in the chain, resulting in an off-by-one, which in turn led to x509_vfy_check_chain_extension() skipping the check for the EXFLAG_CRITICAL flag. A second bug in x509_verify_set_xsc_chain() assumed that it is always called with a trusted root, which is not necessarily the case anymore. Address this with a temporary fix which will have to be revisited once we will allow chains with more than one trusted cert. Reported with a test case by tobhe. ok jsing tobhe
* Set chain on xsc on chain build failure.jsing2021-01-091-1/+3
| | | | | | | | Prior to calling the callback, ensure that the current (invalid and likely incomplete) chain is set on the xsc. Some things (like auto chain) depend on this functionality. ok beck@
* Bail out early after finding an single chain if we are have been called frombeck2021-01-091-1/+9
| | | | | | | | x509_vfy and have an xsc. There's no point in finding more chains since that API can not return them, and all we do is trigger buggy callbacks in calling software. ok jsing@
* search the intermediates only after searching the root certs, clarifybeck2021-01-081-11/+15
| | | | | | | this in the comments. helps avoid annoying situations with the legacy callback ok jsing@
* Handle X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE in new verifier.jsing2021-01-051-1/+4
| | | | | | Yet another mostly meaningless error value... Noted by and ok tb@
* Gracefully handle root certificates being both trusted and untrusted.jsing2021-01-051-3/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When a certificate (namely a root) is specified as both a trusted and untrusted certificate, the new verifier will find multiple chains - the first being back to the trusted root certificate and a second via the root that is untrusted, followed by the trusted root certificate. This situation can be triggered by a server that (unnecessarily) includes the root certificate in its certificate list. While this validates correctly (using the first chain), it means that we encounter a failure while building the second chain due to the root certificate already being in the chain. When this occurs we call the verify callback indicating a bad certificate. Some sensitive software (including bacula and icinga), treat this single bad chain callback as terminal, even though we successfully verify the certificate. Avoid this problem by simply dumping the chain if we encounter a situation where the certificate is already in the chain and also a trusted root - we'll have already picked up the trusted root as a shorter path. Issue with icinga2 initially reported by Theodore Wynnychenko. Fix tested by sthen@ for both bacula and icinga2. ok tb@
* Remove two reduntat memset calls.tb2020-12-161-3/+1
| | | | pointed out by jsing
* Plug leak in x509_verify_chain_dup()tb2020-11-181-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | x509_verify_chain_new() allocates a few members of a certificate chain: an empty stack of certificates, a list of errors encountered while validating the chain, and a list of name constraints. The function to copy a chain would allocate a new chain using x509_verify_chain_new() and then clobber its members by copies of the old chain. Fix this by replacing x509_verify_chain_new() with calloc(). Found by review while investigating the report by Hanno Zysik who found the same leak using valgrind. This is a cleaner version of my initial fix from jsing. ok jsing
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