| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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We refuse to generate RSA keys larger than 16k and DH keys larger than 10k.
Primality checking with adversarial input is a DoS vector, so simply don't
do this. Introduce a cap of 32k for numbers we try to test for primality,
which should be more than large enough for use withing a non-toolkit crypto
library. This is one way of mitigating the DH_check()/EVP_PKEY_param_check()
issue.
ok jsing miod
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ok tb@
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The behavior of the BPSW primality test for numbers > 2^64 is not very
well understood. While there is no known composite that passes the test,
there are heuristics that indicate that there are likely infinitely many.
Therefore it seems appropriate to harden the test. Having a settable
number of MR rounds before doing a version of BPSW is also the approach
taken by Go's primality check in math/big.
This adds a new implementation of the old MR test that runs before running
the strong Lucas test. I like to imagine that it's slightly cleaner code.
We're effectively at about twice the cost of what we had a year ago. In
addition, it adds some non-determinism in case there actually are false
positives for the BPSW test.
The implementation is straightforward. It could easily be tweaked to use
the additional gcds in the "enhanced" MR test of FIPS 186-5, but as long
as we are only going to throw away the additional info, that's not worth
much.
This is a first step towards incorporating some of the considerations in
"A performant misuse-resistant API for Primality Testing" by Massimo and
Paterson. Further work will happen in tree. In particular, there are plans
to crank the number of Miller-Rabin tests considerably so as to have a
guaranteed baseline. The manual will be updated shortly.
positive feedback beck
ok jsing
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They should go away, but they have not yet disappeared and this
consolidates the source files.
Discussed with tb@
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Libcrypto currently has a mess of *_lcl.h, *_locl.h, and *_local.h names
used for internal headers. Move all these headers we inherited from
OpenSSL to *_local.h, reserving the name *_internal.h for our own code.
Similarly, move dtls_locl.h and ssl_locl.h to dtls_local and ssl_local.h.
constant_time_locl.h is moved to constant_time.h since it's special.
Adjust all .c files in libcrypto, libssl and regress.
The diff is mechanical with the exception of tls13_quic.c, where
#include <ssl_locl.h> was fixed manually.
discussed with jsing,
no objection bcook
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Compiling with BN_DEBUG (and if you want to take it further, BN_DEBUG_RAND)
supposedly adds consistency checks to the BN code. These are rarely if ever
used and introduce a bunch of clutter in the code. Furthermore, there are
hacks in place to undo things that the debugging code does.
Remove all of this mess and instead rely on always enabled checks, more
readable code and proper regress coverage to ensure correct behaviour.
"Good riddance." tb@
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This way we deduplicate two inclusions of the same big table and eliminate
lots of stupid casts.
input and ok many
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Instead of using the BN_is_prime_fasttime_ex() API, use a direct call to
bn_is_prime_bpsw(). This increases readability and simplifies error
handling. Also put a division by two to the natural place now that we no
longer need to do Miller-Rabin rounds.
ok beck jsing
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Garbage collect a few pointless variables and remove a loop that wasn't
really a loop. Simplify BN_CTX handling and drop some stupid comments.
ok jsing miod
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ok jsing
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Since there is nothing randomized in bn_is_prime_bpsw(), the concept
of rounds makes no sense. Apply a minimal change for now that avoids
expensive loops that won't change the outcome in case we found a
probable prime.
ok jsing
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ok jsing
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ok jsing
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If gcd(a, primes[i]) == 0 then a could still be a prime, namely in the
case that a == primes[i], so check for that case as well.
Problem noted by Martin Grenouilloux
ok jsing
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as was done earlier in libssl. Thanks inoguchi@ for noticing
libssl had more reacharounds into this.
ok jsing@ inoguchi@
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ok jsing@
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matter for constant time, and make the public interface only used
external to the library.
This moves us to a model where the important things are constant time
versions unless you ask for them not to be, rather than the opposite.
I'll continue with this method by method.
Add regress tests for same.
ok jsing@
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BN_mod_word() can return incorrect results if the supplied modulus is
too big, so we need to fall back to BN_div_word.
Now that BN_mod_word may fail, handle errors properly update the man page.
Thanks to Brian Smith for pointing out these fixes from BoringSSL:
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/67cb49d045f04973ddba0f92fe8a8ad483c7da89
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/44bedc348d9491e63c7ed1438db100a4b8a830be
ok beck@
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becoming negative in probable_prime_dh_safe(). Reported by Franck Denis who
noticed `openssl gendh 0' would segfault.
Fix adapted from OpenSSL RT#2701.
ok beck@ jsing@
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There are currently cases where the return from each call is checked,
the return from only the last call is checked and cases where it is not
checked at all (including code in bn, ec and engine).
Checking the last return value is valid as once the function fails it will
continue to return NULL. However, in order to be consistent check each
call with the same idiom. This makes it easy to verify.
Note there are still a handful of cases that do not follow the idiom -
these will be handled separately.
ok beck@ doug@
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Improves readability, keeps the code smaller so that it is warmer in your
cache.
review & ok deraadt@
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Remove the openssl public includes from cryptlib.h and add a small number
of includes into the source files that actually need them. While here,
also sort/group/tidy the includes.
ok beck@ miod@
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from OpenSSL CVS; ok otto@ deraadt@
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*warning* this bumps shared lib minors for libssl and libcrypto from 2.1 to 2.2
if you are using the ssl26 packages for ssh and other things to work you will
need to get new ones (see ~beck/libsslsnap/<arch>) on cvs or ~beck/src-patent.tar.gz on cvs
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functionality for shared libs.
Note that routines such as sslv2_init and friends that use RSA will
not work due to lack of RSA in this library.
Needs documentation and help from ports for easy upgrade to full
functionality where legally possible.
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